Text Selections from:

Learning to Be—Variously
On Education, Individuality, and Schooling the Self In Pluralistic Egalitarian Culture
* An Archetypal Analysis of Educating Individuality *

Introduction
Educating Individuality

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Introduction

Educating Individuality:
Examining Educational Efforts
In Relation to Individualistic, Socially Egalitarian Cultural Values

Framing a Pervasive and Complex yet Broadly Accessible Reflection Upon Education of Selfhood

The task undertaken in this writing is not to 'fix' education or 'reform' schooling with yet another 'new' theory of 'how it ought to work.' Rather, the purpose is to provide a radically diverse reflection upon which values, concepts, and social structures actually bear upon the topic of how education and the practices of schooling are made manifest. This reflective analysis is configured specifically in relation to egalitarian cultural values for individuality, personal liberty, and social pluralism under the rule of law. Thus it asks questions about not only 'how to educate' but 'what gets educated' and why. Such an effort to elaborate the multiple factors of pluralistic yet institutionalized society that bear upon how, what, and how well persons learn requires questioning generally accepted assumptions about both individuality and education—as well as elucidating some unacknowledged ones.

That examination requires serious reconsideration of what is meant in the usage of terms deployed in discussions of individuality, personal identity, social pluralism, education and schooling. It also compels reference to concepts and research from across the spectrum of academic and intellectual disciplines. In rather summary form, that survey is focused not upon 'what is wrong with education' but, firstly, how education and schooling are expressions of socio-cultural factors and, secondly, how pluralistic egalitarian values do, do not, and might shape those expressions. These two elements are developed around an investigation of what or who the self is that requires educating, and how that self can develop its individuality within a social collective. Thus derives this work's title, "Becoming our selves—among others," and its guiding term, "schooling the self in egalitarian culture."

In order to render this reconsideration and its contemporary references broadly accessible the language of this writing is composed primarily within a non-specialized vocabulary. In the interests of maintaining a complexity of discourse appropriate to the concepts and subject under consideration, that vocabulary is deployed with meticulous concern for specificity. As a consequence many descriptions are presented in phrases that

attempt the specificity of specialized terminology from particular intellectual disciplines but are meant to be accessible from a general understanding of normative word meanings and usages.

The style of this work seeks to emphasize the complexity of its reflections by using various phrasings to describe similar characteristics and dynamics of phenomenon related to individuality, pluralism, educational efforts, and schooling practices. A particular context or characteristic thus often is represented by slightly different phrasings and words to enhance both its complexity and also express a wariness about asserting definitive, singular descriptions. In addition, many words and phrases are presented within singular quotation marks or "scare quotes." The intention of this presentation is to emphasize the figurative or connotative references of words used in particular contexts as well as their more literal, denotative meanings. The intended effect is to convey a sense of things being 'more than one way' and of word descriptions as functioning in an 'as if' or metaphorical manner. Since it is the intention of this study to explicate a greater complexity to the context of education and schooling, a further stylistic effect is deployed to emphasize a difference between reductively oppositional dynamics of association and less reductive, more complexly relational ones. That contrast is represented by linking words or terms with either a converging pair of arrows, thusly > <, for the more oppositional or antagonistic association, and by a diverging pair, thusly < >, to indicate a more inclusive or complimentary association. This graphic representation of more opposed, antagonistic contrast and more interactive, related association is meant to enhance the discussion of reductive and non-reductive understanding developed in this text. A final stylistic note involves the usage of hyphens to emphasize the composite meanings of certain compound words, such as 're-configure.'

The topics considered here are arranged with the intention of illustrating how much 'goes unnoticed' in most discussions of educating in egalitarian society. Thus the initially focus is upon reconsidering how education and schooling are more habitually defined. Secondly issues of social and psychological contexts for selfhood and identity are explored to better establish who and what is the 'subject' of education and schooling. Then there follows a roughly historical sketch of ways in which learning has been contexted and the purposes for which educating and schooling have been undertaken. That interpretation of the 'history of education' concludes in some considerations of a 'postmodern' status for learning and knowing. Finally there is a chapter devoted to suggesting some ways to re-articulate understandings of and approaches to learning 'at the end of modernity.'

The thoughts presented here compose a transdisciplinary range of associations. Those references are obviously derived from the work of many brilliant analyses of Westernized mentality and its historical developments as well as of human consciousness and socio-cultural dynamics in a global historical context. However, this present writing is primarily intended to serve as a pro-vocation—a provoking of other voices to speak of these issues from a perspective that values the radical complexity of selfhood as a basis for egalitarian, pluralistic society. Thus it has been composed as succinctly as seems viable relative to the complexity of the topics considered. In accordance with that purpose, it is not presented in a detailed scholarly elucidation of the

many relevant historical and theoretical texts that inform it. Instead of meticulous citation, an annotated bibliography is provided to direct readers toward more specific elucidation of related topics.

All the above stated, by way of stylistic introduction, it is evident that even while this writing is intended to have a broad accessibility, it is not written in a typically simplistic manner. But neither are these peculiarities of style meant to be obscurely referential to the many specialized fields of study that 'stand behind' this presentation. Instead, they are utilized in an effort to bring the complexities of their specialized theory and language usage into a wider discourse. No doubt most readers will find at least parts of this work exasperatingly simplistic, particularly in reference to their own field of intellectual specialization. What the author asks is that both the specialized and non-specialized reader 'bear with' this attempt to bring many perspectives 'into interactive play' around the topic of educating and schooling relative to egalitarian pluralism.

The Cultural Context and Historical Moment for this Educational Reflection

The contemporary historical moment of this writing is the first years of the 21st century, with its beginning under the globalistic dominance of Westernized cultural values as expressed in social systems of government and commerce. Thus the primary reference for these thoughts is the social expression those values and systems in the institutionalized formalities of "universal compulsory education." In the United States (as elsewhere), after decades of succeeding waves of concern for "educational reform," a recurring sense of crisis regarding student competence once again stirs political proclamations in national discourse. After several decades of eruptions of such concern, institutional schooling continues to be criticized from all aspects of social and political spectrums. Currently, a comprehensive program of federally mandated testing is being implemented in an attempt to ensure 'adequate' learning by way of uniform 'assessment.' Such a persistently recurring sense of failure or inadequacy on the part of students and the educational theories and practices applied to their development—despite various reformations-- might suggest that further "reform" or greater enforcement of existing standards will not address the sources of distress and dysfunction. Rather, this repetitive cycle of attempts to 'improve' institutional schooling could be taken as cause for reconsideration of collective assumptions about just what education is and is intended to accomplish. An effort is made here to orient such a reassessment by acknowledging some inherent conflicts among educational motives and schooling practices in egalitarian culture and pluralistic (yet systematically institutionalized) society.

For over a century, most of the structures and practices of Western educational institutions have remained relatively consistent in industrialized post-Enlightenment society, despite significant periods, and radical examples, of experimentation. For the most part, this formulation of age segregated, merit graded institutionalized schooling has become the international standard. The very persistence of this Western model of educational formality, and its increasingly globalistic dominance, suggest that there are potent societal and economic forces invested in its promulgation and effects. Yet the concurrent eruptions of anxiety about the failure of students to learn or perform adequately in that perdurable institutional context, as well as about its

potentially negative effects on the capacity for independent rational thought in individuals, suggests that dominant educational formalities are also somehow frustrating certain cultural values. Attacks on education and schooling have consistently arisen from both conservative and liberal social perspectives. Such broad-based criticism indicates that significant cultural objectives for learning in this politically pluralist, individualistically competitive society are not being attended appropriately by the persistently dominant educational methods. In addition to these concerns, the evidently successful academic and social performance of so-called 'home schooled' children suggest that institutional schooling is not necessarily a 'superior' context for learning individual competency and becoming 'effectively socialized.'

Another disturbing phenomenon is found in the numbers of students reportedly encountering serious difficulty in coping with contemporary institutional school contexts. Considerable percentages of school age children are currently judged to require atypical programming to compensate for their 'failures' to 'perform appropriately' in dominant institutional contexts. Similarly significant proportions are judged to need pharmacological therapy (Ritalin, anti-depressants) to enable them to conform to the intellectual and behavioral demands of those contexts. Such compensatory measures suggest some elemental disjunction between students, society, and the 'educational system' of schooling. In addition, considerable percentages of adolescents who fail to perform as intended in school are frequently expelled, transferred to 'outside' or 'alternative' programs, or otherwise excluded from statistical assessments of school 'efficiency' in respect to 'standards of performance.' Schooling is obviously beset with many problems. But is 'school' to blame for these 'unsatisfactory' results?

An appropriate comparison for the confusion over 'how best to educate' can be found in the struggles surrounding health care. Attempts to improve the standards and availability of health care for Americans have not proved successful in most recent history. An actual decline in the percentage of persons having health insurance and thus access to any high standard of health has been reported. The reasons for such a deterioration of health care do not; however, appear to involve a lack of medical skill or even economic resources. Americans are said to spend more per capita on average for medical services annually than citizens in any other technologically developed nation. Yet the lesser amount of funds spent on health care in those countries are said to provide coverage to a much higher percentage of their citizens than is generally available in the United States. The 'health care system' in the U.S. might well be 'broken' but what ever is 'wrong' with it would appear to derive as much or more from socio-economic factors rather than the quality of doctors, nurses, medications, and technological expertise. Similarly, schools are not the only context to examine for 'what is wrong with education.' If there is a 'fault of education' in respect to how it serves pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian values, that fault might well be found in pervasive social attitudes and structures not typically associated with education.

Rather than repeatedly attempting to 'fix schooling as we know it' a wiser course might be to reconsider how school came to be formalized as the institutional form in which it currently manifests. From such a historical perspective one can ask what aspects of cultural values, social structures, and economic forces dominant formalities of education actually 'serve' and which ones might they frustrate. How might the same

'methods' generate differing 'results' among diverse social, economic, and cultural groups? The persistence of methods and contexts which seem to 'fail' to 'serve' important cultural values, such as 'universal academic development,' further suggest a sense of conflicting interests behind impulses 'to educate.' In short, there must be more to schooling than most people are aware of.

The question of just what socio-economic forces the dominant educational formulations 'serve' is obviously central to any understanding of the persistent resistance of those forms of 'schooling' to 'reform.' A 'non-partisan' analysis might well indicate that some primary social structures shaping the 'schooling of sense of self' are neither intended by overt educational aims nor representative of principle cultural values. But to ask how educational concepts and practices influence the development of individuality and thus the 'performance' of individuals in social and collective contexts is perhaps just as significant—particularly for a society based upon the rights and responsibilities of individual persons. Thus the investigation presented in this writing seeks some deconstruction of notions about both education and individuality as essential to understanding the role of education in pluralistic, democratic society, and how schooling is shaped by inherent, unacknowledged structures.

Though the primary purpose of this text is to consider what notions about education, individuality, and the schooling of one's 'sense of self' appear most appropriate for promoting an individualistic, egalitarian society, such cannot be only a 'theoretical exercise.' Rather than produce one more idealized or abstractly theoretical model of 'how education ought to be,' an attempt is made to locate such notions in historical contexts and among practical social realities. To do so requires a more general consideration of motives and methods for 'educating' and 'schooling.' Thus this study involves elements of philosophical, psychological, sociological and historical perspective on the ways education and schooling 'serve' the often-conflicting interests of autonomous individuality, collective unity, societal stratifications, and economic forces.

Pragmatically, 'merely' determining what notions about education and schooling might be most conducive to the promotion of a pluralistic, egalitarian society that values individuality is inadequate. There would be little possibility of fostering those notions in the absence of an understanding about how and why education and schooling have evolved their present formulations. There has been no shortage of rhetoric extolling the values of individuality and egalitarian equality in recent history. But there is quite clearly much resistance to the actual primacy of these concerns from persisting social structures and economic interests—and from constitutions of personal 'sense of self' that have been 'schooled' by those structures and interests. It is necessary, therefore, to consider how the ideas and practices associated with the terms 'education' and 'schooling' can serve or frustrate the 'interests' of both individuality and collectivity, equality and inequality, social and economic forces, institutional and human concerns.

Such consideration is meant to acknowledge that education and its formulations that 'school the sense of self' are sociological phenomenon subject to myriad influences. Insight into the notions shaping those influences requires considering how the particular intellectual history of Western cultures, with its characteristic logical

philosophies and methodologies, has shaped the social structures that shape 'the schooling of the self.' In a summary sense, these various perspectives are engaged toward the goal of enabling what could be termed 'an honest education.' This phrase is meant to indicate an educational process that overtly acknowledges and includes as a subject of study how schooling is both coercive indoctrination of 'sense of self' by social structurings and a means to individualized autonomous engagement with the inherently conformist forces of society.

Returning to the summary phrase, 'as sense of self is schooled so shall society be structured,' an extension would thus be: if schooling of 'sense of self' is structured in significantly un-intended or unacknowledged ways then attempts at educational reform are likely to 'miss' significant aspects of how society shapes schooling and schooling shapes sense 'of self.' Insight into how educational efforts 'school the self' require radical reassessment of all operant assumptions about the nature and purposes of schooling that are both consciously and not consciously active in social structurings.

The above attempts to orient this reflection upon 'how schooling educates selfhood in contemporary pluralistic societies' needs be positioned further in regard to the proposed meta-level shift in collective philosophical attitudes and socio-functional realities. That shift is associated with the notion that a set of attitudes and social factors termed "modernist" have, through the cultural, societal, philosophic and scientific developments of history since the era of the Enlightenment, enacted a qualitative transition to some 'after modernist' or "postmodernist" status. The concepts articulating such a shift suggest in general that some essential motives for and operations of contemporary societies and economies have altered significantly, though most of us remain unaware of such a transition. Accordingly, it can be supposed that collective assumptions about education and schooling might well be inadequate to understanding either the current 'needs of students' or the nature of some of 'societies demands.' This analysis will thus attempt some consideration of such a possible confusion about 'how to educate and school in the 21st Century.'

The remainder of this introduction seeks to similarly specify the usage of the terms education, individuality, and identity as well as some related notions. The concepts elucidated here will subsequently be examined in relation to specific perspectives on how sense of self or selfhood is configured or 'schooled.' Thereafter, contexts for learning are examined, and the role of Western intellectual method in society is sketched in some historical perspective to expand upon Western attitudes toward individuality as a basis for pluralistic social collectivity.

Specifying Some Broad Terms and Concepts

Considerable care has been devoted to specifying the intended meanings of terms used in this text. That effort arises in large part because the topics of individuality and education are so frequently discussed in broad and contradictorily applied expressions. These topics, so often spoken of in broad platitudes and vague demagogic declarations, are invoked by most every philosophical, social, economic, and political, point of view.

Thus some initial distinctions are offered here at the beginning of this analysis. Again, the reader's patience is solicited in the interests of composing an appropriately complex presentation.

<u>The Notion of Analysis and Its Reasonably Reflective Uses</u>

      In so far as education involves learning to analyze, and this work is an analysis of what education is, some remarks on the mode of analysis used are appropriate. The concept of differentiation, of separating aspects of some set of 'inter-related' components or 'a whole,' such that these aspects become 'knowable' in terms of contrasting traits, provides a primary method for how self, other, and world are 'known' in human consciousness. To 'perform a logical process' of such differentiation is typically termed as "to analyze." This word derives from Greek roots that are said to translate as 'to loosen throughout' and that appear in words meaning to 'dissolve.' Thus the notion of 'analyzing' appears to derive from some 'untangling' or 'stretching' of related elements that enables a more particular 'view' of these and thus a more complex basis for understanding 'what' composes the 'entity of their relations' and how those relations are 'enacted.' A clock and be analyzed to differentiate its parts. Thus, in one sense, analysis 'takes things apart.' In another sense such 'loosening' can also focus more upon the ways those parts appear to interact and effect each other. A differentiation seeking understanding of how components compose a 'whole' typically involves posing a causal interpretation of relations between parts or aspects. Speculations on such causation derive, at least in the logical modes of Western intellectual method, from references to criteria of consistent reasoning related to mechanical functioning. 'An analysis' is thus typically regarded as an attempt to 'consistently reason' the differentiation of, and relations between, component parts. The goal of such an analysis tends to be 'totalistic' or conclusive—it seeks to definitively describe all parts and their relations with reductive finality. That use of rational analysis, or the application of consistent reasoning to 'loosen' the component parts of some entity, can be generally termed reductive in that it is applied with the purpose of positing a final interpretation of parts and their functional relations.

      However, analysis can also be applied in a less reductive manner—seeking to elucidate various ways that a 'whole' can be differentiated into parts and their interactions without positing as singular, mechanistic ordering or function. A clock can be analyzed not only as a mechanism but also as an expression of various cultural attitudes and social structurings the values or reasons for which are not necessarily consistent. The resulting differentiations of 'clock-ness' are thus more various and so not 'conclusively in logical agreement': clock-as-machine, clock as mathematical formula, clock as expression of cultural value placed upon quantitative measurement, clock as means of social order, etc. It might then be said then that there are analyses that seek to exactly specify the parts of an entity or subject and their relations (to in a sense 'nail the down),' and those that seek to 'loosen up' the relations between 'involved elements' so that their relations can be variously examined. One 'aims' to reduce the differentiated parts of some entity to 'an order' while the other mode 'opens up' the composition of the object of its 'reasonable scrutiny' to foster various interpretations. One mode can be termed 'linear analysis' and the other more 'constellative' in that it poses parts in various relations to each other. That

latter attitude guides the analysis presented here of education and individuality. As such, it is not intended to 'come to an end' but rather to commence, by way of 'diversified loosening,' a more complex ongoing examination of its topics. Another term for characterizing this mode of analysis is as reflection or a 'looking back at,' 'looking at again,' 'mirroring,' 'forming images of,' 'bending something back upon itself,' and, of course, 'to think about seriously' or 'to re-consider.'

Therefore, the terms deployed here to represent aspects of the subjects "education," "self," and "schooling" are not intended to be reductively exact or even all-inclusive. Rather, they are meant more as references that have various meanings and thus can promote a more complex differentiation of what it means 'to educate' and 'to school'—particularly in relation to what it means to be or become 'individualized.' This approach can be termed a 'qualitative analysis' rather than a more reductively 'quantitative' one. It seeks to emphasize the qualities of relations between factors generating the impulses for as well as the enactments and consequences of 'educating' and 'schooling.' As 'reflective analysis' this is a 'looking back again' at a set of concerns, concepts, and practices that seem 'utterly familiar'—so familiar that their parts are typically con-fused into a poorly differentiated 'whole' represented by a few words that are used with a variety of unarticulated meanings.

In attempting such a 'reflective analysis' the intention is not only to re-consider the 'component parts' of educating and schooling selfhood, but of demonstrating the method of non-reductive analytical reflection as an intrinsic dynamic for understanding the complexities of self, other, and world. That demonstration includes deploying the above mentioned usage of pairs of arrow brackets to indicate oppositional association thusly > < and more mutually interactive association thusly < >. It is important to note that the same pair of factors, such as person and society, can be posed in either the more reductive form of opposition (person> <society) or the more inter-related one (person< >society). This 'reasonable reflection' begins then with consideration of notions about the interplay of personal self and society, as well as with the words 'culture' and 'society,' in regard for how terms suggest the over-arching field of reference for educational motive.

Posing A Primary Reciprocity of Self Complexity and Social Structures in Relation to Egalitarian Pluralism

Identifying 'the self' or what constitutes selfhood is approached as a radically difficult endeavor in this writing. Yet it is held to be essential if one is to be specific about what constitutes individuality and how it is to be educated. To begin, then, 'self identity' is described as a 'sense of self.' A principle assumption developed in the following considerations is that a reciprocity exists between personal 'sense of self' and collective social structures. Each is regarded as significantly 'configuring' the other. A personal 'sense of self' is thus seen as becoming articulated in response to the structural characteristics of a social environment. Persons encounter 'self formulating' patterns in social 'structurings' such as kinship relations, social manners, legal codes, the practices of schooling, economic roles, political systems, and the configurations of knowledge and reason in language usage. Conversely, the 'sense-of-self' developed by individual persons collectively configure societal structures—personal 'senses of self' aggregate to produce, or re-produce, society's structural configurations. In this sense 'social structures' exist primarily as collectively shared attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.   Yet those

'structurings of selfhood' are viewed as also being 'at odds with' certain impulses and characteristics of individuals. There is then, both conformity of personal selfhood to social structures and some conflict between them as well.

The question of which is the 'primary shaper' of the mutually creative dyad persons<>society formulates the 'problem of agency' debated in such contexts as the 'nature versus nurture' contrast for childhood development: Does society create selfhood or individuals create society? It is accepted here that there must be 'agency' on both sides of this reciprocal relationship between person and collective. The two are regarded as mutually co-creative and thus essentially inseparable. It is further proposed that the configurations of selfhood in persons and collective identity in society are in actuality not fixed states but living, dynamic performances. Each person performs their version of collectively structured roles and standards under the influence of individual character and in response to the varied contextual factors of their particular circumstances (family, community, education, experience, etc.). Personal sense of self and collective social structures are thusly viewed as influencing or 'guiding' the enactments that collectively constitute the 'performance of social processes' in an intricately complex interactivity—including those of educating and schooling.

Posing agency in this manner implies that there is some intentional aspect not only in specific persons but also in or of established social structures. Just as human persons are thereby regarded to manifest some inherent character that seeks expression, so too are social structures seen as asserting 'interests,' though the latter 'act' through their 'presence' in personal 'senses of self.' Any significant autonomy of personal agency (or capacity to 'act individually') thus requires an intimate awareness of how social structurings have configured one's 'sense of self' and thus 'confine' or 'direct' one's thought and actions. 'Sense of self' is thus regarded as shaped by both 'internal character' in persons and a complex, often contradictory, set of 'external' social structurings that become 'internalized' as formulations of self or selfhood. Personal sense of self is then created both by individual character and assimilated social structurings. The significance of this reciprocity for education is summarized in the phrase: as sense-of-self is 'schooled' so shall society be structured, and vice versa, as society is structured so shall sense-of-self be schooled. This formulation of agency is dialectically reciprocal rather than 'binarily equational'—one aspect is neither superior nor equivalent to the other. Thus, determining which aspect of the dyad is more influential does not appear ultimately feasible. What is feasible is the development of personal and collective awareness of the complex inter-active relations between individual persons and social structurings. (The terms complex and complexity are used here in particular reference to notions of interconnectedness, intricacy of composition, and inter-relatedness that suggest some ultimately un-dividable yet diverse 'entity.' 'A complex relation' is thusly regarded as a 'variously ordered' or 'diversely intending' context of factors, impulses, rules, capacities, etc.)

In relation to the person<>society dyad, it is further posited that a complex and often competitive interplay of 'intentional agencies' exists not only *between* personal sense-of-self and social structures, but also

within both the 'complex of social structures' as well as within the character and mind of particular persons. 'Inherent character' is thusly regarded as also variously composed of contrasting and competitive aspects. That is to say, human character is inherently complex or 'pluralistic' in is composition of agencies, capacities, and impulses. Thus, 'a person' is approached here as expressing 'individual character' as a complexity of self-aspects embracing contrast and conflict, not as a singular sense of self.

A society seeking to promote both autonomous individuality and egalitarian pluralism would have to necessarily cultivate the individualizing expression of a complexly formulated, variously configured sense of self among its 'personal members.' An egalitarian society composed of individualized persons in pluralistic associations with each other that are relatively unrestricted by coercive conformity to uniform social standards would thus be an expression of persons whose 'internal psychology' or sense of self is similarly configured as a complex diversity. A pluralistic society so conceived derives from persons expressing a pluralistic sense of self that reflects the dynamical variety of pluralistic social diversity.

<u>Culture and Society as Intention and Actuality</u>

A primary concept in this discussion is presented in the terms social structure and societal structuring. In order to specify this reference in relation to general usages of the terms society and culture, an orientation to both is provided here. In general the term culture is posed to represent background values and attitudes of a mutually identified group of persons. The term society is used here in reference to the actual 'foreground' structures of and operant standards for interpersonal associations. Culture then is posed as the milieu of generally held, typically traditional or inherited beliefs and values in, or out of which, the forms and enactments of social life emerge in any given historical era or geographic locality. Thus one might say that cultural attitudes provide a directional impetus or orientation from which the actual activities of society emerge: culture as script, society as performance.

A primary dictionary definition states culture as, "The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought characteristic of a community or population (Am. Heritage Dict. '86 p.348)." Definitions of society tend to overlap this one for culture. But in the definition of society as "the totality of social relationships among human beings," and that for the word societal as "of or pertaining to the structure, organization, or functioning of society (Ibid p.1160)," a notion of 'relational structure' is indicated. It is that quality of how society configures or structures interpersonal life that is primary in the usage of the term in this writing. Society and societal or socialized structure are thus approached as the extant, if often unacknowledged, form and functioning of interpersonal relations that generate the most overt influences upon development of sense of self or selfhood.

Thus an assumption is made here that there can be distinctive differences between 'cultural values' and 'social operation.' The category 'culture' is deployed to indicate concerns with how life 'ought' to be lived. The category 'society' is deployed to indicate the actual, functioning structures of collective interpersonal activity.

However, both 'fields' are regarded as composed of inherently conflicting and competitive elements or concerns. Cultural values can be 'in conflict' with each other as well as with societal structures. It is further taken that the values of cultural perspective are often contradicted by the 'functional' ones of existing societal structures or actual collective behaviors. The term social values becomes rather confusing in relation to this distinction between a background of cultural values or beliefs and a foreground of operant social structurings. But in relation to that distinction, social values could be understood as in essence the 'values of social structure'—that is, if a society is structured in a hierarchical manner, having inferior and superior social classes, then the values of that structure might be described as hierarchical. Yet such a 'value' as implicit in the actual structuring of 'social order' and its 'performances' could be at variance with more overtly asserted cultural values. The latter might be democratic and egalitarian while actual social structures manifest more hierarchically stratified status of classes.

Culture can then be considered as providing 'motives' for social structuring that might not be 'actualized.' Those motives can be both vague and inconsistent, thereby contributing to disparities between them and societal structurings. Conversely, social structures developing in a given cultural milieu can be regarded as asserting, by virtue of their influence on personal sense of self, specific tendencies of thought and behavior that could also be called 'societal motives.' That is, societal structures 'act' as if 'they' had intentions or values as well as, often in contrast to, cultural values or intentions. Cultural values for individualism find various expressions in societal structures—such as how the rule of law can protect personal liberty. Yet socially structured institutions can also develop in ways that repress individualism as a consequence of their self-perpetuating, power-driven operations—'school' being not the least of these. Culture can then be generalized as the 'ideal' version of 'how society and human behavior ought to be' in contrast to the actuality of social life: culture as ideal, society as real. Obviously, this distinction between culture and society breaks down, as is indicated in the overlapping of dictionary definitions and this portrait of divergent 'values' or 'intentions.' There is a logical reciprocity between the two 'fields of phenomenon' these terms are deployed to indicate. Social structurings can become the basis of cultural values as a result of their becoming overtly acknowledged primary references for 'how life ought to be lived.' Past standards of cultural values can pass from overt acknowledgment as such, but remain 'overtly active' in the forms of the social structures these originally prompted. But, for the purposes of this discussion regarding individuality and education, the basic distinction between them will provide some important reference by indicating how the influence of societal structuring upon education often diverges from cultural values and thus goes unacknowledged. In so far as society and culture are regarded as constituting a continuum of influences, the term socio-cultural will be used.

Formalized, institutional educational processes are approached here as prime examples of societal structures. Those structures are readily assumed to represent rather traditional, implicitly shared cultural values—even though they have been altered rather radically in the last century and a half. Such assumptions can be regarded as inherently naïve not only in reference to history but also since there are always competing socio-

economic forces in pluralistic societies, forces that are not necessarily attuned to broader cultural values. Such inherent conflict between 'culture' and 'society' is considered here to be an essential and important characteristic of non-homogeneous, pluralistic societies, as these tend to be neither traditionally uniform in cultural values nor hierarchically structured. Education, then, can be considered as having potentially divergent cultural and societal motives. Specifically at issue in these present considerations is whether the values of egalitarian democratic culture are adequately in-forming the educational formalities that constitute schooling as a systematic structure so that those values are actually being 'served' by the how 'the self is schooled.'

Distinguishing the Whats and Hows of Education from the Whys

Seeking to distinguish between purposes and methods, or the 'whats,' 'hows,' and 'whys' of education and schooling, demands close attention to unacknowledged assumptions and contradictory references typically made in assertions about these activities. Thus some care will be given to overtly declaring the references intended in this writing for primary terms used in relation to education, schooling, and individuality.

Educating as Leading 'Out,' 'Toward,' and 'Inward'

Unless the entire issue of what is meant by "being well educated" is addressed, all analysis of 'the topic will be biased toward habitual and historical assumptions, some of which have never been thoroughly examined in public discourse for how they influence schooling. Significantly complex analysis of educational theories and practices requires questioning the pedagogical (socio-cultural) intentions generating them. To attempt an answer to the question "what is the best way to educate," requires a clear statement of what a "proper education" is determined to be. Yet that query prompts the more fundamental question "what *is* education?" A standard English language definition reads:

- **Education**. The act or process of imparting knowledge or skill; systematic instruction; teaching. 2. The obtaining of knowledge or skill through such a process; schooling. 3. a. The Knowledge or skill obtained or developed by such a process; learning. b. A program of instruction of a specified kind or level: *driver education; a college education.* 4. The field of study that is concerned with teaching and learning; the theory of teaching; pedagogy. (American Heritage, p.415)

The definitions for the verb to educate are similarly given. Education would thus seem to constitute a systematically focused development of skill in performing established procedures, be these mental or physical, and a capacity for remembering and applying existing knowledge in the form of concepts and data. These notions appear particularly appropriate to a society deeply imbued with the systematic models of technological mechanism and scientific materialism. In such a culture individuals must learn 'how to do' many specialized technical and mental procedures. Furthermore, a lack of understanding of many such procedures that one is not required to perform personally will render a person ignorant of how the technological society around them functions. Thus a primary motive or 'why' for educating would be to adapt persons to understanding and

executing the technical knowledge and procedures of such a society—be those driving automobiles, operating computers, filing taxes, or specialized functions of engineering and banking.

However, the linguistic root of the word education suggests a somewhat different intention or 'why' for educating. The contemporary form of the word educate derives from the Latin *educare*, taken to mean 'bring up,' and the Indo-European root of it is *deuk*, designated as meaning to pull, draw, lead. This meaning is reflected in the Latin *ducere*, for to lead. Thus *educare* can be regarded as meaning to 'bring up' by leading out, bringing forth, or to rear—as indicated in the word educe. This same root appears in words such as induce and introduce (Partridge, Origins: A short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, p. 169).

Etymologically, then, education suggests a process of leading something, or someone, *out*, *forth*, and *up from* a status that either is un-skilled, un-knowledgeable, or perhaps simply unseen or hidden. One could regard such 'leading forth' as being a 'leading toward' specific standardized attitudes, capacities, and values. Rather conversely, the 'leading forth' and 'raising up' might be taken to suggest the revealing and enabling of attitudes, capacities, and values inherent in the person being educated. This purpose for 'leading out' poses a 'bringing forth' of what is 'in there' in a person that his or her conscious attitudes are not necessarily aware of or are (as yet) unable to articulate. The former reading would indicate emphasis on 'leading' persons to conform to established abstract standards of knowledge and performance, while the latter reading would privilege a 'leading out' of individualistic traits—whether or not those traits conformed to societal standards and sanctioned academic models. Preservation of any academic and societal status quo are more likely served by a 'leading toward,' while innovation and reconsideration of the validity of that status quo are more likely to result from 'leading out' whatever intelligences and sensings might exist in non-conforming individuals. The latter emphasis in educating would obviously be the more 'subversive' in respect to dominant cultural values and social standards for thought and behavior. Concentrations of power in societies thus tend to promote the 'leading toward' aspect of educational efforts to maintain or promote their dominance.

These 'readings' of the word educate thus suggest contrasting purposes or 'whys' for educating, though both would involve being 'led to learn' about self and the world in previously unfamiliar ways. However, both meanings for educating appear to assume there is some thing 'in' persons to be 'lead' or 'raised up' from some status of inchoate, inarticulate, uninformed, or con-fused status. That 'something' can be identified as 'personal subjectivity' or consciousness with its various cognitive functions and capacities for emotional, physical, and intellectual intelligence that are 'to be educated'—whether in leading forth, toward, or 'back in' toward more reflective understanding of the self these articulate. That 'leading back in' of the sense of self toward its self would seem to be possible only subsequent to considerable leading out and toward. There appears a reciprocity, then, between the 'leading out' that 'leads what is in there' toward more complex relation with others and the world and the 'leading back in' of self awareness to a more complexly articulated selfhood. Educating sense of self can be viewed as a 'two way street' with traffic continually moving in both directions, 'outward' as well as

'inward,' in which what is learned about the others and the world 'reflects back upon' the self and its self-knowing. In reverse, an increasingly complex sense of self enables more complex knowing of others and world.

Learning as Change in Personal Awareness, Understanding, or Capacity

This seemingly simple term is applicable to a vast variety of contexts. Dictionary definitions include "gaining of knowledge, comprehension, or mastery through experience or study," "to fix in the mind or memorize," "to acquire experience of or an ability or skill in," and "to become informed of; find out" (p.720). Learning thusly defined can occur either from experience and study without involvement with other persons or through being schooled, taught, or instructed. In its broadest sense then, learning results in a change of awareness, understanding, or capacity to act. Obviously educational efforts seek to direct the phenomenon of learning in ways that specify its focus, whether in leading 'forth' or 'toward.' It is important then to relate the breadth of this term to the more specific contexts, processes, and methods involved in schooling.

Schooling as Execution of Educational Intentions and Structural Curriculum for Socialized Learning

If the term education is regarded as designating efforts to 'lead forth' and 'lead toward' that have particular societal and cultural motives or intentions, then how those intentions or are literally structured and performed can be posed as a somewhat distinct phenomenon. Thus the term school is used here to refer to the formal contexts, procedures, and methods deployed to accomplish educational intentions. A potentially conflicting relationship is posed thereby between education and schooling similar to that described as configured by notions of culture and society. Formalized structures of schooling take on institutional identity and as such generate 'self-replicating' tendencies that can contradict overtly declared educational intentions. School as an 'institutional entity' thus often asserts an 'agenda' in competition with presumed educational goals. This tendency is in part due to its being subject, as a social institution, to the influence of other such socially institutionalized and economic structurings. School-as-institution becomes not only a formal expression of general societal order (regardless of cultural values) but also a 'player' and a 'pawn' among the competing interests of businesses, government agencies, and political parties. Thus, when 'the self goes to school' for the purpose of 'being educated' it is always subject to more influences than those specified in overt educational intentions or officially declared pedagogy.

That point of view suggests that school, at least in the form of an institutionalized process, asserts both explicit and implicit educational intentions—it has, some have said, a "hidden curriculum." This term is used to indicate that formalized schooling tends to assert rather covert criteria for and influences upon student conduct and performance in both academic as well as social contexts. Thus the 'what' and 'how' of schooling the development of sense of self or selfhood intrinsically involve more 'whys' than get acknowledged in broadly accepted cultural intentions for educating. In some respects, the forms schooling takes can seriously frustrate or obstruct those cultural intentions.

Schooling as Activity and School as Place of Education

In either reading of educating as a 'leading forth' or 'leading toward,' educational efforts would, by the definitions given, involve learning by way of schooling. What then is 'to school?' As an activity it is defined as "the process of being educated formally, especially a planned series of courses over a number or years," "a session of instruction," "to train; discipline," and "education provided by a set of circumstances and experiences," (p. 1098).   Thus in one sense, schooling is the 'formalizing' of attempts to promote learning by way of instruction or training in particular topics or activities that comprise a curriculum, often over a specified period of time in a given context. In another sense schooling occurs in any set of circumstances and experience that prove 'educational.' Thus, there is both a formalized and a non-formal contexting for schooling, the latter exemplified by the phrase 'the school of hard knocks.' One can pose that there is a 'course of study' or curriculum in both formalized and informal settings, but that it is more overt, more intentionally planned and organized, in the formal or institutional schooling. The term curriculum is closely associated with the sense of formalized schooling in its origin from the Latin *currere*, as in a course that one runs. Schooling thus can be said to inherently involve such a 'course,' or actual set of courses as a curriculum, which a student must 'run' in order to complete the formalized schooling.

As a place, school is designated "an institution for instruction," and "the building or group of buildings in which instruction is given." Yet it is also 'a structure' or 'structural' in terms of the control exerted over the movement, conduct and even thinking of students. Thus the 'place' of school can be regarded as a physically structured environment and a procedurally structured context for both personal and interpersonal activity. The structure of school is then in one regard physical and architectural and, in another, composed of rules, procedures, hierarchical classifications and authority, pedagogical methods of teaching, and a specified curriculum of study. School as this physical and psycho-socially controlling place, then, exerts a certain 'schooling' by its formal constitutions in which body and mind are "instructed, drilled, disciplined, study (ibid p. 1098)."

It is curious to note, though, that this term school derives from the Latin *scola* and the Greek *skhole'* used to indicate leisure. Subsequently the term came to be associated with time or leisure used for intellectual argument or education, lecturing for the purpose of educating or 'schooling,' and eventually with the building in which schooling occurs. This history of usage suggests that aspects of educational effort expressed as schooling require some 'removal' from the ordinary occupations and contexts of daily life—some 'time off' or leisure time. Thus, when schooling becomes highly organized, scheduled, competitive, or structured in other ways that might induce anxiety about time and performance, whatever was once regarded as important in the relation between leisure and development of intellect seems likely to become displaced.

To educate by way of schooling, then, can be posed as 'instructing, training, or disciplining' persons through a formalized curriculum. Such curriculum can be regarded as presenting the informational data and conceptual ideas persons are regarded as needing to know according to cultural values and social standards. It

further seeks to condition persons for competent performance of the physical and cognitive procedural skills required to live their lives for the purposes specified in a given socio-economic context. To educate thusly involves structuring certain formalities that 'direct' and 'form' thought and behavior, while imparting specified knowledge and procedures of action. That structure can be asserted in both the subjects of study and their presentation in the curriculum of the procedural process called schooling, as well as in the physical attributes of the place called school. Schooling as activity can be further distinguished between structures that deploy a curriculum emphasizing academic development of theoretical and scholarly intelligence in contrast to those that focuses on competent performance of vocational or technical skills.

<u>Schooling as Teaching and Instructing</u>

It appears significant that definitions of schooling as a formalized process favor association with the terms instruction and training. That proverbially informal 'school of hard knocks' might well educate one about life but rarely involves organized formal instruction in 'the lessons to be learned.' That one can learn in either a formal or informal context suggest a need for some subtly in the use of terms for how one is assisted to learn. Thus some effort is expended here to differentiate teaching from instructing.

Teaching is regarded here as engagement between persons that serves to enable the 'student' to learn to act and think in new ways or with 'expanded capacities of understanding.' A dictionary definition associates teaching with "imparting knowledge or skill," "to cause to learn by example or experience," "to advocate," and also "to give instruction" (p.1246). There is a suggestion here that 'teaching' can be rather indirect, that it can 'cause one to learn by experience' or through being witness to an example, and that 'a teacher' can 'impart knowledge or skill' by perhaps subtle means. Instruction, by contrast, is regarded here as a more specific attempt to impart informational data and procedures of action, to essentially 'in-structure' or 'train' a student's cognitive functions and physio-motor skills. Instruction is thusly positioned as a sub-set or aspect of teaching. This term derives from the Latin root *insturerre*, for 'to build.' Thus in a sense, instruction is the 'inner building' of a person 'from outside'—a sort of transmission or 'packing in' of data and procedures. This distinction between teaching and instruction is essential to understanding teaching as educational effort that not only 'leads toward' by conforming persons to standards of knowledge and performance (instruction or training), but also 'leads out' what is intrinsically 'in there' in or of personal individuality.

Teaching is thusly posed here as not only an activity of instructive 'transmission' but of discerning the directedness of individual intelligence or character and a 'going with' it to 'show it to itself.' One who teaches, then, would be engaging the student not only for the purpose of in-formational instruction but to enable the student to develop the particularities of their intelligence and sensibilities. Teaching in this sense resembles coaching in that it seeks to assist the development of inherent capacities, as one does with the physicality of athletes. Instruction, in some contrast, aligns more closely with the function of schooling as prescriptive and proscriptive about learning, while teaching is being associated more with 'provocative engagement' of personal

particularity. The instructional mode so conceived concerns how to behave and not behave, what to think and not to think, how to do and not to do. Teaching, aside from such instructing, concerns also how to express, how to think, how to feel 'in one's own way.' Instruction thus has more readily measurable results than the broader concerns of teaching. It might be posed that while to school is to instruct, to teach is not necessarily to school. Yet establishing what 'results' are intended by schooling-as-teaching-and-instructing still requires determining just what knowledge and capacities are considered important to 'acquire,' and to what social purposes these are to be applied.

<u>Pedagogy and Teaching as Intention and Actuality</u>

These two terms used to emphasize an 'inter-active dyad' similar to that of culture<>society, or education<>schooling. The actual acts involved in conducting schooling, whatever the knowledge and skills determined to be important by educational intentions, involve teaching and instructing. As such, these actions constitute the actual schooling—be that evaluated as a 'good' or 'bad' education according to some set of educational criteria or purposes. The organizing strategies for these efforts are referred to by the term 'pedagogy,' understood as both the 'art' and theory of teaching. The word derives from a Greek association of terms for 'boy' and 'leader.' The Middle Latin term *paedagogare* was used specifically to indicate one who teaches. As a term that originated in reference to 'leading bouts to school' and developed that of 'teaching knowledge,' pedagogy, being a term for the theory and method, or procedures of teaching, thus relates to educating as 'leading out' and 'leading toward,' But actual teaching and instruction can be carried on with little overt reflection on what 'pedagogical intention' is overtly intended, or that might be configuring the 'procedural acts of schooling' in some defacto, unplanned manner.

That is to say, teachers and instructors are not necessarily conscious of the pedagogical 'structure' or strategies implied in their efforts at 'educating' by 'teaching' specific subjects and skills in particular ways. Aspects of the methods and procedures they are using might well be 'leading' their students in ways of which they are not aware and might not approve if they were so aware. Stated conversely, overtly asserted pedagogical intentions and strategies for how to teach and instruct are often not actually exemplified by the schooling being enacted. In such cases, a disjunction between pedagogical intentions or theory and actual teaching and instruction are going 'unnoticed' or ignored. Pedagogy as theory provides a plan for teaching—but that teaching that actually occurs might or might not conform to that plan. Thus teaching might be done assuming it is fulfilling a stated pedagogy but actually be asserting other values. For example, both acknowledged pedagogy and actual teaching practice can place more stress upon either the 'leading out' or the 'leading toward' aspects of education. In some instances the actual procedural processes of schooling might be enacting more 'leading toward' in the form of instruction even though the pedagogical theory emphasizes a 'leading out' of individual character.

Awareness that pedagogy and teaching can diverge thusly is important to discovering the 'actual' or 'operative' functions of schooling, since that actuality frequently contradicts pedagogical intentions or plans and

thus is unintended by persons doing the 'educating' or 'schooling.' The planned education is not necessarily the schooling that takes place. In essence, the 'operant pedagogy' of teaching/schooling can be established by other social structures rather than culturally derived educational intentions or 'scientifically derived' pedagogical theory. Thus discussions about 'the best' ways to educate through schooling are often 'blind' to a primary source of 'pedagogical structure' in other social practices and institutions that covertly or inadvertently structure schooling procedures.

Another distinction between pedagogy and teaching is that the latter is regarded here as praxis, or as 'more than theoretical' in that it is a practical activity based on interpersonal engagement. In this view, teaching involves elements of lecturing, instructing, demonstrating, and testing. But it is also regarded as requiring dialogue, tutoring, and caring *in relation to* individual persons. The term 'pedagogue' has been used pejoratively to indicate one who 'instructs dogmatically' or in a pedantic manner. Such an approach to 'schooling the self' is here regarded as more procedural and thus 'non-relational' than indicated by the term 'teaching.'

Understanding as Reductively Conclusive and Non-Reductively Diversifying

In so far as schooling seeks as its purpose, through its pedagogies and teaching, to promote learning that leads to particular understanding of concepts, functions, proper conduct, and competent performance, it can be said to lead persons toward specified conclusions. But an important distinction can be made regarding the character of those conclusions. These can be classed generally as 'reductively conclusive' versus 'diversifyingly complex' or non-reductive. The reductive version tends to be absolutely fixed and final, as in 'water is H_2O.' The non-reductively diversifying understanding of water tends to understand it through a variety of meaningful descriptions that are not exactly the same: water as liquid, water as ice, water as a status of purity, water as characteristic of types of behavior, etc. Reductively conclusive understanding asserts authority over such various meanings by way of hierarchical ordering in which one meaning is understood to be 'superior' or 'more elemental.' Reductively conclusive understanding and its manifestation as fixed hierarchical orders of importance is particularly important to the leading toward aspect of schooling sense of self, other, and world. By leading personal understanding toward these more fixed states of meaning educational efforts more readily reproduce consistently standardized attitudes among members of a social collective. Emphasis upon non-reductively diversifying understanding in contrast tends more to emphasis particularity, complexity, and individuality without reducing these to superior versus inferior, more essential versus less essential.

This contrast relates to the preceding remarks on the reasonable uses of analysis. Rational modes of analyzing can be applied in either more or less reductive ends This contrast is not only evident in the 'whys' of educating, expressed by intentions to 'arrive at' conclusive, fixed understanding, but also in methods of schooling. The ways people are taught, and thus learn, can emphasize modes of thinking, feeling, and expressing that are also more or less reductively defining. Emphasizing measurement and quantitative methods of

understanding phenomenon tends to develop a reductively exact sensibility and understanding. Emphasizing qualitative description and diversified explanations tends to promote diversified, and as such, rather inconclusive understanding. Reduction and non-reduction, singularity and diversity of understanding, are thus important factors in the composition of the 'whys' and 'hows' of schooling. Interactions between reductive and non-reductive emphasis in purposes and methods of schooling can produce unintended or covert influences. An educational intention to lead persons toward complexly diversified understandings can be diverted if the methods of thought and analysis used favor reductive definitions and hierarchies of conclusions.

Education and Schooling as Extensions of Power

As suggested in various ways above, educational intentions and their expressions in schooling can emphasize the dominant order, beliefs, and standards of a socio-cultural milieu. Such emphasis places its stress upon the leading toward aspect of educating selfhood—a leading toward that focuses upon selected or 'official' ways of knowing, thinking, behaving. Such educating and schooling tend to promulgate acceptance of and obedience to existing centers of power in society—both by utilizing overt and covert or 'hidden' curricula. In a rather different sense, educating can emphasize the 'power' or 'potency' of the social collective by 'leading persons toward' creative, inventive cooperation. In yet another sense, the power or potency of individuals can be emphasized in regards to how their particular traits of character and intelligence are 'lead out' into engagement with others and world, then back 'in' again to further develop sense of self that is both aware of and promotes individual capacities. These latter two versions of 'extending power' appear more inherently compatible than either does with the former one that favors existing concentrations of hierarchical power— whether social, political, or economic. Thus another intrinsic contrast is illustrated between possible purposes or 'whys' for educating and the manner in which these configure the 'whats' and 'hows' of schooling.

An Honest Education as Various Educations

As indicated, educating might be regarded as primarily a 'leading toward' intended to enable persons to effectively conform to existing social standards and economic conditions or, in contrast, to enable individuals to live complex emotional, physical, intellectual, and relational lives regardless or even in spite of existing socio-economic contexts. In general, these are contrasting purposes that might be posed as education for 'conformity within' social standards versus education for 'autonomy under or beside' existing standards. Such a distinction can also be thought of as the difference between how persons can be 'educated' to behave and perform 'on the job' or 'in public' as opposed to 'at home' or 'in private.'

The notion of 'leading forth' 'hidden' aspects of 'a person' confronts one with the realization that if different persons have different 'hidden aspects' then what might be 'hidden' in them cannot be 'known in advance.' Thus attempts to educate by 'leading toward' standardized values and knowledge is likely to be a rather different endeavor than a 'leading out' of what is 'in there' but not yet getting expression in a person's

individual thought and conduct. In the first case one can know where to 'lead' but in the second, one must seek appropriate provocations that might 'stimulate inner voices' of individuality. The latter context implies an effort to assist people to come to know themselves as other than they have previously—as persons whose capacities and impulses, once elucidated, might radically contradict their previous sense of self. In order to 'lead forth' what is 'in there' one must first discover its 'character'—the distinguishing features, qualities, even eccentric peculiarities of an individual's intelligences and sensibilities.

This contrast of the 'leading toward' and the 'leading out' of persons through education poses three concerns for attempts to teach. These aspects can be figured as a triangle that frames educational efforts. On one side is the established social and cultural attitudes about how persons are to behave, what they are to know, and how they are to learn—in short, how they are to be 'lead to' understand self, others, and the world. On another side is the person 'to be educated,' having already established personal concepts and beliefs about self, others, and the world—much if not most of which exists as reflexive or unconscious assumptions in their attitudes and so serving to obscure awareness of the 'as yet unseen' aspects of self and world. And on the third side is the concern of the 'hidden' aspects of that person—what each person is as yet unfamiliar with about the particular capacities and character of his or her own individuality. Depending upon the values of a given culture, the social standards aspect of this triangulation can influence the 'leading toward' aspect of educating either to support or oppose the 'leading out' of what is 'hidden' in persons. In practice, culturally oriented educations tend to selectively 'lead out' aspects of personal individuality, which conform to collective social standards and repress those that do not. Thus there can be various 'educations,' depending on what educating is intended to accomplish—recall the dictionary distinction between "driver education" and "college education." Educations can be said always to have objective (if not entirely conscious) motives or intended social functions, as well as specific 'contents' to be learned and methodologies for teaching same—schooling and pedagogy of teaching. Persons are educated to drive cars so as to prevent accidents—but also, rather less obviously, to provide them with identity-defining driver's licenses and enable them to efficiently perform the economically required roles of commuters and shoppers, etc. that social structure depends upon.

In all cases, schooling is inherently prescriptive in its selective emphasis on subjects for inclusion in it curriculum and thereby inherently proscriptive in its exclusion of topics for and methods of study. Similarly there is always some particular emphasis of social, economic, intellectual, or aesthetic content expressed in the physical and procedural structure of the 'place of school.' With this sense of schooling as both a process and a place that assert 'instructional influence,' as both prescriptive and proscriptive in promoting learning about self and world, it is appropriate to recall the notion of 'hidden curriculum.' This term suggests that formalized schooling and schools always assert effective forms of 'instruction' or 'in-structuring' that are not stated in the overtly acknowledged 'courses of study.'

Presumably, the contents and methods of teaching are selected and presented in ways shaped by the intended effects of 'educating' personal 'sense of self,' and of world. Yet even a 'bad education'—one that

'fails' its overly stated intentions—is still 'an education' in that it has specific effects, being a process of conditioning and 'training,' or 'indoctrination,' into specific attitudes, values, and 'capacities'—or perhaps rather incapacities—of self. That such consequences of a 'bad education' might be unintended does not make it any less 'effective' as a process that induces those consequences. The student that has 'undergone' such schooling has been 'processed' through 'a curriculum' or particular 'course of study.' Whether 'an' education is considered 'good' or 'bad,' it involves 'learning' through 'in-structuring' of sense of self and world—whether as consciously intended or not. And from a perspective of psychological sophistication, one must assume that all 'educations' are generated by both overt and covert, planned and unplanned, or conscious and unconscious collective purposes and motives—having both intended and unintended consequences. There is inevitably, then, an overt as well as 'hidden' curriculum to education and schooling.

Thus persons involved in educating are enacting both personal and collective motives or purposes, some of which are inherently obscure or unconscious. It would be extremely naïve not to maintain awareness that formalized educational processes are, by their very structure, content, and methodologies, 'forms' of indoctrination, in so far as these 'structure' patterns of thinking and sensing. Many social and economic 'forces' or 'special interests' are ever involved in shaping the forms of education so as to influence personal sense of self and world to their advantage. In a complex pluralistic society there are bound to be many such 'interests' competing to assert influence on the formulations (hows) as well as the contents (whats) of educations— interests whose influences are often not 'planed by persons' but rather are innate 'effects of' social structures (part of the so-called "hidden curriculum). Such an inherently varied and divergent set of educational intentions need not be considered a 'bad thing.' But to educate honestly in such circumstances would be to acknowledge and even emphasize the various 'leadings toward' and 'leadings forth' that comprise 'multiple schoolings of the self'—such that individual persons have the capacity and option to be ware of how their sense of self, others, and world is being pre-determined.

A Historical Perspective on the 'Genealogy of Schooling.'

To seek for the overt and covert intentions shaping educational efforts as 'the schooling of the self' only in contemporary cultural values and social structures would be as naïve as to assume there were not covert ones.

The trajectories of the development of such schooling extend far back into radically 'foreign' historical contexts. While there are many texts in print asserting to summarize the 'history of education' there are few attempting any Foucault-like 'genealogy of schooling.' To adequately analyze this 'history' would require extensive competency in a wide variety of disciplines. In so far as some such perspective is attempted here, it is admittedly rudimentary.

Education as currently institutionalized can be regarded as deriving in part from concerns generated under the influence of Western European Enlightenment ideas (and their Classical Renaissance and Greek progenitors). These concepts about what proper knowledge is and how to attain it were subsequently adapted to

a systemically formalized general public education in highly industrialized societies. Those approaches to studying understanding in practical and rational modes eventually came to be termed "the sciences and the humanities." The Enlightenment impulse for educating can be regarded as, in one respect, seeking to enhance the application of autonomous reasoning in individuals to social and scientific concerns, thus promoting 'human emancipation' from ignorance, superstition, and social injustice. In some contrast, the educational motives of industrialized society carry such purposes as 'producing productive citizen-workers' for technological economies of scale and inculcating uniform obedience to the authority of hierarchical nation states and corporations. Once again, it is evident that there are significant potential conflicts in such motives or 'whys' for educating.

Reflexive assumptions about the purposes for education and how appropriate these are to cultural values readily obscure an accurate historical perspective on what has constituted notions of 'being educated' and what contemporary covert or unconscious purposes for education might actually be 'at work.' Contexts and practices for education have become so pervasively formal and institutionalized that one can readily assume that significant learning only occurs in such context. Similarly, the pervasively consistent formulations of educational processes in contemporary society can readily promote the assumption that these represent the only viable contexts and practices for formalizing education—as these rather automatically 'define education.'

Whatever the purposes 'behind' formalizing education, past and present, the elemental focus of educational efforts remains particular persons. Persons are to be taught, instructed, informed, trained, or otherwise 'educated.' Yet just how the individual 'to be educated' is conceived and approached can vary considerably. How persons and their potential individuality is conceived contributes much to the ways education is formalized to accomplish whatever socio-cultural values it is 'in service to.' Thus, prior to speculating on the historical factors shaping educational intentions and schooling, some careful parsing of notions of persons as individuals is essential. Assessing the purposes of educating, and thereby establishing an adequate basis for evaluating educational content and methods appropriate to those purposes or 'whys,' requires a clear orientation to 'who' and 'what' learns or is to be 'schooled.' The 'whats' and 'hows' of education are not only the subjects 'to be taught' and the methods for teaching them. These terms can as well applied to the questions 'what is being educated' and 'how does it learn.'

The Who of Education: Constituting the Self to be Schooled into Pluralistic, Egalitarian Society

In addition to examining carefully assumptions about the whys and hows of educational efforts, a through reflection upon the effects of schooling requires making very conscious definitions about 'who' is being schooled. Analytically, this question requires elucidating the 'what' of the 'who': what constitutes 'the self' being educationally schooled? In order to educate by 'leading forth' and 'leading toward' in a conscious manner, it is necessary to establish 'what' is being 'led' and how 'it' can be led, taught, instructed—how 'it'

learns, particularly in response to schooling. Two general categories of concern are posed for making such distinctions. In the first case one can consider how the 'self' to be schooled is specified by society and how 'it' tends to identify itself. Establishing how identity for selfhood is composed enables understanding of how schooling shapes sense of self. The second category addresses what about 'mind and body' constitute the ability of a 'self' to learn, what 'aspects of self' can be taught and how differing contexts might influence the learning of such 'self aspects.' These two categories will be addressed in the following two chapters.

This introduction concludes with an exploration of terms constellating around the notion of 'a self' as both a personal and a social status. The term 'self' is taken here as presenting the most inclusive field of reference for personal identity—the 'totality of individual being.' The ways in which a person experiences and expresses 'being a self' can be regarded as their 'enactment of selfhood' that generates a 'sense of self.' As previously emphasized, sense of self is intimately interactive with cultural values and social structures. Thus in order to differentiate how schooling influences aspects of self some distinctions between personal and individual status as representations of selfhood within the context of egalitarian society are offered here.

Personal Identity in the Socio-cultural Context of Egalitarian Pluralism

      Identity status under the aegis of cultural value placed upon egalitarian social standing and pluralistic tolerance of diversity among members of the social collective is quite different from that under values for rigidly hierarchical social classes or castes. An egalitarian is defined as "an adherent of the doctrine of equal political, economic, and legal rights for all human beings (Am. Heritage, '85'p.440)." Pluralism is defined as "a condition of society in which numerous distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural groups coexist within one nation," but also as "the doctrine that reality is composed of many ultimate substances; the belief that no single explanatory system or view of reality can account for all the phenomena of life (Am. Heritage. Dict. 85 p.955)." Two important implications of these definitions are worthy of examination here. In comparing the two terms, it might be inferred that there is some inherent conflict between egalitarian equality and pluralistic diversity: how are radically different persons to be 'made equal?' If equality is a status of similarity or continuity of status in society, then how are the diversified persons of a pluralistic social order to consider them selves as having 'equal status?' This contrast also prompts the question of how sense of self can be educated to both experience and value equality while asserting pluralizing individuality. This issue illustrates the particularly difficult contrast between cultural values and social structure given an emphasis upon egalitarian pluralism: how does an actual society manifest conditions for the attainment of these cultural values or ideals? How can persons be equal and different? That question seems central to considerations of 'schooling selfhood.'

      Thus the prominent significance of individual persons in Western social and cultural tenets seems central to the purposes of education in pluralistic egalitarian society. The very constitution of collective life under the rule of law in democratic political systems having market-driven economies is based upon an elemental importance and preeminent rights ascribed to individual persons—'rights' asserting their 'freedom of action' or 'expression' as social, economic, and spiritual entities. The importance of so-called "inalienable

rights" for persons, as termed in such society-founding documents as the <u>Declaration of Independence,</u> are legally imposed as primary concerns for government. But ethically egalitarian society is also dependent upon the exercise of both social and political responsibilities by citizens in order to preserve personal liberties. Citizenship in such a 'political state' is not a matter of dutiful obedience to tradition or hierarchical authority. Rather, governance is constituted explicitly as "by and for the people"—a 'people' understood to be composed of diverse persons. It is inherent in this concept of social relations that there is great diversity among personal interests and perspectives, which requires such a system devoted to maintaining personal liberty within collective, institutional governance.

The anxiety of the framers of the United States Constitution about how monolithic political power treats persons is expressed in the independent authorities they composed as the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive branches of government. A principle purpose of such a power structure is to ensure attention to the ethical concerns of law and protect persons and minority groups from oppressive abuse by the power of government authority and majority rule. If persons were regarded as more or less similar, such a concern would seem less important. It is the notion that persons have individual character, and thus distinctive interests and needs, that prompts such a political philosophy dedicated to preserving a 'pluralistic society'—a society of diverse, often conflicting, perspectives and expressions.

<u>Discerning Personal and Individual Identities in Pluralistic Society</u>
With that as the socio-political context, this analysis of education and schooling seeks to reflect upon how educational formalities and practices might serve the purposes of such a primary cultural value attributed to 'the individual' and his or her responsibilities of democratic citizenship in a pluralistic society. To 'serve the purposes' of such a society 'an education' would necessarily have to 'serve the purposes' of 'being individual.' In order to consider what sort of education could enable the successful functioning of a society based at least as much on individuality of thought and action as upon conformity, one needs ask what might be meant by 'being individual' as a psychological, political, social, economic, and even spiritual entity. Thus some reflection upon notions of individuality is essential to considering the roles of education in facilitating social life that values individuality.

Individual: *adj.* 1.a. Of or relating to a single human being. b. By or for one person: *an individual portion*. 2. Existing as a distinct identity; single; separate. 3. Distinguished by particular attributes; distinctive. . . .4. Indivisible as an entity, inseparable. . . . –See Synonyms at characteristic, single.—*n* 1.a. A single human being considered separately from his group or from society. b. A single organism as distinguished from a group or colony. 2. An independent, strong-willed person. 3. A particular person. (. . . from Latin *individiuus,* indivisible . . . .)

Usage: *Individual* (noun), in a sense of a person, is most fitting in examples in which a single human being is distinguished from a group or mass, by contrast or stress on individuality: *the*

individual's right to dissent from a majority rule; an individual to the core. In modern usage, *individual* has less acceptance when it is employed to indicate eccentricity or disparagement . . . . It has still less acceptance when it has no meaning that the word *person* would not convey more appropriately . . . .

Individualism: *n.* 1.a. Individuality. 2. The assertion of one's uniqueness. 3. *Economics.* a. The theory that a citizen should have freedom in his economic pursuits and should succeed by his own initiative. b. The practice of this: *rugged individualism.* 4. The doctrine that the interests of the individual should take precedence over the interests of the state or social group.

Individualist: n. 1. One who asserts his individuality by his independence of thought and action.

Individuation: n. 1. The act or process of individuating; specifically, the process by which social individuals become differentiated one from the other. (American Heritage Dictionary, p. 670)

These notions establish the meaning of 'being individuated' as 'an individual' or uniquely distinguished person relative to other persons in one's social grouping or context. In one sense they derive from a certain 'indivisible' unit or status of being. To be individual is thus somehow to be 'singularly unitary.' Rather paradoxically, usage of the term individual is also given as asserting the uniqueness of a person in respect to his or her social context. An individual person is thus regarded as both an irreducible singularity among others and an incomparable status established by some uniqueness of behavior. The dictionary notation on usage indicating that the word person is more general than the term individual indicates a greater sameness for 'persons' and a greater divergence among 'individuals.' In regard to that distinction, person will be used here to indicate a 'social unit' or general member of a collective. As such, persons have generalized or theoretically uniform rights under the law. Individuals, however, being more particularized, become a status that is both singular, like person, yet complex in such a way as to distinguish it from that identity of other persons.

The notion of such a 'unitary particularity' can thus be regarded as something of a conundrum when one considers individuality as necessarily comprised by a complex of distinctive characteristics. For persons in a social or cultural context to 'have' or to express genuine individuality, they must be not only 'a person' among other persons but also be differentiated by expression of characteristic capacities, values, and performances. The 'indivisible' person expresses his or her individuality by means of some distinctive, perhaps unique, expression of specific, or divisible, characteristics. To 'be individual' thus requires manifesting a distinctive complex of qualities and activity—'an individual' is something more than 'a person.' Furthermore, an individual is not easily confused with 'other persons.' Individuality is thus associated here with notions of inner 'character' as a combination of distinguishing features and qualities often asserting some peculiarity and eccentricity.

Thus one might say that individuals are 'in-divisible,' or 'dividable' only 'internally.' A person indistinguishable from other persons by some complex of distinctive aspects would not be 'an individual' in the fullest sense of the definitions given. This distinction between a person and an individual indicates there could be a difference between legalized rights and privileges for 'persons' versus for the individualistic expression of persons. A collective composed of un-individuated persons would be a much simpler context in which to establish 'fair treatment' as there would be little variation among persons. It would also be a context of minimal

diversity in which 'an individual' would tend to be 'deviant.' Such a difference between an 'equality of persons' and that of individuals is represented to some degree between the political theories of totalitarian socialism and democratic capitalism. In the former egalitarian equality appears more primary, but individualistic expression amid greater socio-economic inequality takes precedence in the latter. It might be asserted then that personal liberty, as the rights that protect one from abuse and repression in pursuit of social, economic, and political expression, is a 'liberty from.' The capacity to 'be individual' or to 'pluralize one's sense of self' in contrast to general social standards of equality, is a somewhat different concern. Schooling selves to value equality would appear then to diverge in some regards from schooling selves to individuate.

A last comparison between person and individual is offered around the notion of wholeness and completeness associated with the word integrity. One can assert that the integrity of persons is maintained through their capacity to resist coercion by society and state—to maintain their physical person and property, their family relations, and employment without fear of 'unjust' interference by other citizens or the state. Asserting a status of integrity of the individual is somewhat different. It would involve not only the 'liberty' to act and express one's 'sense of self' but to both know one's individuality complexly and to have developed appropriate capacity to express the 'wholeness' or 'completeness' of that 'unique character'—however complex and contradictory its aspects might seem. Personal liberty in social and political context then does not necessarily provide the necessary conditions for development of diversified individuality and the integrity of its expression.

These introductory considerations of the varied status of persons in society as individuals can be regarded as preparing the way for a more complex reflection upon how 'being individual' is expressed as the 'who of how one is the various aspects of self among various external contexts.'

Educating the Non-conformity of Individuals with/in the Conformity of Society
A society based upon notions of the primary importance of individuals (disparately non-identical or non-conforming persons) can thus be regarded as requiring an educational process that elicits and enhances the individualizing characteristics of persons. The very constitution of collective life in society, in contrast, demands a considerable degree of conformity among its members—persons must have much 'in common' if they are to cooperate effectively in generating a cohesive social context. Yet an individualistic society must necessarily seek to 'conform' its members to a pronounced degree of distinctive individuality—thereby establishing, as it were, a collective identity whose commonality is conformity to non-conformity. Such a society is in a sense founded upon a mutual agreement to promote and protect a 'necessity' and 'right' of persons to express their characteristic individuality. An individualistic society is not compatible with persons fulfilling rigidly established roles and functions, or on uniform conformity to a given set of beliefs and behaviors. Yet there can be no society without community based in commonality. The inherent contradiction of such a social constitution typifies the difficulty of maintaining pluralistic democratic culture. Individuals 'identified' with resisting

conformity to consistent social norms constitute a dubious basis for social collectivity. Such a collectivity can be held together only by an egalitarian regard for the value of the individuality of others, however divergent their 'individuality' might be from one's own.

Designating an 'appropriately individualistic education' in such a social context thereby appears as a most complicated task. People must learn to 'co-operate' as individuals rather than conform as persons. Educational process and practice that does not 'lead forth' the inherent uniqueness of persons, thus enhancing their individual capacity to think, feel, and act autonomously, will in some ways subvert the premises of a society whose culture is based upon the primary importance of the individual person in relation to the collective. The complimentary, if some ways contradictory issue, is that an education that does not effectively orient autonomous individuals toward duties of democratic citizenship and cooperative interpersonal relations cannot serve the purpose of a primary valuation placed upon individual persons either. That value upon individuality cannot be maintained without a social, economic, and political environment overtly dedicated to facilitating both individual autonomy *and* social interaction respectful of such autonomy as the basis for ethically egalitarian culture. In brief, to be 'civil' in such a society would be to speak and act as an 'honest individual,' even if to do so is offensive to some, while promoting and respecting such behavior in others.

Thus, in considering issues of what education is and is for, one must explore what the collective social structures of egalitarian culture require of the individual person being educated such that their conduct preserves that social context. Yet simultaneously one needs consider what the particular constellation of any given individual's intellectual, emotional, and characterological distinctions require for development and expression for such particularization of persons would be required for them to participate in society 'as an individual'—each person requires assistance that enables he or she to individuate.

These considerations are further complicated in a society focused upon highly competitive models for personal achievement within hierarchical structures of social, economic, and political power (the actual social structure of contemporary pluralistic democracies). There will always be an antipathy between notions of a primary value of individuality and the hierarchical orderings of collective life in competitive societies. That friction is particularly evident in the bureaucratic structurings of institutional, government and corporate entities which, though granted the legal 'rights' of citizens, are not necessarily bound to act in accord with the primary value of individuality. Rather, institutional contexts with their intrinsic hierarchical orderings are structurally biased against egalitarian individuality. A further complicating factor for developing distinctive individuality is the mechanistic emphasis technological culture places upon all 'systems' and the 'parts' from which these are comprised. This latter attitude tends to regard even human persons as interchangeable aspects of mechanistic procedures or systems that are valued for predictably consistent characteristics or functions.

In short, the necessity of social conformity combined with emphasis upon interpersonal competition and hierarchical structuring in contemporary social orders render these intrinsically resistant to realizing cultural

values for egalitarian relations and complex individuation of character. Thus educating to promote the latter is also intrinsically difficult.

Individuality as Personal Particularity: Diversifications of Personality and Character

Establishing the value of 'individualized persons' to diversely pluralistic, egalitarian society does not reveal what it is that generates such particularity of persons. Returning to the notion of where the 'agency' that influences the dynamical interplay of 'sense of self' and societal structuring derives from, it was asserted here that both persons and established social structures 'act' to configure each other. But whereas a society's structures appear to 'act' primarily to reproduce themselves by influencing personal 'sense of self,' the particularized person appears to act not only in accord to existing social structures, but at times out of some 'original' and non-conforming impulse.

Given the typically complex and varied composition of social structures in the forms of kinship relations, socio-economic stratifications, religious orientations, and labor specialization, a person can assert some distinctive particularity by their specific involvements among these possible associations. That mode of particularizing personal identity might be termed individuation by selective association in which one 'identifies with' different activities or interests, such as in regard to sports, religion, politics, arts, etc. However, such a selection of association with external social structures could be considered a 'profile' of conformity to available socio-economic functions or roles, One might then ask if it constitutes the uniqueness of individuality. This question proves to be of particular importance for discerning the role of education in a genuinely pluralistic society. Exploring it will involve making distinctions between personal behavior as conformist adaptation to social standards and structurings as the basis for composing a 'sense of self' in contrast to individualizing expression that seems essential to some more intrinsic or inherent sense of self—particularly expression that conflicts with social standards (is socially non-conformist or non-adaptive).

These categories can be distinguished by the terms personal, persona, and personality for the socially adaptive conformist behavior and character for that source of more original individualizing impulses. The term person derives from the Latin *persona*, a word that referred to the mask worn by actors in dramatic performances. Thus the term personality is regarded here as a presentation of self that is 'socialized' to enable participation in collective social life. Personality or 'persona' is then something of a 'mask' one wears to 'play one's role(s) in the socially structured drama of life.' Personality thereby originates in attempts to adapt or conform to the structural factors of actual or operant social life. Thusly it can be regarded as having some significantly 'external origin.' In contrast, the term character is posed to represent impulses and capacities somehow more germane to one's inherent individuality. While aspects or elements of personality might well arise from some 'particularity of individual character,' it can be difficult to tell what aspects might be derived from impulses 'internal' or 'external' to a person's individuality. Character in this contexting is not presented as some monolithic tendency, but rather a 'field of inherent tendencies' that are typically complex and contradictory. It will be examined below in terms of 'sense abilities' and types of intelligences involving

'intellectual character,' 'emotional character,' or 'locomotive character.' This usage of the term character is not congruent with the notion of 'moral character' as a standard of social conscience and conduct that can be 'taught.' Yet another interactive dyad of terms can be posed here between the more externally adaptive (though not necessarily socially successful or acceptable) formulation of persona or personality, and the more 'internally' derived impulses and capacities of Character. As such these categories provide references for how persons develop and express sense of self through the bivalent interactivity of 'external' and 'internal' factors.

Concepts of Individuality as a Basis for Evaluation of Education and Schooling

In an attempt to facilitate evaluation of the effectiveness of educational context, theory, and practice in 'serving the purposes' of individualistic cultural values, some reflections are offered here on individuality as the capacity to both consciously experience and effectively express a person's 'characteristic' particularities of intelligence, emotional feeling, material appetites, ethical valuation, relational association, and spiritual or metaphysical sensibility. In addition, the question of how 'an education' can serve to integrate such individuality of character into an effectively cohesive social collectivity will be considered.

That analysis is engaged through consideration of what constitutes a 'psychological entity' or 'subjective self' and how such a 'psychological context' for personal identity can be regarded as distinctively 'individuated' (chapter one). It will be asserted that the effectively 'individualized person' actually comprises an 'internal socio-political collectivity' that mirrors the external collectivity of individual persons constituting a society. Thus the development of a sense of self composed by 'internal' relations between 'one's' selves or self-aspects will be posited as the primary basis for establishing genuinely democratic and egalitarian behaviors with 'external others.' Thus this investigation proceeds with reflections upon how the 'uniquely differentiated' personal identity of 'an individual' can effectively cooperate with other mutually differentiated personal identities in social, economic, and political collaboration. Here in is the double meaning of this book's title, "Becoming Our Selves, Among Others."

The perspectives generated in these reflections will then be applied to the consideration of how and where 'learning' occurs (chapter two), how learning has been contexted in archaic cultures (chapter three), how learning has been formalized as education within the social, political, and economic hierarchies of Westernized modernity (chapter four), what an education that facilitates sophisticated internal and external relations of the "I" with self and others might be and how it might be practiced in a 'post-modernist' context (chapter five), and how such an education might be appropriately conducted as schooling, pedagogy, and teaching (chapter six).

This writing is in no way intended to present a comprehensive history of educational theory and practice. Neither does it assume to present any adequately thorough articulation of the many notions summarized here from other disciplines of study such as psychology, philosophy, and critical theory. Rather, its broad association of ideas is intended to provoke a more fundamental awareness of the role of complex individuality and sense of self in pluralistically egalitarian culture and about how educational efforts might

promote the articulate expression of both. This effort to expand the references for educating egalitarian individuals necessarily draws upon a variety of intellectual disciplines, yet consciously resists using their specialized terminologies. The many ideas referenced are substantiated by the of work authors who have generated complex analyses of notions about learning, constitutions of personal selves, and social dynamics in both historical and cross-cultural perspectives. Direct citations of those authors' writings have been kept to a minimum for the sake of providing a concise association of these ideas. A bibliography with notes on specific orientations of the works listed to the present subject is provided for further reading.

Chapter 1
The "I" That Needs to Learn How to Be It's Complex Self, Among Others, In The World:
Positioning Self-Knowing among Notions of Personal, Individual, and Collective Identities

This chapter presents a broad consideration of how the "I" of personal identity is composed from the interaction of divergent thoughts, impulses, emotions, experiences, traits of appearance, and mental capacities with cultural concepts, social structures, roles, and conventions. It is thus unavoidably inconclusive and variously reiterative about how the "I" and selfhood can be described and can be understood. The result is a range of references positing the 'who of how one knows and presents one's selves'—a range that provides a basis for asserting a 'radically complex selfhood.' The very diversity of approaches to defining selfhood presented is taken as evidence of its inherently radical complexity. Such irreducible diversity of selfhood is thus regarded as an essential reference to examining educational efforts in relation to pluralistic social values favoring individuality. The perspective presented here is a pluralistic one: selves are actually composed of concurrently diverse references and self-aspects in ways that particularize personal identities. Yet it is also assumed that those identities may or may not articulate inherent individuality of character. Thus the "I" of selfhood that seeks to 'know its self' is posed as confronted with two general fields of origin. From one side selfhood is conditioned by influences of cultural concepts and social structures that are extrinsic to inherent character.

On another side, inherently intrinsic characteristic traits are presumed to be the source of individualized identity. How these two fields of influence on persons interact is assumed to determine 'sense of self' that composes 'a personality.' But the effects of inherently contrasting motives and impulses involved in that process seem inevitably to limit representation of self complexity through socially approved identities. In order for the "I" of selfhood to know 'its self' more thoroughly it requires some educating (leading forth, toward, and inward) about how it is composed, and can be re-composed from those two fields of reference. Only then does the possibility of asserting some autonomous 'self determination' become feasible. Yet the radical complexity of these 'inner' and 'outer' references for selfhood does not suggest any possibility of definitive self-knowing. Rather, selfhood appears in this view as an intricately interwoven play of intrinsic character and extrinsic conditioning. Thus it becomes difficult to discriminate between intrinsic and extrinsic selfhood, between socialized personality and character as 'false' versus 'true' self. Becoming individualized thereby appears to be a matter of 'coming to consciousness' about their interplay, rather than excising what is not somehow 'inherent.' Selfhood in this view cannot be separated entirely from cultural and social contexting and is inherently a 'self of many motives.'

Again, the term 'self' is employed here as the most broad and inclusive status of being that, due to the complexity of the personal < > interpersonal, psychical < > physical dynamics composing it, is inherently complex and ambiguous. The term "I" is then intended to represent the status of 'self-awareness' or self-definition assuming to represent the full range of personal selfhood. Thus the phrase 'sense of self' is used to indicate how that "I" of personal mentality tends to experience 'identify' as/of its 'self.' The term 'identity' is used here in close association with 'sense of self,' with the understanding that there are various, concurrently relevant 'self sensings' or 'self identifications.' In this regard, the "I" identifies the self in particular and typically habitual respects that can appear 'self-consistent' but usually are not when considered closely. Similarly, others and society tend to identify persons with specific references as well and these are typically diverse or inconsistent. There are many 'categorical statuses' of self-identity: personal, familial, social, cultural, ethnic, political, legal, economic, spiritual, biological, racial, psychological, and even philosophical. The "I" is used to represent the general function of consciousness that asserts 'an identity' in regard to these—an identity almost certain to be partial, complex, contradictory, and context dependent. This theme of the diversity of selfhood is correlated in this chapter with a similar process for establishing collective group or social identities. Just as persons are found to grapple with the interactivity between extrinsic or external influences and intrinsic or internal ones as they configure or reconfigure sense of self, so are groups found to do. Thus the self that seeks to become itself among others can be both a personal and a collective one. As persons learn about how their identities are formulated they also learn about collective ones, and vise versa. It is the purpose of the following analysis of sources of identity for selfhood and the dynamical interplay between them to better prepare a discussion on how to educate and school the individualizing aspects of selfhood, both personal and collective.

Posing the "I" of Pluralistic Egalitarian Collectivity

If a person is to become a participating member of a social collective, then such a person must become 'socialized' to the standards of behavior and belief fundamental to the ordering of that collective. In one sense people come to know who or what they are by coming to know what the society expects of them. One comes to 'know one's self' as 'a self' is supposed to be according to one's society's standards for structuring reality and identity. Socially constructed 'sense of self' exists to serve social structures, whether or not such self-sensing represents a person's individual character. If being 'a woman' is socially defined as being submissive then all females are expected to behave accordingly. In a society that emphasizes the individualizing of personal identity and intelligence such a social expectation for identity can only be fulfilled by some degree of self-reflection leading to particularized knowing of one's self as individuated relative to socialized norms for behavior and identity. Yet the concept of social pluralization presents a collective expectation or standard that impels persons to individuate. It is one task for a person to seek to know, and conform to, an externally standardized identity role in a traditional society, such as that of Woman/Mother. But the task of becoming an independently self-aware individuated citizen is quite another type of conforming to social expectation. In this situation key

references are 'internal' and external ones become more vague and various. Identity must be derived from the inside out at least as much as from the outside in. The "I" of an individuated person must know itself as something other than a social role or function and be capable of questioning whether the ways society structures identity and reality actually represent the experience of 'its self'—or that self's experience of others and the world. Somehow it must differentiate its own thought and feeling from external conditioning. Thus the "I" in pluralistic egalitarian culture is confronted with conforming to social standards that involve its developing an individuating self-reflective self-knowing. Yet, again, for an "I" to act as representative of its intrinsic self it must know the particularity of that aspect of selfhood, its character. An understanding, it will be shown, that requires the assistance of appropriately diversified educational efforts and methods of schooling.

This internal struggle of the "I" to know (and enact) the character of the selfhood it represents has a corollary in a pluralistic social collective that seeks to govern its diverse self by means of democratic citizenship. Democratic societies with egalitarian ethics generate effectively representational governance through the informed, autonomous intelligence of their citizens. A citizenry of unreflective and analytically unsophisticated persons can readily be misled by opportunistic politicians, economic manipulations, or their own unacknowledged biases that cause them to remain ignorant of inequities and repressions. Responsible citizenship in such societies depends upon a considerable degree of socio-political, economic, and psychological awareness. In a pluralistic society that attempts to maintain "equal rights" for its ethnically, culturally, economically, religiously, and philosophically diverse members, a citizen needs be both informed about and sensitive to the needs and concerns of dissimilar others. And those others can appear, at least, to be radically different, foreign, competitive, or threatening to one's own sense of selfhood. Thus, just as the "I" of selfhood must struggle to accommodate its own internal or intra-personal complexity, so must the "I" of citizenship contend with external or inter-personal diversity.

Pluralistic societies cannot rely upon the homogeneous bonds of common origins, religious beliefs, inherited social hierarchies, or philosophical tenets to provide cohesion since they are typically comprised of pluralistically 'sub-cultures.' Rather, they must rely upon the creative if often competitive and divergent perspectives, interests, and intelligences of a varied citizenry to attend to their complex issues, but also upon a compassionate mutual respect between often radically individualized persons, to prevent serious rupture of collective cooperation. The development of both individual intelligences and sensitivity to the value of un-like others require a civil-(izing) educational effort. The pluralistic collective must individuate its own complex character just as its personal members are expected to do if it is to 'know it's self' such that it can fairly govern itself. Citizens that are capable of cooperating to generate egalitarian democratic society thus require a basis for appreciating the valuable and varied complexity of others. Simplistic competition for personal advantage alone is an inadequate basis around which a collective can make common cause in seeking egalitarian social order while maintaining pluralistic diversity. Rather, it is the thesis of this analysis that an appropriate basis for such social relations is most vividly derived from an intricate familiarity with one's own individualizing complexities

that can, subsequently, enable mutual interpersonal respect. Thus the development of an individualized, reflectively nuanced sense of self or identity can be regarded as essential to such citizenship. The socio-politically and economically defined "I" must learn both to 'think for it's self' and 'like others' to fulfill its social role as a pluralistic citizen.

In order to explore what might best constitute an appropriate education for egalitarian citizenship, a variety of perspectives on what the "I" of identity is in relation to the self or person and the latter's individuality are here offered. As noted, there are many overlapping aspects to the notions presented here about how 'sense or self' is composed or 'identified.' This rather dizzying array of references is considered important precisely because a profoundly pluralistic society, by the very nature of its cultural and social diversity, constitutes a radically complex set of models for sensing and configuring selfhood. If persons are actually to become capable of individualized discretion about how their self-identities are composed, they will need to develop awareness of and ability to differentiate among the models for selfhood influencing them. In addition, it is important to the theme of this writing to note that characteristics of sense of self or self-conception are regarded as a primary basis for perceiving and conceiving the character of other persons. Self-identification tends to configure other-identification in fundamental ways. Thus a self-identification formed in response to relatively few or narrowly confining models limits capacity for knowing the diversity of others.

Self Identity in Its Many Models of Configuration, Association, and Operation

The term identity is employed here to indicate some 'fixing' or configuration of sense of self in relation to specific references. The "I" of selfhood, composed by way of these references, asserts or accepts particular identifications. 'An identity' can thus be described as a status or position composed by way of specific associations and correlations among a field of contrasting references. Self-identification can be understood as 'knowing self in reference to' various external models or as 'identification with' them. In the latter view, the "I" tends to regard its self as identical with or 'art of' the model—it 'takes the model as its self.' However, even a brief reflective analysis of how identity is derived in relation to models indicates that there is nothing simple about identifying selfhood. Firstly, there is the theme of intrinsic and extrinsic references. Whatever constitutes some 'original' or intrinsic field of personal character, those references inevitably interact with, or react against, a prolific field of extrinsic influences and references. Identity, or identities, can be said to evolve as patterns of interaction between these 'inner' or intrinsic and 'outer' or extrinsic fields. In this view, the binary relationship of intrinsic < > extrinsic develops a third field or reference in the form of those patterns of association that constitute identities for self. Thereby, the overall assertion of selfhood involves an ongoing interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic factors *with* established habituated patterns of identity structure, since all three 'fields' remain to

some degree differently constituted. Identity, then, is derived in part from both intrinsic character and extrinsic influences or context. This interplay develops in reference to social and cultural dynamics and models.

With this general model in mind, the rest of this chapter elaborates various ways of modeling identity configurations. Theoretical perspectives on how models for selfhood are derived, organized, and operate in human consciousness can be found in various intellectual disciplines of analysis. Sociological perspectives elaborate structural relations between persons and societies, analyzing historical, political, legal, and economic factors. Philosophical perspectives analyze conceptual foundations for valid rational determinations of self, other, and collective status, distinctions between body and mind, even subjective and objective statuses of reality. Empirically scientific perspectives investigate evolutionary origins, genetic determinations, and physiological mechanisms for consciousness and personal behaviors. Psychological perspectives include such physiological examinations of brain functions as well as behavioral conditioning and intangible psychic dynamics as the basis of identity. Cultural anthropology perspectives provide theories about how specific cosmological, mythological and religious references to a 'more than human' realm of intention or intelligence configure sense of self and social orders. The following examples of references for selfhood and its social contexting of identity represent summary simplification of these disciplinary perspectives and their insights.

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Cultural Ideals and Social Structures as Selfhood Models

Selfhood in as Expression of Social Order
Specific attributes of societal structures that categorize persons by function and class, or designate particular types of relationships between them pose perhaps the most overt models for self-identity. Persons are virtually 'born into' identifications of selfhood deriving from their gender, social status of family, racial, ethnic, national, and geographic 'origins.' Social order also involves extensive categorization of approved and disapproved thought and expression. Self-identification is constrained by what is affirmed as proper or condemned as improper. In vertically hierarchical social structures persons are presented with a pervasive model of superior versus inferior orientation for identity. In societies with more laterally complex networks of function and relations the modeling is less linear and more complex, often tending to promote more egalitarian relations.

Selfhood as Expression of Political Order
The interplay of personal sensing of self and societal structures is particularly evident in terms of how political power relations are ordered in a given group or collective. In so far as dominant social structures provide models for composing self-identity, persons are readily inclined to reflexively 'know their selves,' and the selves of others, in reference to how the self of collective society is configured politically. Authoritarian,

totalitarian, monarchical, and fascistic political orders pose remarkable different models for self-identity than do communist, socialist, or democratic ones. In particularly hierarchical political formats, there is often only one person who can claim to be the "I" of the social collective. The office of kingship is the primary example in which the entirety of a society's diversity converges upon a singular, personal aspect—the person of an all-important 'head of society.' This form of singularizing the collective identity is pointedly expressed in the tendencies of kings and queens to speak with the "royal we" that overtly identifies their person as the collective and the collective as their person. Though such royalist society presents a model of all-inclusive singular identity, there is also an implication that only one person is granted the right to make such a claim. Thus citizens subject to the power of kings in some sense have 'given over' their identity to another person—they become a subordinate extension or self-aspect of the supreme "I" of collective selfhood.

Such singularity of collective identity has slightly different expression in so-called totalitarian and authoritarian political structures. Under the former, persons are forced to submit their will and identity to the total control of those persons or 'the system' that is 'in power.' It might well be said that selfhood is even more completely 'given over' to social structure in this instance than under the rule of kingship. In contexts termed authoritarian, the concept suggests that persons have at least some liberty in defining their own selves *as long as* they defer to the authority of centralized power—be that endowed in an individual or ruling elite. There appears less 'total control' here than under totalitarian political rule which is considered to assert complete dominance over personal and social identity. But authoritarian conditions surely obstruct a personal sense of latitude to 'do as one is' or 'freely individuate' since one never knows when those in power might decide certain behavior or thought is unacceptable.

Selfhood presented by representational forms of political governance, such as republics and parliamentary or congressionally legislative democracies, posits a much different example. Under these structures persons are presented with a more complex and varied models for relations of self-aspects constituting collective identity. Thereby, a more diverse and less reductive model of personal selfhood tends to be posed. Further modelings for selfhood can be found in such socio-political categories as liberal versus conservative. In so far as these are the options for expressing one's selfhood politically, the forms of such selfhood are constrained by definitions of these categories. One might experience selfhood as either more 'liberally' or 'conservatively' constituted. Yet another contexting for selfhood in collective attitudes can be seen in strategies of national conduct. A state that is avowedly neutral and non-confrontational presents a strikingly different model for personal selfhood than one that is aggressively warlike or exploitatively imperial.

Selfhood as Expression of Legal Definitions

Legal codes and definitions offer institutionalized models for self-identity. The more overt form is exemplified by legal designations of a class status, such as that of 'slave' or 'criminal.' But even gender can be defined in legal terms and thus become an institutionally defined category. Legalistic definitions provide the

more rigid formulations of socially derived identity. Legal status as a person granted or denied specific rights, responsibilities, and privileges has a wide range, depending upon the social and political orders it supports. In more egalitarian societies, legal status confers a much greater latitude to one's legally constituted references for self-identification than in more hierarchically ordered ones.

Selfhood as Expression of Productive Functions and Economic Models

Productive functions of individuals in their collective offer potent models of self-identity. Functional roles such as hunter, farmer, wage laborer, bureaucrat, banker, scientist, teacher, etc, present a contextual field for asserting and understanding selfhood. Specific economic structures pose models for composing self-identity in so far as these configure social relations and primary modes of valuation in a given society. A society that uses barter as its economic mode poses a more subtle and contextually dependent model of interaction between persons than does one relying primarily upon the more abstract and quantitative one of money and capital. An economic system that produces notable disparity of wealth and power between persons relative to their productive functions poses more of a hierarchically vertical model for self-identity. Selfhood in a collectively organized agrarian peasant economy is positioned quite differently than in one structured by capital, competitive markets, and consumer spending.

Mythical and Religious Models for Selfhood

Mythic and religious depictions of relations between persons and some super natural or divine realms of causation pose potent references for self-identity composition. Selfhood here derives from, and is thus modeled upon, some original and other-than-human references. Some such depictions emphasize a more lateral, variously constellated model, such as in pagan cultures that present multiple and contrasting figures of divine selfhood (ancient Greek gods and goddesses). More vertically hierarchical and reductive models are posed by monotheistic religions that present a more singular model for self-identity in their 'one god.' The notion of human status judged by God to be inherently flawed due to "original sin," thus destined to be an immaterial soul 'trapped' in the inherently corrupting form of a carnal body presents an intensely oppositional and conflicted model. The animist concept of human consciousness as participating in a continuum of intentional consciousness in a natural world inhabited by spirits presents quite another context for self-identification.

Scientific Models for Selfhood

Secular societies attempt to define reality and human status without invoking overtly mythical and religious references. Yet the effect of rationally and scientifically asserted status can be seen to have similar effects upon self-sensing and identification as do the overtly religious. Empirically scientific assertions about status are regarded with a similar level of belief and conviction, as are mythical and religious ones. Selfhood as seen through the methods, evidence, and interpretations of science is modeled just as potently when science is the dominant mode of identifying reality and truth. If a scientific basis is asserted for the notion that humans are

born 'as blank slates' whose character and personality are determined by behavior conditioning, then a powerful model of selfhood is asserted. Similarly, if behavior and personality are attributed to genetic factors that pre-determine them then the self tends to be regarded as 'programmed' and lacking in autonomy. Western medicine is a potent scientific model for selfhood. It tends to assert the preeminent importance of health as a homeostatic condition. All illness and discomfort thus become pathological violations of that status. A self that feels depressed is thereby 'diseased.' (Chinese medical approaches pose a rather less oppositional model of the 'psychosomatic' self.) There are also much less reductive or oppositional scientific models, exemplified by the theory of relativity between time and space or the mathematical validation of the phenomenon of deterministic chaos.

<u>Philosophical Models for Selfhood</u>

Philosophical perspectives on how human consciousness is derived and functions are also similar to mythical and religious depictions as selfhood models. Philosophical models differ from the religious in that they are asserted less in reference to a super natural or divine status of origin and more to a rationally validated interpretation of phenomena and consciousness. The philosophic is also generally distinguished from the scientific because the former does not rely on the empirical and experimental basis of the latter. As such, rational philosophy is most closely associated with Western cultural history and its development of secular societies. Western philosophical perspectives tend to emphasize an origin of selfhood in analytical thought, thus centering self-identity 'internally' in relation to cognitive processing that is abstracted even from the physical body (Descartes', "I think therefore I am"). Human identity is thereby rather intrinsically 'set off from' the rest of nature as the exclusive locus of rational cognition (a distinction many cultures do not make). The Western emphasis on reason as self-consistent rationalization promotes a rigidly progressive, linear model. Chinese philosophy tends to position selfhood in relation to a non-linear complementarity of nature (the dynamical interplay of Yin and Yang, the "way of Tao"). Philosophical notions about the existence or impossibility of "free will" or human autonomy pose models for self-identity just as potent as religious ones about being born in "original sin" or scientific ones about genetic determination of character and behavior.   Similarly, concepts about whether accurate human knowing is derived from analytical cognition or intuitive understanding present distinctly contrasting models.

Individual and Collective Selfhood: The Inherent Opposition and Interdependence of Personal and Social Selves.

Though it would seems that selfhood is constituted in or by individual persons, selfhood can be conceived of 'extending beyond' persons in so far as personal identity is intrinsically dependent upon cultural and social references. If persons 'know themselves' in large part by reference to values, beliefs, and roles established by the socio-cultural context in which they develop and live, then their selfhood is constituted to

some considerable degree in and of the 'out there' of society. Yet the very concept of individuality indicates that there are significant differences between socialized definitions of selfhood and its particularization in personal expressions.

Of Social, Personal, and Individual Identities

A person can be regarded as having a 'species identity' as a single human being among other human persons. But such a person is no more or less or differently human than another person in this most general of self-identities. Thus such identity is an utterly collective identification. But a social collective requires differentiated yet mutually understood aspects of identity that 'function' in interpersonal associations. Persons in a given social collective are typically categorized by certain roles, rights and beliefs understood by all. They are distinguished further by subsets of group distinctions such as gender, age, filial roles, social status, and ethnicity. While some of these distinctions are derived from physical traits of persons (such as male versus female) their significance or meaning is socially derived. Thus one's ethnicity or race is 'identifying' by way of cultural belief or social structure, not because it necessarily causes personal *experience* of being 'a particular self.'

Identity as a member of society is primarily composed of such shared definitions and associations. Personal identity thus derives partly from a particular set of socially defined associations and roles. However, traits of appearance, behavior, and expression can be regarding as manifesting individual character as well as social roles. The same traits or actions can be interpreted as both part of socialized identity and of individual peculiarity. Individual identity as particularly prompted by some 'inherent characteristics' might compliment or conflict with one's socialized personality. Thus the three terms suggest a sort of spectrum: social<>personal<>individual. On the one end, social identity could be seen as more a matter of likeness with other persons in specific social roles and status, whereas the individual extreme would be more typically a matter of un-likeness or peculiarity. In between lies the range of personal identity and manifest personality. Personal conduct can express anti-social behavior that is reactive to social standards or that comes into conflict with particular standards by adhering to others that are in conflict. That is to say, social standards for proper identity are often contradictory or context dependent. Propriety of socialized identity can be so context dependent that the same behavior in different contexts is acceptable while in another it is prohibited.

This point raises yet another difficulty in establishing 'an identity' since not all cultural values, social standards or structures are complimentary. Thus a socialized identity can be inconsistent with itself regardless of whether or not it expresses individual character. Behavior deemed inappropriate to societal standards might be identifying of a given person (violence) but be more a consequence of maladaptation to, or confusion about, those standards rather than expression of intrinsic character. Thus socially problematic or improper personal behavior is not necessarily expressive of characteristic individuality. Furthermore, the 'uniqueness' of individual character need not be associated only to self-expression that is non-conforming to social standards. It can just as well be an individualizing manner of performing socially sanctioned roles. Individuality is thus

expression of inherent character, which might or might not find a readily approved context in social structures. It can, thereby, be either overtly or subtly non-conformist. Offering these distinctions is not meant to imply that 'telling the difference' between socialized and individualized identity is an easy task, or that there are ultimately exact distinctions between these identities and their expressions. Rather, the intent is to establish the complexity of interplay between socialized and individualized identity that is presented 'as personality' but which is understood to typically be an incomplete representation of 'the self.'

Person as Part and A/part From Collective Society.
      Any collective group, be it identified by attributes of ethnicity, gender, or political order, is composed of persons collected together by some commonality. Personal identities are thus always in some part differentiated by 'membership' in collectives, as if being an 'arm' or 'leg' of some particular 'body.' Collective groupings similarly are identified in much the same ways as persons. Collectives can express individualizing characteristics; such as distinguish different nationalities, religious sects or labor unions. Persons share identity with other persons by way of association in the same collective groupings while at the same time giving the group its particular character by their individualizing diversity. Such groupings can also share identity as subsets of larger collective groupings, or meta-collectives, that are composed of more specialized collectives. Nation states are thusly composed of sub-sovereignties (states or provinces) whose members have a provincial identity but share a national identity with other members of the larger collective group as citizens of a certain nationality ('these United States'). Thus even collectives are constellations of other collective identities/identifications, just as personal identities are 'variously composed.' And since personal identities of self are inherently comprised in association with collective social groups and structures, personal and collective 'sense of self' inevitably overlaps. (Fig.   )

      Personal identities can thus be seen as ultimately indistinct from collective ones, since each are composed of attributes of the other. A collective derives its particularizing character from that of its members, and vice versa (i.e., the individual doctors' composing the American Medical Association). Yet personal associations with collective identities that particularize personal identity are typically multiple. Persons are identified by association with many collective groupings. Persons in one collective also associate with other groups. Thereby all collective identities, like personal ones, tend to overlap other seemingly distinct groupings. Contemporary pluralistic democratic societies are an extreme manifestation of such complexes of diverging and converging identifications that constellate a 'single' identity, such as being 'an American.' (Fig.   )

      A person is thus the various persons posed by their various collective associations and social roles, as in being Doctor, Mother, Senator, and Jazz Singer concurrently.   Yet the individually identifying characteristics of a personal self can also be distinct from any particular collective identity. Most complexly individuated persons, in so far as such are 'unique individuals,' are likely to find 'some' of their 'self/selves' lacking an appropriately complimentary collective association or identity in available social contexts structures. Some self-aspect just

does not 'fit in.' A general distinction of this type is represented by determinations of propriety, of what constitutes proper versus improper conduct or thought according to the values of social collectives. Improper conduct often has no collective identity unless it is with some 'anti-social' grouping. Thus the 'improper' often is hidden from public view in psychological 'repressions' or 'denials,' or relegated to categories of criminality, perversion, sociopathy, or insanity. Attitudes and behavior that do not 'fit in' are either unacknowledged as valid or given overtly negative value.

Inherent character as a basis for self-identity is likely to conflict with some aspects of social propriety even as it is known in relation to those standards. Thus socially affirmed and more individualized personal identifications are intricately, inextricably interdependent, while ultimately also 'self-contradictory' or 'at odds' with 'their selves.' Selfhood's identity is thus radically complex and inherently incompletely represented by way of societal standards.

Collective Conformity and Its Purposes in Co-operative Society.

An effectively egalitarian social association might be described as one that promotes both the survival of its members as a coherent collective and the capacity of persons to function as individuals, to express their particularity within collectives. Such a mutuality of collective and personal depends upon social values that emphasize their cooperation.   Societies whose collective identities are defined narrowly and consistently, and thus in which individuation of persons is more repressed, can be said to function by deferral of individual selfhood to the standardized collective ones. Persons thereby cooperate in posing the collective social identity. But cooperation in such cases tends to be with a hierarchical set of social roles or classes and a narrow range of 'proper behavior' or personal expression that constitute the submission of individuality and conformity of persons to social standards. Pluralism, in contrast, suggests a sense of individualized choice and conscious capacity to choose. Thus one can observe in such settings a dynamic of 'co-operation,' rather than capitulation to conformity. As represented by democratic political life, persons must operate together (co-operate) out of a mutually values differences and likeness in order for representational government to actually function representationally. Only then can "majority rule" manifest a genuinely pluralist complexity that is more inclusive than conformist and coercive.

Conformity in more pluralistic societies thereby becomes a matter of conforming to co-operating with other overtly individuated persons and collective groupings rather than uncritical acceptance and obedience to standards. Pluralistic societies are often noted to generate a proliferation of 'special interest groups' and a tendency of these to compete for power emphasizes. Such divisiveness emphasizes the need for 'conformity to co-operation' if a functional collective is to exist. Absence of such co-operation can create an aura of chaos capable of prompting the rise of fascist impulses toward enforcing unity.

The Self Reflections of Personal and Collective Identity

The reciprocity of effects between personally and collectively derived sense of suggests not only their ultimate inseparability, but also a microcosmic<>macrocosmic relationship. Each 'mirrors' the other's structural configurations and dynamics of activity. The personal complex of self-identifications presents a 'microcosm' of the 'macrocosmic' the complex of collective identity. As noted, the relations between these complex constellations of identifications for the self/selves of persons and groups is interactive. One does not simply generate the other. The intrinsic tension between individuated personal and standardized social collective identities also reflects the internal tensions in each field of identity. Each expresses internal struggle between contrasting and competing aspects. Persons must contend with being Doctor OR Mother, genuinely autonomous or essentially submissive 'social units.' Similarly, collectives are pulled between identification with contrasting socio-cultural roles or values—such as being Peacemakers or Warriors, primarily egalitarian or caste/class ordered. Such typically irresolvable contrasts depict the inherent, inclusive identity of selfhood, be it personal or collective.

The In-divisible Self of the Indivisible Political Person

The singular person, as a political and legal entity, possesses an indivisible social identity. A person so defined is held to be 'responsible' for his or her actions according to an assigned category of legal status (such as minor or adult) and applicable legal codes. Such a singular person is granted one vote in political elections pursuant to that standard of singular identity. Yet the particularities of such a political person's individual thoughts, motives, history, etc., can be taken into account in assessments of guilt and punishment for violations of legal codes. Such distinction indicates a cultural regard for the 'internally divisible' (and variously 'center-able') aspects of an 'outwardly' singular self. 'Internal conflicts' or 'divisions' of an individual's cognitive and emotional 'constitution,' in relation to particularities of their historical origin, experience and development (their 'given' and 'attained' identities) can be considered as mitigating circumstances in assessing appropriate degrees of culpability and punishment for a given infraction of legal conduct. The notion of motive thus represents a sensitivity to the internal variability of human character in each person and under different circumstances or contexts, as in "crimes of passion" versus those of greed or sadism. An admission of 'legal guilt' accompanied by emotional remorse is thus regarded as presenting an particularized status of culpability that differs significantly from guilt without expression of remorse. The person as legal political entity is technically guilty in both cases, but might be judged quite despite the criminal actions having been the same. An extreme case of such distinction is represented in legal trials involving persons assessed as manifesting schizoid or 'split' personalities such that they are judged incapable of 'internal self governance' (self-centering) and thus legal responsibility for their actions. Such persons can be held not guilty because they are considered 'not responsible for their actions' due to the extremity of their 'internal dividedness.' Thus society tends to judge the self's actions in regard to how well these represent an 'internal ordering' or centering and how accurately it reflects social structures and standards, yet can also allow greater latitude for the deviance of some individualizing

aspects of personal character and motive. Such tolerance of the 'inwardly divisible self' by a social order that is structured around the assumption of singular personal identity is essential to maintaining any genuinely pluralistic social collective

Theoretical Models for Selfhood in Science and Psychology

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The Physiological Self of Brain Science: Variations in the Neurological Basis of Personal Cognitive Functioning

The radically adaptive capacities of human consciousness can also be discerned in their physiological basis. The brain, as the anatomical context for mind or the dynamics of consciousness, provides significant references for the complexity of selfhood and how it develops, is conceptualized, and experienced. Brain structure in itself presents a material basis for conjecturing the diverse origins of 'self aspects' as deriving from particularities of physiological brain function. What is termed "the brain" is not a simple, singularly constructed organ. On the grossest level, the brain is physiologically distinguished as having three major aspects, some times classed as 'three brains': limbic, cerebellum, and cerebral cortex. An evolutionary 'history' is ascribed to these 'parts' of the brain designating their sequence of 'evolutionary development'—with the limbic aspect considered as the most 'archaic' or original. It is feasible then to propose that aspects of human intelligence, motive, and behavior are generated from quite different 'evolutionary organs of consciousness.' Thus there is considered to be a physiological 'source' for both 'irrational' "fight or flight" mental impulses in the more archaic brain aspect and one for rationally analytical responsiveness in the more recently evolved cerebral cortex. Differences of individual conduct and capacity might thereby be associated with characteristic emphasis in individuals upon different brain aspects or functions.

The Self of Distinct Brain Functions and Their Variable Interactivity

Scientific study of the human brain, or "brain science," has only more recently developed the technological capacities for meticulous examination of the radically complex functioning of the 'organ of consciousness.' The emerging, and rapidly changing, interpretations of organic brain function and how it might actually 'generate consciousness' are presenting models of great diversity and complexity. Various cognitive functions, such as for language, mathematic calculation, etc, are identified as typically being 'located' in specific physical aspects of the brain. These 'functions' are observed to operate concurrently *and* interactively. Yet despite a typical compartmentalization of cognitive functions, persons have been observed to act in a relatively normal manner even after injury has incapacitated one of the brain regions dedicated to a particular cognitive function. In some cases, loss of such a region has been observed to be compensated by another part of

the brain 'learning to perform' a cognitive activity not typically associated with it. In addition, just how the brains of particular persons perform various cognitive functions is determined to be at least somewhat disparate. The necessary interactivity of brain parts and functions in producing perceiving< >thinking< >feeling is evidently variable. Brains, or at least their functionings, are inherently inconsistent or individualized. How one person's brain < > mind constitutes and employs the capacity for language and speech might differ considerably from how another person does so. And yet, such different brain processes for language appear (at least on occasion) capable of communicating mutual understanding.

The Intentional and Autonomic Self of Cognitive Processing

The vast majority of "cognitive processing" occurring in a brain is said to transpire 'below' the level of ordinary self-conscious awareness. Just as the brain regulates much body physiology (heart rate, glandular function, etc.) by way of the autonomic nervous system, it evidently conducts much of its cognitive activity in a similarly 'automatic mode.' Thus the "I" of self-aware selves is not aware of most of the cognitive activity occurring in the very brain that that "I" presumes to represent. In one regard, the vast majority of perceptual 'data' from the five senses of vision, touch, heat, scent, and hearing is not registered by the self-conscious "I." Aspects of such perception that do 'come to awareness' have been culled from a much greater field of cognitive processing. In another regard, much of the cognitive activity of the 'autonomic self' that evidently supports conscious awareness in the form of analytical thought and imagination occur in a virtually spontaneous interplay of brain aspects or functions to which the "I" of self-awareness remains oblivious. Some awareness of this sort of 'subliminal' brain activity evidently appears in the 'remembering' of dreams after waking from sleep. This concept of the majority of neurological brain activity that constitutes human consciousness being essentially 'unconscious' or not readily accessible to self-awareness testifies to how challenging self-knowing of one's own cognitive and emotional selfhood can be to obtain. Just how intentional this autonomic consciousness might be is obviously difficult to assess. Yet it seems reasonable to assume that, at the very least, it operates by way of socially conditioned patterns as well as from some intrinsic, individualizing character of the particular person/brain 'doing the cognating.'

Particularity of Identity as Individually Differentiated Neural Pathway Development

The manner in which brain function performs specific cognitive tasks, such as interpreting sensory data about color or texture and employing concepts in intellectual analysis, is currently understood to involve neural pathways in brain tissues that associate in networks whose patterns of neural 'firing' generate the appropriate functions of consciousness. These pathways and networks are not inherent in the brain but must be generated and 'built up' in response to external stimuli. Such a process can be understood as the most basic process of human learning. Repetition of specific stimuli supposedly 'strengthens' these networks such that they become more complexly developed and are more likely to endure over time. Whether learning to ride a bicycle or perform calculus, neural networks must be developed in the brain on a physiological basis.

The cognitive capacities for 'mind' require development of specific physiological structures in the brain. However, just which stimuli or how much are required for one brain<>mind<>person to develop appropriate and adequate pathways to enable performance of a given aspect of consciousness might vary considerably between persons. In some brains the pathways might develop more readily and be more enduring than in others. The same cognitive functions might develop in response to different stimuli in different brains. Researchers also indicate that how networks 'link' various cognitive functions in particular brains might vary considerably. Such linking of interactivity between pathways and specialized areas of cognitive function form meta-pathways or patterns that can, presumably, also vary, How persons produce and inter-relate perceptual, analytical, and imaginal cognitive functions might differ considerably. In addition, developed pathways that are not adequately re-stimulated can literally dissipate so that they are no longer present to enable the activities in relation to which they developed. Long-term brain studies in childhood and adolescence indicate surges of pathway generation that build up networks as well as stages of "pruning" in which some are literally terminated.

Thus the physiological basis for consciousness provides a remarkably intricate and transient context for development of cognitively individualized selfhood. The concept of categorization as a means of managing diversity and contrast in and among persons seems apt to this view of how brains develop the neurological basis for 'a mind.' The implied complexity of brain categorization and subsequent inter-relation of cognitive categories, between specific pathways and regional functions, is vastly complex. But it is presumably that very complexity and its potential for variation that constitutes the possibility of radically adaptive human consciousness. Some theorists attempt to define it all as computational activity, in comparison to electronic computers that 'run' software programs. Many analysts resist this comparison, however, feeling it cannot account for either the individually adaptive creativity or emotional aspects of human consciousness.

Self Differentiation in the Developmental Sequences of Brain Aspects and Cognitive Functions

Yet another context for diversification or disparity between brains and their functioning is added by interpretations of brain development in different persons over time. The brains of infants and juveniles have long been assumed to undergo rapid changes in a process of maturation. More recent study indicates the brains of adolescents are subject to 'robust development' as well. But current studies indicate that development over time is neither consistent between individuals nor a gradual, steady process within them. Rather, it is an irregular one involving sudden neural pathway proliferation and "pruning." Even adult brains have been shown capable of significant physiological changes in response to certain types of stimuli. Thus different persons might well be in different states of brain development at the same age and the actual capacity of their brains to perform certain cognitive process might fluctuate over time or under differing conditions.

Perhaps it is the concept of individualized brain development in response to particular types of stimuli that is most compelling as an indicator of the variable ways brains and their functioning can develop in response to education and schooling. This view of development does not present an intrinsic, uniform, maturation

process that generates predictable neural networks in response to the same set of stimuli. Rather, the consciousness of persons appears to derive from context-dependent and stimulus specific factors for brain development that are at least in part determined 'by their own brains'—or some 'other' individualizing characteristic of their being. These diversities and interactive complexities of brain structure and dynamical functioning are potent references for notions of personal diversity and individuality. Personal intelligence and character, judged in reference to brain science, can be regarded as deriving from inherent differences in the development of physiological bases for consciousness. Such a view proves particularly significant for questions about how to educate the intelligences and sense abilities of persons. Brain and 'mind' develop differently under different influences, and among different persons subject to similar influences.

<u>The Two-Sided Self of the Bicameral Brian/Mind</u>

Brain anatomy also presents the structural characteristic of differentiated right and left hemispheres composing the cerebellum. This lateral division is interpreted as the basis for significant categorical distinctions in brain functions or characteristics of mental operation that together constitute a bicameral mind. In general, the left hemisphere is associated with more logical and rational cognitive processing and the right with more intuitive, emotional and creative modes of knowing and feeling. The hemispheres are linked by a bundle of nerve fibers termed the corpus callosum. But in extreme instances of epilepsy this connection has been surgically severed and persons have been able to continue to function mentally. This anatomy and its evident physiological role in generating different modes of consciousness and knowing present a model of a 'two-sided mental identity' as a basis for selfhood. Persons can thereby be considered as having some intrinsic basis for contrast or competition between the more rational modes of composing identity and more symbolically or emotionally based ones. Such distinction has been viewed as relevant to how persons learn different types of tasks and how learning styles might be individualized as a consequence of greater emphasis in an individual's mental operation being placed upon one hemisphere.

The Psychologically Conceived Self: Theoretical Logics for a Complex Yet Personally Singular Mental Selfhood.

<u>Versions of Psychic Structure and Dynamics in 'An Individual'</u>

Attempts to describe the 'parts' that compose a personal mind or psyche (terms used here to indicate the broadest 'field' of human consciousness), and how these manifest a self, constitute theories or 'logics' of psyche—psyche-ologies. Such theoretical 'models of self dynamics' speculate on how supposed aspects of mind interact to generate some unitary 'field of consciousness' that somehow manifests both an individualized person and a socialized member of a collective group. Modern psychology took shape within the development of medical science with its remarkably effective mechanical interpretations of anatomy, physiology, and biochemistry. However, techniques for examining the intricacies of brain function have only recently become available towards the end of the 20th century. Thus 19th century medicine could provide no complex

physiological basis for human consciousness and character. One response to this situation was to avoid explaining any physical basis for human consciousness and consider it a sort of epiphenomenon—a sort of 'by product' of the body's functions. Such a view allowed rather informal psychological theory to post that personality and social achievement were 'acts of will power.' Those who excelled were simply stronger willed than those who did not. Nonetheless, a potent impulse to conceive more adequate explanations persisted, and it was primarily medical doctors who conceived psychological theories of selfhood. To do so they had to resort to making models that did not have direct bases in known anatomy and physiology. Two general forms of these models can be said to have developed. One type adheres to relatively linear, mechanical references. These include the concept that selfhood is strictly predetermined by genetic factors that control human capacities and behavior—rather like a computer program. Another version holds that humans are born essentially as "blank slates" upon which society and experience 'write' the development of personality and behavior. Here again, a person is an expression of some 'programming,' the results of which are 'good' if the conditioning is appropriate to creating socialized thought and behavior. These two perspectives are contrasted as the "nature and nurture" theories of human development. Such extremely reductive versions of how selfhood comes to be composed are both placed in radical doubt by recent brain science studies of the complexity and sensitivity of brain functions to a myriad of inter-active factors. The other type of psychological theory that originates in the late 19th century seeks a more dynamically complex model for human consciousness that were not simplistically mechanical or deterministic. It is this mode of psychological theorizing that will be considered most closely in relation to individuality.

Significantly, such interpretative representations of mind and selfhood were not invented by modern psychology. Plato posed the image of a charioteer whose cart is pulled by two horses, one 'rational' and one 'irrational,' to represent the struggle of the "I" of human being in ordering a socialized, self-aware identity, within an intrinsically 'divided' consciousness. Such a tripartite division of whatever constitutes personal consciousness was posed in religious terms as 'mind, body, and soul.' Its most famous psychological reiteration is Freud's id, ego, and super ego. All such 'models of mind' and the proposed dynamics of their interactions could be considered 'logics of the self.' In whatever manner the 'parts' of persons are theoretically configured, there is most always an aspect that plays the role of negotiating between other parts in choosing how to think, feel, and act *as a singular, individual person.* The most commonly used contemporary term for such a self-organizing self-aspect that acts to compose an "I" is "the ego." It is also sometimes termed the "executive function" in consciousness.

Among the many diverse theoretical schemas describing psychic structure there seems to be general agreement that a person's particular expression of 'mindfulness,' their 'intelligent individuality,' is to some degree a matter of choice. That is to say, the sense of an "I" derives from some 'agency' in mind or psyche that functions to compose 'a self' from diverse internal and external references for selfhood. Much of that composing of self-identity is regarded as reflexive or not overtly conscious while some seems to be more overtly

selected. One can thereby readily suppose that to 'become individuated' would require considerable overt familiarity with whatever various aspects of 'the self' or psychic person are exerting influence on a person's thought, feeling, and behavior so that the "I" or ego could more consciously align behavior and character. Becoming 'an individual,' as well as gaining the capacity for 'taking personal responsibility' for one's actions, thus requires some degree of psychological self-knowing—knowing about one's own psychic composition.

Attempts to become aware of the complexity of one's individual personal psychic composition requires some 'logic of psyche' to assist in sorting one's thoughts, impulses, and feelings into the parts or aspects that compose the complexity of selfhood. Yet there are so many models of psychic structure and dynamism, so many psychological versions of the 'logic of complex selfhood,' how can one know which one is 'the right one?' Perhaps there are many such versions because human being is so complicated in its psycho-somatic totality that personal psychic life and its individualized manifestations cannot be 'explained' by any single theoretical representation. Perhaps the diversity of individualized selves requires persons being presented in society with a diversity of psyche-ological models. The premodern version of such psychologies of selfhood and human-consciousness are found in the stories and descriptions of myth, religion, and philosophy. Subsequently, under the more modern influence of scientific rationalism, such representations of mind and selfhood came to be based in empirical observation of not only biological functions but the vast diversity of human behavior.

The point of considering 'logics of psyche' that do not present simplistically mechanical models is that, despite the absence of empirical evidence that they are functionally accurate, these types of theories present a dynamical activity much more like evident expressions of human experience and behavior. In addition, the dynamical activity among self-aspects they model is more like that suggested by recent brain science studies of that 'physiological basis for selfhood,' the brain itself. Thus whichever of theses psycho-logical modelings and theories might be 'the most accurate' in the empirical or quantitative, considering their range can indicate something of how complexly 'the self imagines its own self-complexity.' If education is regarded as about 'teaching self knowing' then these models are likely to be important references for schooling.

The Complex Self of Modernist Psychology—or, Psychologies of the Hidden Self

Psychological thought that poses models of consciousness adequate to the radically diverse expressions of human individuality might be characterized as 'the psychology of the hidden.' This phrase is meant to convey that there must always be more to mind or psyche than 'appears on the surface' as self-awareness or typically habitual behavior. The most famous founder of such theories is Sigmund Freud, who attempted to apply scientifically rational analysis to seemingly inexplicable disruptions of 'normal socialized identity.' In examining such "pathological" behaviors that seemed to derive not from physiological disease but some unseen, unfamiliar mental 'forces' in what he termed his hysterical female patients, Freud conceived of a 'hidden aspect' to the self. He began an investigation for what was 'hidden below' or 'in' the overt symptoms of anxiety, distress, and disorientation. Understandably, as a medical doctor Freud's analytical approach to human

consciousness generated a systematic theoretical conception of psychic function and its effects upon behavior inspired by the medical model of disease in which he was trained. Commensurately, he attempted to provide some scientific basis for human psychology by posing its origins in biological urges. But he also found it necessary to propose a configuration for personal consciousness that had no literal, empirical basis in anatomy or physiology. That conception involves a two-fold field of psychic activity composed by two opposed aspects or levels out of which human behavior is generated—the conscious and the subconscious. Summarily stated, the subconscious aspect is composed of impulses, thoughts and feelings that have been 'repressed' from conscious awareness but nonetheless exert influence on behavior as if by some invisible magnetic force—one that 'comes from below,' as it were, some conscious threshold of self-awareness. This fissure of/in the self is regarded in Freud's theory as resulting from conflict between the impulsive urges of a biological self-aspect termed the "id" and an opposing force in the mind structured by acculturated social values for proper thought and conduct, The latter is termed the "super ego." In between these 'uncivil urges' of the id and 'moral rules' of the super ego, Freud posited an egoic aspect struggling, much like Plato's charioteer, to control these conflicting 'horses of the self.'   In his theory, that struggle was determined to require much 'repression' of feeling, desire, and conscious experience into a subconscious status that allowed the conscious egoic identity to at least appear to conform to social standards represented by the super ego aspect of consciousness. However, for all its efforts to control the uncivil urges of the id, the ego was destined to fail. As a result, much of human behavior was 'consciously unintentional' and motivated by the repressed urges confined to the 'hiddenness' of the subconscious status.

Freud's model of mind or psyche that suggested that persons were neither aware of many of their motives or much of their behavior proved shocking to collective social assumptions that generally conceived human consciousness as capable of willing complete rational control of self awareness and thus of deliberate self determination. Nonetheless, Freud's ideas gained significant notoriety. This 'psychology of the hidden self' came to be termed "depth psychology" in reference to the notion of the 'depths of the psyche' existing 'below' the surface of conscious egoic "I" awareness. In seeking some therapy for the confusion and distress that the ego's struggle to satisfy the urges of the id while obeying the socialized demands of the super ego, Freud's formulated an approach to educating persons about their 'real' or 'hidden' self by 'leading out' the repressed material of the subconscious so that the conscious ego aspect of self can 'know itself' more completely. That process required a specially trained analyst to act as teacher. A person having 'undergone' this psychoanalytic 'self education' would supposedly have access to increased understanding about the impulses and resistances in their thoughts, feelings, and behavior generated by the conflict between id and super ego. Though the ego aspect of self was thought to be 'strengthened' in its efforts to negotiate between impulsive id and judgmental super ego, Freud's theory did not regard it as capable of controlling either one. At best it can come to enough awareness of their struggle and what has been repressed from self-awareness as a result to 'make the best' of the such a divided human life. An adequately developed ego function was considered to be what enables persons to

negotiate between these polarities in producing some individualized self-expression within a socially appropriate identity.

Freud's contemporaries and successors in the development of scientific psychologies posed variations of such psycho-dynamic structure involving a 'hidden' dimension of mind. Among them, Carl Jung generated one of the most distinctive models of self and selfhood. Jung's version is distinguished in part by the notion that what is 'not conscious' to the egoic awareness of a person includes not only unsocialized biological urges, repressed thought and feeling, but other aspects of psyche that are not motivated by simplistic biological urges related to appetites such as for sex, consumption, and dominance. Though much repressed thought and feeling can be brought into the awareness of the analytically orchestrating ego (Plato's charioteer), these other psychic forces and contents which Jung poses are subtly complex in their composition, asserting competitive intentional influence on thought and behavior, and 'acting' with such intensity and autonomy that the egoic sense of self might never fully comprehend or articulate them. He thus termed the 'above and below' of psyche as "conscious" and "unconscious" rather than subconscious. In Jung's view, aspects or 'contents' of psyche that are 'below' or 'inaccessible' to conscious awareness include not only repressed thoughts and feelings but also more 'impersonal' psychic forces. Some such 'more than personal' psychic elements he represented as "archetypes" of the unconscious. These 'presences' in psyche or mind are ancient patterns that manifest in human consciousness autonomously. They are most readily understood in forms such as 'the Father archetype' or the 'archetype of the Lover.' These 'archetypal patternings of psyche' tend to have ranges or complex sets of characteristics—there are various 'ways of being Father,' or 'a student.' Thus this way of imagining influence on selfhood enables an analysis of how persons individually manifest particular aspects of these ancient patterns as 'life roles' or psychological functions that can be termed 'archetypal' in that they are recognizably like generalized "archetypes." Thus individual persons are conceived to experience the influences of these patterns on behavior and thought somewhat differently. In Jung's theory, then, he egoic consciousness of the "I" of selfhood is thus caught up in an intra-psychic interplay of biological urges, socialized standards for identity and behavior that result in repressed thought and feeling, and the influences of various archetypal patterns of personal consciousness as well as character. And, in keeping with the notion of 'depth' psychology, most this psychic field and its intricate activities, which can remain 'hidden' from the egoic I's immediate awareness. Jung posed the overall dynamic of these factors as a relational totality of "self and Self"—the small 's' self representing the more consciously aware and socialized sense of being "I" which becomes constellated within the larger, relatively hidden or 'unconscious' totality of Self.

Within and out of that field of complex selfhood,' the egoic aspect or function of mind (the "I") is seen as appropriately asserting a sense of singular personal selfhood that allows one to act in the 'outer world.' However, since the 'totality' of the larger Self is so much more complex than such a singular sense of self can express, the ego identity is necessarily stressed and distressed by eruptions of what Jung termed "unconscious contents" in psyche. This term indicates that those aspects of psyche not associated with conscious identity are

'other than' ego consciousness—not directly knowable by the "I." Yet these psychic aspects tend to be regarded in Jung's scheme as both intentional and competitive with each other in seeking to shape personal thought, feeling, and behavior.   Thus some 'contents of the unconscious' are 'conscious' in so far as these represent nexes of perception and intention within psyche or mind, though in a manner that differs from whatever constitutes egoic awareness of 'an I.' The egoic "I" is here 'confronted' not only with impulsive biological urges (id), conformist societal rules (super ego), and subsequently repressed feelings and thoughts (subconscious material), but also archetypally shaped complexes of intelligent intention that assert autonomous influences on identity, thought, and behavior. To add to the complexity of this psychical 'dramatis personae,' playing parts of the self, Jung's interpretation regards these 'categories of influence' to be overlapping and recombinant.' In an overlapping fashion various aspects form "psychological complexes" that can essentially assert 'alternate personalities.' However, the dynamic operation of the "complexes of psychic contents" tends to remain 'unnoticed' by conscious egoic attitudes, despite the influence they assert upon it. Much of the 'dynamical structure' of selfhood thus remains 'hidden' from conscious 'sense of self.'

Given his interpretation of psychic aspects and their dynamic interaction, Jung's version of 'leading out' a person's egoic sense of self into a more 'self educated' status also includes a 'becoming aware' of repressed thoughts and feelings. But his version of 'becoming self aware' involves developing overt relations with those 'not-I' aspects of psychic activity in the larger Self generated by archetypal patterns. In such a process one's sense of self is 'lead' to understand one's individuality as including particularly formed nexes or "psychological complexes" that 'act autonomously' from conscious egoic intentions of the "I." One can characterize this shift in 'sense of self' as being from a reflexively singular assumption about personal identity of the "I" *toward* one that is more pluralistic, more a constellation of an individuality that is both "I" and "Not-I" yet still 'this self.' That sense of being composed of some 'me' and yet some thing other suggests an ultimately mysterious source of selfhood figurable as a sort of "Not Not-I." That is a sense of self derived from conscious experience of being both what one feels is "me" and also what seems 'other than me'—not "I" but not "Not I." Such an experience brings the notion of 'otherness' most intimately 'home' to self-identity.

Freud and Jung were pivotal in 'pioneering' the 'science of psychology,' but their efforts at systematic analysis of the self were not alone. The variations of such 'logics of complex selfhood' proffered in the twentieth century are legion, with no ultimately accurate model yet acclaimed. This diversity of psychological theories about the structure and motives generating psychic life and thus human consciousness and character indicates a radical complexity for psyche. It is that implication which prompts the association here of psychologies of selfhood with issues of education and schooling. But, in so far as most of these posit an 'aspect of psyche' that is not directly accessible to the conscious sense of self associated with the ego or "I," these are all in a sense 'psychologies of the hiddenness of self or selfhood' and thus assert some inherent plurality of selfhood. They all pose selfhood as involving some sense of "I" and of 'Not-I' that is also 'Not-Not-I.' These

theories posit various unknown/unseen or unacknowledged/repressed aspects of self relative to the conscious "I."

Such configuration of selfhood is also posed in the more recent and strictly scientific brain function studies of cognitive psychology that indicate the minimal amount of cognitive psychology that indicate only a rather minimal amount of cognitive processing is registered by the conscious sense of self. In those studies of neuro-physiological brain activity processing appear to verify at least the general concept of the 'hiddenness of the self from itself.' Such notions suggests that awareness of 'hidden' structure and activity in psychic nature can temper, if not humble, the inherent tendency of the "I" to 'lay claim to the self.'

Egoic Activity as Executive Function: Self-governance in Persons as in Social Collectives
The depth psychological view of psyche as a shifting, competitive constellation of complexes of psychic elements and intentions, of which the "I" is often unaware, appears dangerously chaotic. The notion of an egoic aspect or 'executive function' in mind that serves to order and compose an aggregate identity out of these aspects is widely accepted in psychological theories, though somewhat variously described. Some psychological perspectives tend to regard the self *as* the ego aspect, selfhood *as* a 'constructed' personality structure (ego-centered psychologies). In the depth or 'hidden self' psychologies, egoic identity appears more as a mental function attempting to present a 'face' or persona for an irreducibly complex self. In either view, some mental process seeks to create an identity that seems viable in the external inter-personal or social context. The former view regards "psychopathology" (emotional distress and difficulty in socialization) as deriving from conflict 'within the ego' resulting in "personality disorders" and the latter view regards 'psychic disturbances' more as conflict between egoic function and other aspects of psyche and society competing to assert influence on selfhood. In both views, some 'agency' seeks to compose 'an identity' in response to an 'inner' complexity of personal psyche as well as 'outer' standards, beliefs, and proprieties of inter-personal social context. Thus the generation of egoic identity or self-identification is a *collective creation*—one occurring within an intra-psychic 'community' as well as an inter-personal or social one. Obviously it must be guided or *governed by* some 'ordering function.' However, there is no guarantee that it will be 'successful' either in expressing intrinsic character or accommodating that character to social standards.

The personality structure that results might or might not represent the range and variety of a person's internal self-aspects. It might or might not effectively accommodate a person to social demands and standards. And that structure of preferred attitudes toward self and society, of acknowledged or repressed thoughts, feelings, impulses, is assumed to itself have aspects 'hidden' from conscious egoic awareness. Thus the egoic 'agency of identity assertion' must not only grapple with internal complexity and external social factors but becomes readily entangled in the personality structure it produces through its attempts at self-representation and social conformity. Thus this egoic function is generated by interactivity of all three fields of reference (the contents of psyche, external socio-cultural influences, and the personality structures generated to represent

selfhood) and yet in a sense operates in/between them. The effectiveness of its overall self-representation would thus seem to depend to some degree on its developed capacity to be aware of the competition, conflict and paradoxes among these three fields of reference for composing selfhood. Egoic function, like executive management, needs be capable of 'stepping outside' the competitive interplay of forces and factors it is attempting to organize.

These notions of continual dynamical activity between more and less self-aware aspects of psyche, or between various established and evolving patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting that configure the range of mental selfhood, appear extremely relevant to understanding how educational efforts and the structurings of schooling interact with the diversity of particular persons. The concept of an inherently conflicted and incomplete process of self-manifestation in persons necessarily yet variously 'at odds with' their particularized sense of social requirements presents a radically complex portrait of the 'who and what' that is being educated. In order to lead forth, lead toward, and lead back in the particularity of individualize persons, educational efforts would seem to have to assist conscious egoic activity in developing awareness of and relation with these 'hidden' aspects of selfhood. Self-assertion, self-articulation, and self-governance are all terms that apply to the development of individuality and its education. Here again an important correlation between the internal or intra-psychic 'drama' of selfhood and the external or inter-personal one of social relations is readily drawn. The term executive function, as applied to the development of some egoic activity that mediates between self-aspects internally and social ones externally, is also apt for an a collective generated by and mediating between the persons of a social collective (marriage, family, community, corporation, etc.). It would seem useful for educational efforts to emphasize this correlation in developing self-governance in both personal and collective domains.

Models of operation for the executive function of self-governance are derived from dynamical modes mentioned above as selfhood models. Effective governance in terms of establishing and maintaining consistency of order and function in a rigid or systematic manner is not, however, necessarily the best mode of representing diversity in personal or collectively social selfhood. Hierarchical prioritizing as a mode of ordering in society generates overtly vertical associations (as in master and slave castes or men as superior to women), composing categories for personal identity in definitive states of dominance versus subservience. In contrast, inter-personal social life can be conceived so as to pose most humans as of one 'class' in the lateral field of an egalitarian model. In general, what is significant about 'vertical' egoic ordering of psychic elements in personal identity as well as collective social structures is that it appears *utterly and intrinsically human*. Thus hierarchical orderings can be regarded as an unavoidable production of any premises for identity. But again, close analysis of identity structurings indicates typical contradictions and paradoxes in how both individual persons and groups define or assert sense-of-self. Thus verticality in self-governance can be regarded as intrinsically inadequate to self-representation.

Thereby, egoic function in persons as in social groups can never really 'rest easy' in an attitude of having completed its task of consistently and finally having defined or represented 'the self' as 'a personality' or consistently ordered and unitary 'collective.' It is an on going 'performance' of selfhood. The 'hierarchies of self' or 'personalities' egoic function generates to compose an "I" or a "we" prove contingent upon both individual personal sensibilities and external social contexts. These on occasion appear to undergo rather spontaneous change, sometimes even collapse. In the former instance a notably different self-representation appears. In the latter, a traumatic sense of non-identity or even multiple identity can emerge (think 'civil war'). Self-governance of identity thus appears as more insecure than commonly assumed and likely requires constant adjustment or 'shoring up.' Yet the 'hierarchical formulations of self'—be they personal or collective—also demonstrate a tendency to become 'autonomous' from the 'rest of the self' and act as 'justified tyrants' whose dominance is 'right' and 'proper.' In this instance, egoic function can consciously find itself impotent in its efforts to adjust personality structure even when there is awareness that such habituated self-representation is painfully inaccurate or socially unacceptable. Most marvelously, though, egoic function often appears capable of challenging such 'all powerful,' 'self-defining' formulations of identity. That is to say, somehow the "I" can challenge its self, can question how it serves to represent the larger self as a 'sense of self.' In collective society this struggle is expressed by conflict between social classes over rights and privileges that is resolved by members of the conflicting classes, such as when both Caucasian and African American persons collaborated to end over racial discrimination.

Approaching self-representation through this perspective on egoic activity as executive function in mind or psyche that constitutes self-governance activates a sense of pluralism in internal selfhood that can develop understanding of collective interpersonal self-governance for the purpose of egalitarian social relations.

<u>Self-Esteem as a Psychological Notion: Feeling Good versus Being One's Self</u>

A desire for personal confidence and comfort in relation to available social standards can pose conflict with development of complexly representative self-identity. Self-esteem has a dictionary definition of "pride in oneself." Depending upon the psychological theory the basis for such pride could be differently conceived. From the perspective that associates selfhood with egoic identity in personality structures, the pride of self-esteem might be based in a sense of self-derived from successful accommodation of personality structures to social standards. But from the more depth psychological perspective, pride in Self would most likely have to be pride in an intricately diversified, possibly conflicted, and in some ways socially improvable selfhood. Depending in part on how well intrinsic character 'aligns' with social standards for thought and behavior, self-esteem based in unrepressed self-complexity might create significant conflict between 'being one's self' and 'feeling good about one's self in society.' This distinction is of considerable concern for educational efforts and schooling practices because it is easy to promote the value of self-esteem without acknowledging that it has these two categories of derivation—social approval and self-approval. A sense of self that takes pride in its articulation and expression of its complexity might well encounter social criticism and even categorization as

deviant or pathologically symptomatic. As a social concept self-esteem can readily become a 'tool of conformity' in which persons are told they 'should' feel pride in the selves and thus if they do not then they are socially unacceptable. Thusly egoic function can be pressured to favor a personality structure that appears to exhibit pride in the self in ways that are socially acceptable over complex self-knowing and self-representation that could constitute articulated individuality. A society that favors individuation would thus not be likely to promote self-esteem as a simple matter of exhibiting self-pride or 'feeling good.' An individuated person might well not feel particularly happy or prideful about their complexly articulate selfhood, though they might take pride in having explored and attempted to express it—particularly if social standards place value on such a self-expression. This view also implies that distress over one's experience of one's self is not necessarily a 'bad thing.' Dis-order in personality structures or self-identification can provide the impetus and opportunity for a more appropriate mediation between egoic self, a larger Self, and society.

Pathologizing the Self of Modernity: Personality Dis-Ordering as Illness and Self-Expression
        'Disorder' or pathology of selfhood in modernist psychology is conceived as having three general sources. One is biologically mechanistic in that it derives from physiological or neurochemical dysfunction of normative brain processes. The other bases for mental pathology involve some maladaptation of personality to the demands of social contexts and/or representation of personal character. There is considerable uncertainty about which basis provides the more common source of mental disturbances and whether each can cause the other. It is easy from the mechanistic view to assume biological dysfunction causes maladaptation of personality. But there is evidence that inadequacies of egoic function to either adapt to social contexts or adequately represent intrinsic character results in neurochemical imbalances or even physiological changes in the brain. Regardless of which source is primary in which cases, person experience repressive, depressive, and eruptive symptoms of 'internal distress.' Feelings of 'not being one's self' or of 'being beside one's self,' as well as 'not being a proper self,' can generate extreme anxiety and result in distressed behavior. Within the perspective of modern psychology, such a personally 'troubled' and socially 'troubling' status has come to be regarded as manifesting pathologies, much in the manner a diseased physical body experiences biological illness. The self of a distressed person can be diagnosed as exhibiting symptoms of 'dissociation,' a sort of fragmentary status in which maintenance a of normally defined hierarchical identity fails to consistently order personality or proves incapable of accommodating behavior to socialized standards. In short, the "I" becomes overtly divided or conflicted in such ways that it is 'at odds with itself,' and often with society's expectations of it. In one extreme the ego or "I" becomes 'unfixed' or ''splintered' so that there is a sense of no identity or multiple identities. In another it appears as 'fixated' or so narrowly confined that it manifests desperate anxiety about being overwhelmed by a chaotic self or invasive society. Formulations of such psychopathologies are categorized with diagnostic terms such hysteria, paranoia, neurosis, psychosis, schizophrenia, multiple personality, manic depression, and borderline personality.

As of this writing the official psychiatric manual for diagnosis of psychological 'disorders,' known as the "DSM IV," is a book the dimensions of a metropolitan telephone directory. The sheer number of specified statuses for diagnosis of mental dis-order in personality elaborated in this manual suggests the radical complexity of psyche or mind that can manifest its distress so variously. However, one might well conclude, faced with this vast array of mental dysfunctions, that selfhood in its modernist configuration is either somehow intrinsically 'at war with itself' such that it produces such varied and frequent distress. An alternative conclusion might be that the dominant cultural concept of a 'properly composed person' (at least as conceived in the normative model of psychiatric medicine) is somehow incompatible with the inherent structure and function of psyche 'in our historical moment.' It is worth noting that the 'mad house' or insane asylum is an institution of modernity, the development of which appears to have been significantly instigated by Enlightenment ideals designating 'sanity' as consistently rationalistic mental functioning. But subsequent to that emphasis modernist psychological perspectives developed something of 'two minds' about 'abnormal behavior.' The medical or psychiatric mode tends to center around the metaphor of illness or disease for such 'disorder' of personality. As such it requires 'cure' to 'restore' some relatively healthy status of 'functional equilibrium' in personality. Thus that perspective prescribes treatment seeking to limit or eliminate symptoms of distress and disorder. Prescription of anti-depressant medications is the most overt example but much "talk therapy" is applied toward the same objective of restoration of self-confident egoic control over feelings and behaviors. It can be questioned, though, whether such a result might not simply 'restore' the egoic identity status responsible for precipitating symptomatic distress. The more depth psychological perspective refers to the metaphor of 'the return of the repressed,' presenting a view of psychic disruption in egoic identity as potentially healthy for the 'well being of the larger self.' Thereby, therapy in this perspective seeks to 'uncover' what important aspects of self might be manifesting the distress or disorder while still remaining 'hidden in' a person's psyche-logical symptoms. The psychology of 'hidden selfhood' thus seeks articulation of selfhood in or through its distresses. "Psycho-pathology" in this sense is the 'speech of the self/psyche's distress' in regard to the restrictions imposed upon it by personality and social identity structures. Where personality 'cracks' there might appear access to or insight about the complexity of an individual's character and its conflicts with socialization. In this view, symptomatic distress can be regarded as a positive, even healthy phenomenon. That notion is particularly significant to a primary cultural valuation placed upon individuality since it is the 'peculiarity of individuated character' that most readily becomes a 'target of repression' for the conformist impulses of collective social structures and their manifestation in personality formation, thereby setting the stage for the symptomatic 'return of the repressed' from the 'hidden realms' of the self.

Thus, to the medicalized psychiatric perspective, plurality of selfhood is inherently problematic because it frustrates effective maintenance of egoic function or self-governance in some personally comfortable and socially acceptable homeostasis of identity. But this approach to psychic distress derives directly from the normative social values that specify what proper or normal, and thus healthy, egoic identity or personality

structure is. Emphasis upon consistency and singularity of self sensing and expressing necessarily produces a classification of dissociative experience and eruptive or otherwise 'socially uncontrolled' behavior as 'illness of selfhood' or psychopathology. In essence there then exists a prejudice against some aspects of self-differentiating individuation of persons that become classes as psycho- and socio-pathic. Again, the point here is not that depth psychological perspectives tend to affirm such behavior as 'good' and 'proper,' thus requiring no ameliorative attention. The distinction is that these psychological attitudes approach 'symptomatic behavior' as presenting potentially valuable opportunities to 'better know the self's complexities.' Education and schooling in an avowedly pluralistic, egalitarian cultural valuing individuation thus is confronted with an inherently critical role towards its society's tendency to conform persons to normative standards. It must attempt to distinguish between reflexively pathologizing behavior and actively facilitating self-expression—even when the latter is 'difficult' or asocial.

<u>Of Persons that Do Not Know Their Own Psychic Individuality and Collective Endeavors to Know the World</u>

Certainly it seems reasonable to conclude, in reference to the diversity of psychological versions of selfhood, that generating 'a self' is a complicated, if largely unconscious, process. Coming to more overtly 'know one's self' as a complex or constellation of 'selves' appears to be a reasonably appropriate manner for describing the process of 'becoming individuated.' And clearly, such a process requires more than the simple willful intention of the 'egoic I,' since the latter is a selective version of selfhood constituted by habituated social conformities and self-repressions. The "I" is an intrinsically biased representation of the larger self. Such a typical status of relations between conscious sense of self and 'the rest of the self' can be regarded as similar to that between personal self and world. Persons are confronted from infancy with a potentially overwhelming diversity and complexity of worldly phenomenon and human contexting. The knowing of the world, like that of the self, is necessarily partial and configured by social conditioning. Even taken all together it would be difficult to claim that human knowing can 'sum up existence.' Thus a personal status of ever imperfect and evolving sense of personal individuality mirrors that of an ongoing collective cultural effort to know the world or universe in ever-greater detail and complexity. It is this very condition of incomplete and presumptive knowing both persons and collectives that requires educational efforts and formal schoolings.

Thus the educational 'leading out' of persons into knowing 'the world' more complexly is intrinsically linked to 'leading them out' of their own reflexive sense of self singularity toward a more complexly individualized sense of self. Elaborating the subtly and accuracies of knowing both self and world require developing awareness of much that one is as yet unaware or lacks methods and concepts for understanding. Thus the egoic function that constitutes the "I" of self and aspects of mind that generate understanding of the world must be schooled to become capable of reflecting upon and analyzing both self and world. It would seem no accident then that learning the skills necessary for increasing understanding of self and world typically takes place in some collective context, such as school. When persons are educatively lead out, toward, and back in together they can witness this process in others such that it is mirrored back to them. Schooling in this sense is a

formalized version of how persons learn to relate with others in informal social encounters—by trial and error in the presence of the examples of others which, taken all together, constitutes the collective endeavor to 'know the world.'

<u>Of Self Reflexive, Self Reflective, and Selfless Selves in Self<>Self Relations</u>

The complex self variously described in modernist psychologies can be regarded in one sense as a 'self reflexive self.' This term can be taken to mean that 'a' self somehow moves or is moved by 'its self.' Such a notion again implies some degree of plurality to 'the self.' It also suggests a status of unconscious psychic activity. Despite this connotation of unnoticed reactive reflexivity, a characteristic of self-reflexiveness also can be regarded as enabling self-viewing or self-reflection. A self that can 'move itself' is able to learn to differentiate and thus analyze or reflect upon its self-responsiveness between self-aspects. Persons whose sense of self appears so confused or tormented by internal contrasts or conflicts between self aspects that they are unable to cope with 'ordinary life' can be regarded as suffering from some chaotic or unusual divisive reflexivity between self-aspects, creating a struggle of egoic function to establish some satisfying or stable self-identity. In contrast, a status of self-reflective sense of self implies some degree of contemplative perspective—a capacity for observing and considering through conscious awareness of the reflexive activity between elf-aspects (such as ego $<>$ id $<>$ super ego; self $<>$ Self).

Both extremes of anxiously 'not knowing whom one is' and its converse, that of calmly 'accepting one is various,' imply a personal status that could be called 'selfless.' In the former case the "I" seems to feel it 'has no self,' whereas in the latter status the "I" appears to accept being selfless because it is not 'a single self.' The difference between these experiences of 'selflessness' might be a matter of how well developed the egoic attitude's capacity for self-reflection on the reflexive self is. Self-reflection thusly posed seems likely to be a 'developed skill.' Both psychological therapies and spiritual traditions can be seen as attempting to 'lead out' an egoic sense of "I" *from* a singularly literalistic expectation of being and identity *toward* a more complex perspective that is less threatened by reflexive self-complexity. Such an activity of reflective self-engagement can be posed as self $<>$ self relations.

In regard to these notions, Freud might be said to have sought to 'educate' persons 'toward' reflective awareness of their unconscious self and its reflexive control of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Jung might then be posed has having extended that reflection upon the logic of a psyche having subconscious aspects in an effort to enter into conscious relation with a 'larger self' and its impersonal psychic forces of archetypal patterns. Christian religious teachings seek to enable persons to differentiate and moderate the contrasting impulses of 'body and soul' by relation to an ethical god, Buddhist ones seek to bring the "I" of identity into relation with its 'non-being.' In all these versions 'leading forth self awareness' there is evidently more to the "I" than meets the "I." Self-reflection on the reflexive self, and accommodation of the selflessness such implies

for self < > self relations, require some 'outside intervention,' some psyche-logical 'leading forth' of self-knowing 'out from under' the reflexive influences of competing self-aspects.

The Resistance of Habitually Reflexive Identity to More Complex Self Knowing

Most modernist psychological descriptions of selfhood take note of the particular resilience of egoic self-identity or established sense of self in controlling personality. The reflexive character of complex selfhood, in which the self moves and shapes itself, tends to develop habitual patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior–a personality. In this sense, identity comes to be composed of 'automatic' or 'programmed reflexes'—Freud's "subconscious motives" and Jung's "contents of the unconscious." The "I" of identity can thus be said to assume that it knows its self and influences a person's behavior 'unreflectively'—meaning that it does not consider how it is composed of conscious as well as un/subconscious aspects and thus avoids awareness of how these influence identity and behavior. As noted, this formation of unreflective reflexive or habitual identity is seen as both inherent to personal selfhood and yet potentially problematic when it represses important impulses or inadequately expresses the 'totality of psyche'—'the rest of the self' is often not well served by the habitual personality.

What is thusly problematic in psychological theory about the incompleteness of egoic identity (relative to 'the rest of the self') is also a primary factor in attempts to educate. A person's identity becomes configured in response to varied life experiences in family and social settings. The thusly formed sense of self or personality becomes the self-proclaimed "I" that tends to defend its 'legitimacy' against any challenges—internal or external. Once established, personality tends to attempt to preserve its structuring of selfhood. Yet that self-awareness is regarded psychologically as always incomplete, and in some cases composed more of society's or other people's ideas about one's self than from one's individual character and intelligence. Similarly, a person's sense of others, world, and reality, as well as of self, becomes composed in early life experiences, typically before entering formal educational contexts. Formal education is then faced with persons who have reflexive or unconscious assumptions about self, others and world that are often radically inaccurate or contradictory. The child or student is not simply a blank slate or *tabla rasa*. Thus all teaching involves reconfiguring, if not 'deconstructing' old as well as enabling new sense of self, other, and world. Such remodeling of personal knowing is a 'psychological fact' of schooling (Gardner, Unschooled Mind).

Persons engaged in psychological therapies often are said to become aware of their egoic assumptions about their selves yet still find changing those habitual assumptions astonishingly difficult. Similarly, persons entering into formal educations can learn the ideas being taught but not necessarily reconfigure their assumptions about self, others, and the world. Jung took pains to emphasize that every advance of the larger Self into personal expression tends to be experienced as a defeat, a trauma, for the "I" or habitual egoic sense of self which thereby finds its perspective on selfhood challenged. Similarly, an education that 'leads forth' personal awareness toward the unknown or hidden about others and world can seriously challenge habitual sense of self

in such a way that a person becomes conscious of how their identity is 'faulty.' Thus defensiveness of the habitual "I" readily becomes an obstacle to learning since learning can confront it with a selfhood and world that differ significantly from its assumptions. Just as psychological reflection on the reflexive self can render a person 'selfless,' an education that deconstructs personal and cultural assumptions has the potential of radically reconfiguring personal values and definitions for reality—even to the point that one feels 'world-less.' But in both cases, such results seem rather rare. The 'acquisition of knowledge' *about* internal self-complexity or that of others appears to be no guarantee of increased complexity in relation to self, others, and world. Education that promotes the later must evidently involve more than concepts and information.

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Chapter 2
Framing Learning Variously:
Posing Modes and Contexts for Learning that Facilitate Complex, Individualized Self<>Self and Self<>Other Relations

Knowing Difference and the Differences of Knowing

In a very general way, learning involves developing awareness of difference among discerned entities, phenomena, and interpretations. Formal disciplinary studies of 'knowing difference,' or how humans derive knowledge from experience and intellectual analysis, are known as epistemology (study of knowing and knowledge) and hermeneutics (study of methods for interpretation). Similar to the diversity of psychological perspectives on selfhood summarized in the preceding chapter, there are many approaches to questions about how we know what we know and what we can know. Epistemological studies, along with analyses of the heuristic strategies deployed to 'make sense' of what we know, are essential references to effectively educating and schooling reflectively analytical intelligence. The term epistemic indicates processes of knowing. Such work informs this commentary on the importance of diversifying learning contexts, topics, and methods for the sake of promoting individuation. However, the emphasis here is not upon summarizing epistemological and hermeneutic theories. The following comments are concerned more generally with how to arrange or 'frame' approaches to learning that accommodate an assumed diversity of capacities for knowing, modes of understanding, dynamics of learning, and styles of expressing that individual persons manifest. Additional categories of concern include how best to motivate or inspire different persons, how to activate their characteristically constellated emphasis upon capacities and styles for understanding. In the broadest sense the concern addressed here is how to both diversify capacities for knowing while elucidating individualized orientations among the differences of knowing. This concern is considered important partly because if there is much disparity among how persons know then many are likely to be considered inept if they are not taught in ways appropriate the configurations of their particular intelligence.

No teacher can be expert in every discipline of knowledge and study. But teaching any 'subject' can be approached and engaged with due respect for both the astonishing complexities of human intelligences, their considerable variation in individualized persons, and the diversity of ways of knowing and 'making meaning.' Assisting persons to attain greater complexity of understanding about 'the world' involves differentiated disciplines of knowledge or 'knowledge fields.' Each has distinct methods and criteria for establishing differences and interpreting them meaningfully (mathematics in contrast to sociology, art in contrast to biology). These distinctions in 'what to know' and 'how to know it' are intrinsic to Westernized approaches to education and schooling (the "liberal arts" tradition). Surprisingly, though, comparatively little attention tends to be devoted in schooling to 'knowing the self,' how selves know, and how selves 'know differently.' Epistemology, hermeneutics, and self-directed psychological reflection are rarely emphasized in academic schooling. If the

premises elaborated thus far in this writing are held valid, then it would seem that study of how humans know and elucidating how one's self tends to know in particular are of such significance that these topics might pervade pedagogical theory and schooling practice. They could be reasonably said to be more important than emphasis upon any other topic or discipline of study. This chapter attempts to orient attention to these topics and how to foreground them in educational efforts and the formalities of schooling. Its purpose is to broaden perspective upon 'the knowing of difference and the differences of knowing' even beyond that typically taken in the disciplines of epistemology, hermeneutics, and cybernetic study of 'information handling.' In keeping with the contentious contemporary status of efforts to define and explain the 'workings of the mind' (Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind), human learning and understanding are approached here as radically diversified and complex. There are two categories of concern deriving from the perspective that diversity of ways of knowing and reflective understanding about those variations are of primary importance to educational efforts. Firstly it becomes important to establish some categorical contrasts that illustrate the dynamical range of different modes of knowing. Secondly it is essential to conceive of how such a range can be used to actually configure schooling. This chapter addresses the first concern and attempts to broadly frame the second. Chapter 6 addresses the second in relation to the contemporary contexts of 'doing schooling' and the development of those from some historical themes in Westernized cultural traditions.

In order to contemplate framing learning variously one needs first posit some characteristics of how human knowing is diversified. How does the variousness of knowing the knowing of difference begin, develop, differentiated, and become aware of its self? Though some theories about human knowing posit predisposing genetic factors for knowing and expression (Pinker, The Language Instinct) its development in human consciousness is assumed to emerge from a rather undifferentiated status in infants. Awareness at this initial stage of knowing appears to assert little sense of boundary or distinction between self and other ('mother is me'). Infancy then begins a long engagement with differentiation that might be regarded as learning to choose between greater and lesser degrees and types of difference—between sensations, actions and consequences, self and other, between aspects of self, between others, and between both things and ideas. And it would thereby seem that the sensing of boundaries and discontinuities, also engenders capacity for sensing of likeness, familiarity, and continuity. Similarity and affinity would appear 'unknowable' but for the knowing of difference. The suggestion here is that, at least for some aspects of intelligence, 'the world' must be 'taken apart' before it can be understood as a variously composed whole.

Thus a summary phrase that guides the following explication of those complexities is that 'learning occurs in coming to know differences of self, others, and the world.' But such learning depends upon methods or modes of 'making meaning,' of organizing the differences perceived in relation to some contexting ideas. The more such ways in which one learns to engage and organize differences, then the more complexly learning can be assumed to be occurring. Academic disciplines (History, Mathematics) as well as pragmatic technical skills (computer programming, welding) present such contextings for discerning and correlating the differences that

enables identifying and relating aspects of 'the world' in meaningful ways Thus is understanding or 'meaning' considered to be constructed and capacity for 'effective manipulation' enabled. However, lest these notions suggest a simplistically reductive definition of knowing and understanding, it is also assumed that there is more to knowing than categorization of differences. Overall, the view on knowing taken here is best represented by "emergence theories" that conceive how certain conditions emerge from a background context or set of factors form which such a result could not have been predicted and thus is not fully explainable. Human knowing, as a complex of differentiating sensations, perceptions, emotions, cognitions, rationalizations, imaginations, and articulations that some way composes all manner of affinities and complementarities, is an "emergent property" deriving from what readily appears as a virtually chaotic background. Nonetheless it does 'emerge' and thus facilitating its fullness is likely not best approached in a simplistic, linear, reductive manner.

Dynamical Contrasts in Modes and Methods of Knowing and Understanding

A few contrasts in modes and methods of knowing are offered here that will receive some further consideration below. The point is to illustrate some directional and methodological distinctions involved in differentiating difference. There are kinds or types of attention, methods of examination, and criteria for interpretation. Some can be stated variously so there is no attempt to present a systematic set of categorizations. One example is the 'direction' of attention, which can be focused 'outward' on others and world or 'inward' on self-aspects and dynamics. Attention can also be singularly or plurally directed, in a linear manner toward a exclusive focus or in a broader, more polyvalent deployment that attends to a variety of contexts concurrently (some times termed "soft focus"). The methodological criteria used for making differentiations can emphasize simplicity or complexity, quantitative measurement or qualitative comparison of characteristics, rational or intuitive judgment, abstract analysis or emotional response, experiential sensation or empirical testing. The context for evaluation and interpretation can emphasize a singular methodological perspective, procedure, or set of criteria or multiple ones (as in interdisciplinary study). Explorations, assessments, and interpretations can be conducted in an atmosphere of competition or cooperation between persons, as argument or elaboration, as ultimately right or wrong. Knowing can be situated in intimate relation to what is 'being known' or abstracted from the subject in the form of measurements, descriptions, photographs, etc. It can be engaged and expressed in more literalistic terms or more overtly symbolic and metaphorical associations. It can be conducted in relatively more or less formal environments and procedures, as learning at home versus in school, as part of general everyday living or abstracted from that context. A given topic or object for knowing is likely to be known differently depending upon the type of attention, method, and criteria are engaged, as well as in what contexting. Some persons, it is assumed here in relation to the diversity of selfhood, will favor, be more adept at, or perhaps inspired by certain modes of 'doing knowing' and 'making meaning' or understanding. Given the ranges indicated even in this brief suggestion, the differences in knowing difference are likely to be extreme at times, perhaps incommensurate.

Articulating the Mental 'Body of Knowing'

This issue of epistemic and heuristic diversity in ways of knowing can be elaborated by comparison to the differing capacities and development of the physical body in general and in different persons in particular. Human bodies are composed of basically the same bones, organs, muscles, tendons, and biochemical components. The general development of physical capacities occurs in a similar way in most human children. Yet bodies differ to a considerable degree in proportions, muscle type, and even how aspects of their generally shared anatomy and chemistry interact. Thus cognition can be thought of as having the sort of variability of operation that other 'body-systems' express. Just as particular persons develop their muscle usage in specific ways (using or not using their abdominal muscles to life heavy objects), various brain functions and aspects of intelligence can be engaged in different associations in response to different mental efforts. Depending upon the type of physical activity children are exposed to and thus what parts of their musculature are simulated and in what manner, their posture, strength, and coordination can develop in markedly different manners. Kids who swim, play soccer, or concentrate on football can look and move in distinctive ways. Athletic development of the physical body is approached in a variety of ways (weight training, running, yoga) that have rather different effects upon how muscle groups and coordination develop. Some body types seem to respond better to one kind of physical development more than another. But physical development also depends upon attitude. Some persons are more inspired by an activity their body is not particularly suited to, (short people in basketball, hefty persons in running) and they will only make an athletic effort in those directions. Occasionally such persons even achieve the highest levels of performance in an activity or sport for which they appear physically ill suited.

Comparing body development to that of mental capacities indicates that there are structures and capacities in both that can be developed and motivated variously. In both cases facilitating development involves differentiating aspects of physical and mental functioning (muscle groups, cognitive operations of intelligence) as well as promoting coordination that brings these into some larger field of inter-active relationship. Athletic training seeks to condition parts of the body with the intention of bringing those parts into some greater collective relationship that is enhanced by the selective conditioning of the parts. Physical training can focus on a rather exclusive set of muscles and athletic skills. But that which is concerned with the broadest refinement of athletic abilities, such as for triathlon, or greatest possible health, such as yoga, seek to enhance a full spectrum of physiological function and integrative coordination. Education and schooling can be seen as acting similarly in regards to mental and emotional development. Here there is also specialized development of certain aspects of cognitive process as if these were specific muscle groups that are activated by certain exercises of calisthenics. Such selective stimulus actually generates changes in brain development by emphasizing certain neuronal pathways of operation (again, like muscle groups performing certain motions in certain sequences in a particular manner). And, just as athletic conditioning and training can be critiqued for how well it develops and integrates the activity of the entire body, so to schooling can be evaluated for how well

it elaborates, enhances, and integrates aspects of individualized intelligence and expression. Schooling that emphasis some epistemic and heuristic modes for knowing and making meaning over others might be likened to physical training for a single athletic purpose. Such schooling would not be educating the diversity of personal and thus failing to develop and integrate the mental 'body of knowing' or the 'whole person.' Similarly, a school day that does not vary types of stimuli and interrelate emphasis upon different modes will likely generate imbalanced mental and emotional functioning. Such a schedule also seems likely to blunt initiative and motive by boring or discouraging students who are not adept at the particular mental capacities or modes of knowing emphasized—just as a narrowly focused physical routine can do.

Given the aptness of this comparison of physical and mental development, it remains essential to be able to specify just what capacities, qualities, and modalities of knowing or making meaning there are to be engaged and correlated. The 'body of athletic physicality' is readily accessible to empirical observation and analysis, though what makes a great athlete remains somewhat mysterious. Thus enhancing articulation of its parts as some whole appears relatively accessible. The 'mental body of knowing and understanding' is far less tangible, seemingly even more subtle, and just, as if not more so, influenced in its functioning by emotional states of feeling.   Athletic training devotes considerable attention to enhancing emotional confidence and resilience so sustain performance in the face of adversity and even protracted failure to perform as desired. Surely such an effort is every bit as important in education and schooling the 'mind of knowing.' Articulating the capacities of individualized persons for knowing, making meaning, and effectively expressing both is an awesome challenge. In an effort to generate an orientation to that task that is broader than often expressed in actual practices of schooling, some distinctions about the composition of the 'what of the who that is being educated' are offered here.

Identifying Human Intelligence: Of Persons and Their Psycho-Somatic Sense Abilities that Enable Knowing

Studies and theories of human consciousness and cognition pose their subject in a variety of ways. Some examine knowing in terms of rational logic, others as cognitive information processing, emotionally intuitive differentiation, or aesthetic sensitivity and judgment. Representations of the capacities for knowing and the generation of human intelligence are diverse and often incommensurate. But it is not the intention of this writing either to definitively specify such concepts or to compare and evaluate them in any hierarchy of accuracy. Rather, as with the preceding overview of notions about the social and psychological contextings of selfhood, these considerations about consciousness and its capacities for learning are intended to constellate some sense of the complexities of knowing and knowledge. If a pedagogy is to be conceived that facilitates complex or pluralistic self < > self relation as a basis for empathic, co-operative self < > other relation then it needs model such intra-psychic consciousness by its own methodological pluralism and critical self-reflection. Thus, in addition to an awareness of the variable ways selfhood can be posed in cultural imaginations and

societal structures, a complex orientation to modes of perceiving, experiencing, cognating, and articulating expression is essential to any pedagogical pluralism that might constitute an egalitarian approach to educating. Given the lack of concurrence on just what human knowing is and how it functions, a rough typology is attempted here that seems reasonably inclusive of general theories. Approached as some whole, capacities for knowing and interpreting experience are thus considered to be composed by an interplay between somatic or embodied aspects and psychical or mental ones. Together these are assumed to generate abilities for sensing (both physically and emotionally) and thinking (both rationally and intuitively, conceptually and imagistically). No hierarchy or priority is assumed here among these aspects and functions of 'psycho-somatic sense abilities.' Rather, these are approached as both distinct and intimately integrated, thus all essential to producing the fullest complexity of human understanding. Intelligence, then, is regarded here as deriving from some pervasive and subtle interplay of such components of the psycho-somatic basis for consciousness.

Such a concurrent status of differentiated wholeness for psychical knowing implies that there is the possibility of disproportionate development between them. Any pronounced bias in the educational presentation of modes of sensing, feeling, thinking, or expressing will thereby likely constitute an inherent 'leading toward' that will inevitably tend to obscure or repress some aspects of these 'sensing abilities of intelligent consciousness.' Yet some such bias is ultimately unavoidable due to the necessity of focusing teaching efforts on specific methodologies for analysis and interpretation. Narrowing emphasis on particular epistemic and heuristic modes seems essential to their particularized development as constituting 'abilities of intelligence.' But when such bias is not acknowledged, such that a hierarchy of importance or function to one mode over others is implied, a restrictive modeling of self-identity as 'style of intelligence' is presented. The most obvious form of such bias is expressed in priority being granted to rational knowing and valuing over emotional or non-rational forms. Thus there is an inherent conundrum for educating and schooling around how to differentiate modes of knowing without implying some bias. Thus the approach presented here of considering intelligence as deriving from the fullest range of epistemic methods: rational and irrational, sensate or experiential and abstractly conceptual, emotional, symbolic, empirical, etc. But these will be differentiated in terms of how abstract understanding constitutes the more psychical aspects and sensing the more somatic aspects of a continuum.

Intelligence as Intellect, Intuition, and Sense Abilities
In reference to the notion that psychical knowing derives from some continuum of body and mind activity, knowing and understanding are considered here as having more and less tangible aspects, a distinction also expressed in terms such as felt versus thought, or experiential versus abstract. This distinction is not a strictly empirical one, however, in so far as emotions are classed as 'internal feelings' that might or might not be held to have a physical expression. Emotions are also conceptualized as thoughts that refer to sensed or felt phenomena that are, in a sense, abstract psychical occurrences. Thus the following differentiations of aspects of modes for knowing must be taken as artificial. Body is regarded as intrinsic to mind, both as the basis of

empirical experience of the phenomenal world that provides references for thought and feeling, and in regard to the physical brain as a neurological basis for consciousness.   However, having acknowledged such an indivisible relationship, most of this discussion of knowing and learning focuses upon psychical activity that remains in some intrinsic ways 'immaterial' or 'thingless,' constituted in the 'form' of mental feelings, images, thoughts, concepts, and processes. A rough constellation of the 'faculties' composing these elements of knowing could be: an overall field of psychical knowing and understanding that are composed of perception (sensation) processed into abstracted re-presentations as thoughts and feelings deriving from both intellectual and intuitive aspects or faculties. Composition of the intellectual aspect is here posited composed of conceptually and analytically oriented processes, the intuitive one of emotional feeling and judgment. Both of these contrasting fields are assumed to consist of additional sub-aspects. Further, these various properties of psychical knowing are assumed to be variously associable and able to operate in both reflexive ways (automatically or without overt self-conscious engagement by egoic intention) and reflectively in the manner of overt, intentional self-examination. In the reflective mode intellectual faculties can be 'turned on themselves' so as to 'analyze how they analyze' or intuitive knowing could be deliberately engaged to evaluate the operations of the intellectual ones. Taken all together, these faculties and processes are assumed to be interactive and ultimately implicit in producing some integrated range of human consciousness (Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens). The view presented here of radical complexity in human consciousness and intelligence is referenced in part to more contemporary brain research. However, the complexity of the mental processes is regarded in this writing as generating intelligence as an "emergent property." That is to assert that the subtle intricacy and variety of human intelligence appears more complex than the background factors of biological and sociological contexts from which it emerges.

Posing the existence of 'an intellect' is not meant to be asserting an empirically definitive 'part' of the brain or psychical knowing. Rather, it provides a way to conceive of differentiated aspects of knowing that can thusly be attended to in educational approaches to human development. Thus it needs be held regarded as sort of metaphor for discernable traits of dynamism in thought and its expressions. It is also posed here as intrinsically diversified rather than being a singular, hierarchically ordered faculty of knowing. This word derives from a Latin root of *intellectus*, taken to mean perception, past participle of the verb *intellegere*, for 'to perceive.' Intellect has dictionary definitions such as, "ability to learn and reason as distinguished from the ability to feel or will; capacity for knowledge and understanding," and "the ability to think abstractly or profoundly" (p.668). 'An' intellect so described represents capacity for rational reasoning and conceptual understanding, though not for 'feeling.' The 'exercise' of one's intellect involves 'intelligence.' The word intelligence also derives from the Latin *intellegere*, which is a compound of words for 'between' and 'to choose.' To be intelligent by way of perception then appears to be a 'choosing between,' or a 'perceiving of difference' by so choosing.

The development of intellect then appears to involve enhancing ways of perceiving and categorizing that enable a 'choosing between' aspects of what is perceived. The knowing of differences and thus likenesses derives from methods for 'telling things apart.' Yet that 'knowing of differences' must occur in reference to some pre-existing experience or concept. 'Knowing difference' occurs conceptually in relation to some basis for rational understanding of what those differences can mean. Intellect thus construes difference in relation to already categorized difference, generating meaning in relation to other meaning. The implied origin for the development of intellect is posited here as deriving from some level of intrinsic mental and emotional character that interacts with social conditioning and particular personal experience ("nature and nurture").

It would seem that such a process is both complex and variably configurable, that 'an intellect' is likely composed of various 'functions of intelligence' developed in response to various references for rational understanding and experiential perception. Thus different persons are likely to manifest different 'configurations of intellect.' That is to say, personal intellects are assumed to have 'individualized character' such that various persons are variously enabled to perceive, reason, and understand—partly through 'inherent character' and partly in relation to their 'personal developmental history' (nature and nurture). The notion that intellect and intelligence do not include capacities for 'feeling' is questioned here, however. Feeling appears to be a 'mode of perception' fundamental, if not 'original' in learning to 'choose between differences' and thus integral to 'ability to learn and reason.' This word 'feeling' proves rather 'slippery' in this context, however. Is it in reference to the 'feeling' of physical sensation or the feeling of psychical emotionality? Both modes of 'feeling' contribute to differentiation essential to rational configuration of difference. But are these 'capacities of experience and response' integral to the function of 'intellect?' Rather than attempt to parse that particular distinction, it is assumed here that the 'particular aspects of intelligence' are taken to include emotional and even sensorial 'perception.' There are, as some would put it, "emotional intelligences" (Goleman, <u>Emotional Intelligence).</u>

Thus arises the positing of another major aspect to psychical knowing, that of intuitive or implicit knowing. This less conceptual and rational aspect is typically conceived as a more automatic or intrinsic sensing of difference, meaning, and value than what is generated by the intellectual. Thus, though it is often more closely associated with sensate or aesthetic experience, it can still be regarded as knowing through abstracted representation of phenomena—it still poses knowing in a 'psychical form' even it be that of 'feelings.' Intuitive impressions typically assert distinctions of preference or judgment about what is accurate, pleasing, or appropriate. Thus both these categories of intellectual and intuitive faculties can generate discretionary assessment and determine preference or choice. Recent brain studies indicate that the more rational functions of the intellectual field are actually dependent upon some 'input' from the emotional aspects of the intuitive field, thereby asserting that the two are not necessarily independent functions of consciousness (Damasio, The <u>Feeling of What Happens</u>). A primary role in human epistemology for intuitive type processing has also been asserted in the more philosophical study of epistemology (DePaul and Ramsey, <u>Rethinking Intuition</u>).

The terms applied in discussions of human knowing are many and resistant to tidy categorization. Though this ambiguity is frustrating it seems appropriate to the topic. For instance, knowing and knowledge are often posited in opposed categories of rational and irrational. This distinction is regarded here as expressing a useful representation of aspects of intelligence but not one that remains consistently viable. The category or rational knowing seems to include such terms as thinking, rationalizing, analyzing, deliberation, reasoning, speculation, conceptualization, reflection, consideration, calculation, quantification, making sense, and intellectualizing. In contrast the following terms can be grouped under the notion of irrational: intuition, empathy, clairvoyance, instinct, gnosis, un/sub-consciousness, sensing, insight, premonition, aesthetic discretion, revelation, inspiration, foreboding, feeling, hunch, apprehending, non-sense. But then there are other terms that seem to associate with notions from both categories of rational and irrational. These include sentience, consciousness, awareness, cognizance, cognition, understanding, comprehension, perception, discernment, discrimination, creativity, imagination, fantasy, observance, ingenuity, recognition, reception, acknowledgment, and sensing. This last term indicates a mutual aspect of meaning between the notions of these terms and thus word groupings opposed as rational and irrational. The word 'sense' in 'sensation' indicates a physical or emotional awareness yet it is also used in 'making sense,' indicating knowing by way of linear or rational logic. Non-sense is an illogical status but also suggests something that is 'not sensible,' somehow not 'real enough to be felt,' or perhaps 'false distinction.' Similarly the term 'aesthetic' derives from the notion of physiological sensation or 'feeling,' yet people are said to have 'aesthetic response' not only to images and forms but also to ideas and literary representations. Such a response might include physiological sensation but is also taken to indicate some psychical phenomenon of consciousness that effects 'intellect.' Thus again some co-relation is suggested between rational and irrational aspects of knowing or understanding. Furthermore, analytical and conceptual thinking is often critiqued as being, upon reflective analysis, actually irrational—even though it has the 'form' of rational understanding.

In regard to these contrasts and ambiguities among modes of knowing or activities of conscious discretion, an overall term for human knowing offered here is 'sense abilities.' For, just as more overtly aesthetic perception 'senses' differentiations by way of some mental processing of 'data' that can derive either directly from sensation or imagination, so too can more intellectual and intuitive, rational and irrational activities be regarded as 'sensing' differences and likenesses through some mental activities. All these differentiations are 'sensed' in and by the activities of consciousness. It can further be supposed that various cooperative associations of these faculties compose distinctive modes of 'being intelligent.' And, though it might be tempting to attempt to order them in a hierarchically singular general process, it seems a reductive assumption to impose on such activity. Attempting to impose linearity and rigid categorical distinction upon knowing inevitably seems to misrepresent the interactive concurrency of these aspects and how each appears to constantly be modifying others. Studies of brain function indicate a rather incredulous amount of concurrent neuronal activity in different aspects of the brain during cognition. It is difficult to sufficiently emphasize the

'volume' and complexity of brain activity detected even during simple thoughts and actions. Suffice it to state that the "I" of conscious awareness is can register only a tiny fraction of that activity—even when executing very simple activities or thoughts. (Noretranders, The User Illusion). Human intelligence then presents such a complex, variably configured, 'multi-tasking' dynamism than no mechanical or computational modeling ultimately appears appropriate to attempts to portray it. Machines and computers are dubious models for human consciousness. The only respectful way of approaching this 'sensorium' of psycho-somatic sense abilities seems to be pluralistic. That is, as a context having more than one type of activity of intelligence occurring both simultaneously and in rapid, immensely variable combinations. Learning, and thus educating, is then best imagined as occurring in a variety of modes and contexts that variously stimulate and correlate different aspects of the psycho-somatic 'field.' But such implies not only a diverse curriculum of study but also of methods of perceiving, thinking, and expressing.

This notion of a diversified yet radically and concurrently interactive aspects of 'sense abilities of intelligence,' with the proposed yet complimentary categories of intellectual and intuitive, rational and irrational, presents a conceptual basis for what has been termed "multiple intelligences" (Gardner, Frames of Mind, Multiple Intelligences, Intelligence Reframed). This approach actually seeks to specify focused aspects of cognitive function that generate specific intelligences for knowing linguistically, logically/mathematically, somatically, spatially, musically, interpersonally, intrapersonally, and through engaging nature. Such variously dynamical activity in the brain and conscious cognition is also represented by the division of fields of knowledge, methods of study, and modes of expressive representation into intellectual or academic disciplines—from the "hard" sciences to the "soft," oral to literary, mathematical to linguistic and imagistic, mechanical to artistic, theoretical to applied. These many distinctions of modes of thought and expression emphasize the suggestion that significant differences in human faculties for knowing and understanding exist. It is not difficult to further suppose that some persons have more innate talent for some of those faculties than others, or will be more motivated to excel in some versus others. Here then, in the potential variation of emphasis aspects or combinations of the 'sense abilities of intelligence' within the 'mental body of knowing,' is a complex set of factors form which individual character can emerge during intellectual, emotional, and physiological development.

Acculturated Verses Individualized Sense Abilities

In attempting to adequately appreciate the significance for educating and schooling of both the complexity and variability of these sense abilities, one must emphasize their evident 'plasticity.' This term is sometimes used in reference to the variability of development of the neuronal patterns that enable consciousness. The implication is that the physiological brain, in terms of how those networks are formed, interconnected, and maintained, is 'malleable.' It can be shaped or configured on a minute level by external influences, as well, perhaps, by internal responses to those influences. The rate and extremity of such

development in the brain is described as being particularly pronounced in childhood. This background of brain development as a basis for formulation of the sense abilities of intelligence is readily correlated with the observed influences social experience upon sense of self and identity. Cultural imaginations of origins, causality, reality, etc., along with the specifics of operant social structures are thus regarded as directly influencing both the development of those sense abilities and self-identity. Further, it is assumed that these aspects of consciousness, the generalized 'operations of intelligence' and self-identification, intrinsically effect each other. The psychology of selfhood is likely to influence the development of intelligence and vice versa.

Thus, just as selfhood is socialized, different emphasis can be placed upon either rational or intuitive categories of knowing, the activity of conceptual cognition or that of intuitive inspiration. Educational efforts that seek to facilitate development of a broad range of sense abilities must then be attentive to what cultural or social biases are emphasizing which operations of intelligence. Attempts to educate persons in such a way as attends to the diversity of sense abilities for intelligence is likely to meet resistance from some social biases, however, perhaps especially in pluralistic or multi-cultural social milieus where there is disparity of perspective on what and how persons should know, think, and express themselves. Acculturated emphasis on some types of sense abilities of knowing and criteria for compositions of selfhood dominant in one sub-cultural social group can readily be in conflict with that of another group. Such contrasts are readily associated with distinctions between acculturated emphasis in racial groups and economic social classes where there can be disparity of emphasis upon rational intellectual operation versus intuitive and feeling-toned discretion. Similarly, independent self-directedness of intelligence can be favored over obedient exercise of it in response to the direction of superiors.

The notion that particular languages tend to structure the modalities of consciousness and cognitive faculties presents another example of variation in their development. One might here refer to the 'sense abilities' of a given language. Some assert that the English language is particularly conducive to abstract thought and discursive expression. Perhaps then it is no 'accident of history' that English has become the dominant 'tongue' of a scientistic and technological global culture. Others assert that the French language, with its less voluminous vocabulary, induces a greater metaphorical sense ability because fewer words must be deployed to encompass the same diversity of experience, function, thought, and feeling. If such contrasts are valid, then educational efforts that are engaged using English might inherently begin with certain biases about which sense abilities for knowing are to be emphasized. Students whose native language is not English but who study in English are thus likely to encounter some 'cognitive dissonance' resulting from the contrasting emphasis on specific sense abilities between their primary language and English. The specialized 'technical languages' and language usage of academic disciplines also appear likely to effect composition of sense abilities in distinctly different ways. Consider the expressive modes of quantum mechanical physics relative to that of literary criticism. Such differential influences on how sense abilities of intelligence are emphasized also extends to the visual or

imagistic. Predominant exposure to photography versus artistic painting seems likely to effect the mode and tenor of differentiation among 'the intelligences.'

Yet another perspective to apply to differentiation of sense abilities derives from the notion of disposition, particularly in reference to its meanings of temperament and arrangement or distribution. This notion suggests some particular 'turn of attitude' about which faculties of intelligence are preferred and which ones associated with which others. Faculties of intelligence might be arranged as to produce their most cogent expression in oral, literary, pictoral, or even gestural modes of expression. One might thereby expect to encounter such combinations as 'emotive intellect,' or 'poetic expression of logical analysis,' 'mechanically precise artistic creativity,' 'dryly humorous musicality,' 'antic physically activity in response to cognitive processing of abstract concepts,' and 'pictorially expressed analysis of interpersonal intelligence.'

Attempts to facilitated and individualize development of the sense abilities of knowing thus must contend with inherently characteristic traits or disposition of sense abilities in persons, their undeveloped status in child or adult, their habituated usage, resistances to change manifested by established egoic attitudes of self-identification, and socially asserted biases about or repressions of certain modes of intelligence and interpretation. Examples of persons who study in a second language or cultural setting and discover that their sense of intelligence is both expanded and unfamiliar to their historical sense of self, other, and world illustrate the significance of these factors for education.

<u>Developmental Contexts for Sense Ability Enhancement: Learning to Learn Variously Relative to Life Stages or Self-status</u>
Education can then be posed as an effort to facilitate learning to learn variously by enhancing engagement of the diversity of sense abilities for knowing. Yet that effort is not only complicated by cultural values, societal structures, and individual personal tendencies of temperament, character, and modalities of psycho-somatic cognition. The concern of 'how humans learn to know' is linked to that of 'when do humans learn to know in which modalities?' Again the concern of correlating educational efforts to developmental phases of such factors as brain functions as well as physical, emotional and expressive capacities becomes significant. There appear to be both age and stage appropriate concerns for attempts to enhance specific sense abilities of knowing as well as their co-operative functioning. Discerning and attending to such 'opportune moments' for emphasis is complicated by the observation of variation between individual persons. While there appear to be developmental phases in children that roughly correspond to age categories, there are many who assert a considerable flexibility in these associations. In addition, stages of development or status of emphasis in a person's use of particular sense abilities could be posed regardless of their age or social identity. Persons may 'open' to development of a given sense ability or combination of such abilities in any life stage due to physical, psychological, and other factors. Some individuals do not 'discover' they are capable of sophisticated analytically intellectual intelligence until mid-life. Some children have artistic impulses of which they are unaware. Thus it would appear ever important to direct educational efforts toward the specificity of individuals

rather than automatically group them in predetermined 'grades' or developmental statuses according to age, gender, or past experience.

Assessment of just what general life-stages of sense ability development might guide educational efforts remains worthy of study. But in terms of 'learning as understanding difference and likeness' a rough general sequence can be ventured. Infancy and early childhood seem to involve engagement of intellect with difference *within* an experience of continuity between self, other, and world. Intelligences would thus appear to be developing differentiation of inherently related elements. Adolescence behaviors in general suggest a shift toward engaging differentiation through a self-status of more conflict and competition. Thus though learning would appear to be contexted in childhood by a 'sense of self' that includes possessive, competitive, and combative behavior, the thrust of such expression does not appear to assert boundaries that are as definitive and abstract as those of a more adolescent perspective. The childhood status seems a bit less concerned with self-differentiation for the sake of 'being different' or 'distinctive.' Adolescence appears to manifest a greater self-conscious anxiety about the opposition of likeness and difference, to be more generally attentive to definitive identifications in a discontinuous field of associations. What is being suggested here is that self < > self and self < > other relations in childhood are less oppositional, more fluid, than these tend to become in adolescence when issues of assuming a more permanent social identity arise. What and how one thinks, 'who one is,' become more seriously decisive concerns for the assertion of selfhood. Adulthood then could be posed as development of a more mediatory self < > self and self > < other attitude between the 'identity defining polarities' of difference and likeness. Maturation would appear to involve some 'coming to terms' with the anxieties of adolescent struggles with individualization under the pressures of social conformities. Intensely differentiated aspects of social and personal status must be mediated to enable practical function in work, community, and family. Old age can then be regarded as often allowing some return to the more inclusive continuity of self and world that childhood appears to manifest in general. The older person is somewhat less constrained by the preoccupations of maintaining functional familial, social, and economic 'order' so that the rigidity of self-identification, thus relations with self, other, and world can be relaxed somewhat. The implication intended here is that such general shifts during the life stages suggest some likely differences about which sense abilities are, or might be more active and how these are likely to be engaged.

In summary of these references to the great complexity of the sense abilities of intelligence, along with the radically individualizing range of their priorities and combination, it appears important to consider how personal motivation might be effected by which modes and combinations are emphasized. If persons are significantly diverse in terms of which aspects of the range of intelligences and expressive styles are primary in composing their consciousness then educating needs be most attentive to such differences if it is to school in an egalitarian manner. To ignore the implications of this evident diversity by asserting implicit, if not overt, bias for some modes of knowing and expressing over others is to effectively pathologized some characteristic approaches to learning and understanding. An example is the prominent contemporary concern with behaviors

that are classified as "attention deficit disorder" and treated as "dysfunction" which requires correction and even medication. However, such manners of thinking might be regarded as expressing some alternative but potentially important mode of deploying intelligent sense abilities. If such students are considered to be thinking variously, more laterally than vertically and linearly, they might well be found to posses associative dynamics of intellect that provide a valuable contrast to the dominate one of linear rationalism. Schooling that favors one mode of knowing over others might well seem more orderly and manageable, but also seems destined to denigrate and debilitate the primary emphasis or relations of intelligences in many students. In addition, those that do excel under such selective conditions for learning and brain development might well do so by way of repressing or mentally 'amputating' aspects of their own intellect and emotional understanding which are not being engaged or approved. In addition, it is conceivable that a student might excel in a mode of intelligence that is not particularly inspiring for that individual person's character. Emphasis on performance as the primary indicator of what type of study a persons should pursue might well ignore those that bring them a meaningful, motivating experience and thus make them more motivated and creative citizens.

Distinguishing Educational Content and Methodological Development: Posing Appropriately Complex Dynamics for Educational Learning, Teaching, and Instructing

Instrumental Instructing and Hermeneutical Teaching

Educational efforts can be distinguished as on one hand an attempt to convey certain contents or specified knowledge (leading toward data) and on the other hand as seeking to enable people to apply their sense abilities through various methodologies of investigation, analysis, interpretation, and expression (leading out and toward modes of knowing). The 'contents' of educational efforts might be termed data, formulas, concepts, and procedures. The 'methods of understanding' to be conveyed through educating would then be manifestations of diverse dynamical modes of perceiving, cognitively correlating, analyzing, intuitively responding, emotively valuing, creatively expressing, and so forth. This distinction might be considered as posing ontological and epistemological functions of educational efforts. In the former sense persons are taught 'how to do' and 'how things are' in the world. In the latter concern they are taught various modes of 'how to know,' and potentially then ways to 'know about knowing,' or to 'understand understanding.' Whatever the intentions of educational efforts and their manifestation in the forms and practices of schooling, there remains a difference between imparting content as data or procedure and individualized development of effectively applied methodologies of knowing and expressing.

Perhaps then some correlating distinction can be made between teaching and instructing that purpose of illustrating how learning can be contexted. As noted, the term instructing carries a sense of *structuring* the inner aspects of persons, as if placing some preexisting form 'inside' them. The term inform has a similar implication. The 'acquiring' of structure or form suggests a learning that can be readily assessed by testing a person's reiteration or demonstration of that form which they are assumed to have 'taken in.' Knowledge in this regard

might readily be considered quantifiable or measurable. Such educating or schooling can be classed as 'instrumental'—it seeks to convey information and procedure that will serve as 'instruments' in the accomplishment of specified tasks. It has specific, measurable goals. But simply learning to demonstrate performance of 'in-structured' procedures does not necessarily indicate an understanding of how one has learned to think or express relative to other ways of thinking and expressing.

The teaching of how to differentiate and variously combine methodological styles of employing one's sense abilities to investigate, analyze, experience, and interpret phenomenon along with expressing one's thoughts and feelings, can be classes as hermeneutic. Hermeneutics is a term for the 'art and skill' of interpreting and understanding human actions, productions, and institutions. Originally associated with divergent interpretations of meaning in the Christian bible, the term has developed a more general reference to methods or 'approaches' to interpretation. Hermeneutical perspectives and methods can only be demonstrated by application to some complex phenomenon, text, or structure that prompts various interpretations. This is not an approach that leads to 'right' answers according to set rules. Thus the consequence of being schooled about the various methodologies of analysis and interpretation suggests a learning that is likely to be difficult to quantify or test. So it might also be said that education as 'teaching hermeneutics' involves learning ways to 'lead out' meaning *from* information, whereas instrumental instruction 'leads one toward' established knowledge and formulaic methods of quantifiable manipulations of data. In this view, formulaic methods of analysis, such as found in mathematics, are not so much interpretive in the hermeneutical sense as meaningful in objectively quantifiable terms that can be predictably and consistently performed. Nonetheless, quantification is a method of knowing and as such is 'a hermeneutic' or epistemic modality for making meaningful distinctions.

Personal identity can readily be seen as differentiated by Demonstrating the knowledge content one has 'mastered' or 'acquired' according to 'instrumental performance' on standardized tests can be regarded as one ways of asserting personal identity: 'I am the data and procedures I know and can reiterate.' One can be identified as a physician because of what a test has confirmed he or she 'knows'—though such a status tells little about how a person will employ their individualized complex of intelligences to apply such specialized technical knowledge in the 'make meaning' or understanding about life in general. Individualized identity would seem to associate more with development of inherent capacities for thinking, feeling, and expressing in relation to the particular character of one's sense abilities in so far as those are employed to understand, interpret, and express. Quite obviously doctors having had the much the same technical training are observed to 'practice medicine' in quite distinctive manners. From the quantifiable perspective of instruction in standardized data and performative procedures such disparity can seem to indicate a 'failure' of schooling. From the perspective of a diversified and thus potentially more innovative society, the same diversity can be regarded as valuable.

It is evident that some person's developed individuality of intellect suggests a greater facility or 'inspiration' around managing knowledge as data or procedure to generate understanding in formulaic modes of interpretation, such as mathematics and sciences. Other persons demonstrate intelligence more readily in using

less reductive analytical methods and more overtly metaphorical modes of expression, such as in literature and visual arts. Individualized intellect and its intelligences are further particularized by appearing to 'prosper' more in focusing on a single style of cognitive engagement or intellectual method, whereas others can seem 'lost' or ineffectual unless they are encouraged to operate through contrasting styles or 'abilities of intellect' concurrently. Some individuals have difficulty understanding concepts if these are not presented in a spatial or tangible context whereas others gain understanding quickly from abstract descriptions. The learning of mathematics sometimes appears easier for some in relation to the spatial contexting of geometry. Some individuals learn and express understanding more effectively in writing and others by oral expression and dialogue or discussion. Thus the consideration for how a person learns best involves some determination about what combination of instrumental instruction and hermeneutical teaching seems to be most stimulating to the particular configuration of their intellect.

Surely both instruction as an 'in-structuring' of 'how the world is' (or how it has been already determined to be) and hermeneutical teaching as a 'conveying of dynamical styles of knowing' are essential to such individualized development of sense abilities. And obviously there is some 'instrumental instruction' involved in 'teaching hermeneutics.' The distinction indicated here is more in that the instrumental mode of instruction tends to associate significance with efficient or correct performance while the hermeneutic emphasis is not so concerned with 'right' procedures and answers as with distinguishing the 'hows' and 'whys' of thinking and meaning making. Even in 'the sciences' there are considerable differences of hermeneutic method, though most involve the use of standardized procedures and quantification. Thus, becoming in-structured in the absence of acquiring a capacity to reflect upon how methodological structure biases abilities for perception, interpretation and valuation is not likely to enable much individual choice or expression. The 'instrumentally educated' might prove efficient workers for specified functions, but they are less likely to be adept at self-reflection and compassionate co-operation with diversely oriented and identified others. This effect is evidenced within specialized fields by often vehement competition to assert whose theories and interpretations are 'the only truth.' It is further exemplified in the tendency of specialized persons to ignore or devalue the work of other specialized persons. A more overtly hermeneutical education can enhance appreciation of 'other ways of knowing and expressing.'

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Narrative and Syntax in Knowing the Differences of Knowledge

Returning to the notion that knowing is a consequence of perceiving and categorizing differences, it can be posed that 'knowledge' is manifested in descriptions of states or conditions of difference. A distinction between knowing and knowledge appears artificial in the sense that no perceived difference can amount to 'meaningful knowledge' in the absence of some 'meaningful contexting of knowing.' Knowledge cannot exist in the absence of some method for 'determining difference and likeness.' Perceiving the difference of black from white cannot even be 'stated as knowledge' in the absence of some references for naming and comparing

states of light and dark. Similarly, the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, represent states of difference but that difference has significance only in terms of how the numbers 'describe each other' and how the differences between them make mathematics possible. Quantification as meaning derives from a particular method of knowing phenomena. Concepts arrayed in a logical argument are similarly 'units of difference' arranged in a sequence or 'narrative' that establishes the whole argument. The most elemental mode of 'making difference meaningful' could be posed as 'an opposition.' To designate difference as 'black is not white' is a much less defining or 'absolutely identifying' assertion of difference than is 'black is the opposite of white.' In the latter contexting black and white are identified by their opposition or antimony. A similarly elemental mode of contexting identity is to assimilate differentiated status to a comprehensive one, such as 'red and green are colors.' In that mode two differentiated states are reduced to one.

Difference as knowledge is composed in aggregated complexes of differentiations asserting likeness and un-likeness. Differences thus qualify each other in related sets. Such meaning-by-reference is composed in language through referrals of denotational and connotational meanings between words. Thus there is a rather indefinite 'deferral' of meaning from one set of differences and likenesses associated with a word to that of others. The word bird does not simply 'mean' the thing it names but a host of associations to other words such as wings, beak, flight, and feathers that, in turn, derive meaning from association to still other words. Colors are differentiated in relation to each other, then also by how some are composed of the mixture of others, and then by distinguishing more and more of their ultimately innumerable shades and combinations. Such is the 'knowledge of color.' Yet in one sense it is always 'approximate' as there is not an 'exact red' or 'absolute' opposition of black and white, but only various versions of such status that endlessly 'define' each other. Then, beyond such differentiations that seem to exist within the category 'color,' there are all the other references in language and culture that make colors variously meaningful. Thus there is neither an 'exact' status of the difference 'red' nor a final statement of all its possible meanings—redness is relative and its meaningfulness is invariably contextable (from 'blood' to 'passion' and 'communism.')

Noting this dynamic of 'making differences meaningful' provides another reference for understanding the different emphasis of methods of knowing in contrast to knowledge as content or data. Just as words are typically regarded as having fixed meanings rather than representing a variable association of meanings implied by other words associated to other words, knowledge is often treated as 'a thing.' Knowledge as 'facts' or 'units of information' that 'record' or assert various states of being and relations of causation tends to present a fixed status. But the 'things of knowledge' are 'made meaningful' in sequences of association that are endlessly variable just as are the origins of meaning in language. Words have meaning in relation to other words and thus tend to have 'many meanings' depending upon how they are positioned in relation to other words, and even by how they are spoken or 'read.' Knowledge as data also can be 'read variously' depending on how it is arranged in some narrative structured by a 'method of knowing.' Thereby, the differentiated status or 'fact' of human individuality can be understood as either a consequence of differences in genetic coding (the narrative method of

biological determinism) or as differences in behavioral adaptation to environmental factors during physical and psychic development (the narrative method of developmental psychology). The 'known fact' of human individuality is thus situated in a meaningful understanding of its causation by two different contextings of related sets of perceived differences—those of genetic coding and those of environmental influences.

'Knowledge' thus always requires some mode of ordering it in relation to other 'meaningful references' by way of 'methods of organizing difference' in order for its differences to be 'particularly' meaningful. Scientific modes of making meaningful order out of the differences of color in light compose the meaning of those differences in a contexting different from that of theories of color in artistic painting or spiritual traditions associating color with states of consciousness. Such sets of references can be regarded as 'differing narratives of difference' or 'syntactical modes of knowing difference as knowledge.' Thusly, different semantic states of meaning are derived by way of differing syntactic narratives. Modes of knowing then can be understood as differing 'grammars' for making meaning from phenomena. The language and other methods used to convey 'knowledge' in teaching inherently present some particularities of such narration or syntax for 'making meaning.' In a sense knowledge is always known by way of some 'story telling,' some narrative of its differences, and there are different stylistic modes of so narrating, such as represented by different academic disciplines. In a sense these modes compose reality differently even while often referring to the same perceived differences 'recorded as data' or knowledge. (As such, it might be found that different styles of 'narrating meaning' have some correlation with the differing dynamics of the faculties or sense abilities of intelligence).

Among the most fundamental modes of such ordering of difference is that of opposition in a 'binary dyad' such as 'black is the opposite of white.' Such definitional opposition poses a potently succinct statement of difference in that it contains its own conclusive reference. The statement 'black is not white' asserts no more particular a definition than 'black is not green' in establishing the status of black and white. But to pose them as exact opposites defines each as the antithesis of the other. Each is precisely what it is not. Such an oppositional 'syntax' for identifying difference is also reductive in so far as it asserts definitive status. It reduces black to the opposite of white. The reductive mode of subsuming differences into singular states is another 'syntactical move' in 'ordering difference.' The differences of redness can be reduced to 'red', and the differentiations of red, green, yellow, and blue can be 'reduced' to being 'colors.' Both oppositional and reductive modes for 'ordering difference' are powerful and efficient means of composing 'knowledge.' Oppositional and reductive modes of ordering difference facilitate another mode of ordering, that of hierarchical preference or importance. Opposites then often become associated through hierarchical ordering in which they are aligned in 'vertical' sets of superior versus inferior. Reductive associations similarly compose 'chains' or 'trees' the 'converge' upon some definitive category. In this mode of ordering difference all colors are 'reduced' to being 'parts of light.' Mathematical quantification is another form of reductively hierarchical ordering difference to singularly exact status.

These modes of 'narrating difference' are favored in instrumental instruction that seeks to develop definitive knowledge and efficient repetitive performance of established routines. But if these become dominant in attempts to 'know the differences of knowledge' then 'knowing' and its 'knowledge' can become severely 'narrowed.' There are less restrictive, more 'pluralistic' modes of associating difference. Different modes or styles of 'narrating knowing' can be associated with emphasis on differing sense abilities, so that some rely on computational cognition while others emphasize understanding through symbolic imagery. These distinctions are again most readily illustrated in styles of language usage. The exactly sequential language of physical sciences depends upon oppositional and reductive modes while the metaphorical style of poetic diction makes its characteristic meanings by way of irresolvable associations and ambiguities that 'disturb' confidently reductive knowing through asserting exact status. This latter 'syntactical mode' of 'sensing meaningfully' can be posed as a 'triangulating' or 'constellating' of meaningful references rather than reducing them to definitively opposed, quantified, or sequential associations.

These characteristic of elemental modes for 'arranging difference' amplify into 'styles of telling' or narrating the 'stories of knowing and knowledge.' Thus 'scientific narrative' tends to assert rather 'linear' sequences of oppositions and reductions in its 'telling how self and world are'(though that methodologically singular narrative is rather fantastically complex in its elaborations). Its 'syntactical association' of differences suits a formulaic understanding of effective causation between phenomena in which a specific set of differences equal or result in another specific status $(2 + 2 = 4)$. Artistic, literary, mythic, religious and philosophical modes tend to generate less progressive or conclusive, more diffused or multiply centered 'narratives of meaning.' Meaningful association of difference and likeness here tends to be composed in more 'lateral' and 'radial' syntactical relations than in sequential lines of progressive resolution. The meaningfulness of metaphorical syntax (John is a deer in the skyscraper forest) is not 'equivalent' or 'reducible' to that of literalistic causality (John is like a deer because he moves in certain ways among buildings as if these were trees). The different aspects of an 'imaginary' novel and those of a scientific text on optics are both 'ordered' by some arrangement, but the ways meaning is derived in these differing 'genres of expression' are significantly distinctive. The modernist or postmodernist novel, in the mode of Kafka and Joyce, can be virtually non-narrative in that it is not ordered by a singular progression of a plot line. One would better describe this mode as constellatory, being one in which associations are various and concurrently activated as a basis for 'making meaningful expression.' As such, it seems reasonable to assert they the reductively progressive, thus rather monovalent mode of most scientific narration and the constellatory or more polyvalent expressions of metaphorically poetic dictions pose different semantic statuses of meaning which derive from particular associations of 'semantics of intelligence.' That is, these different ways of 'making difference meaningful' must derive from some characteristic faculties among the evident diversity of the 'sense abilities of the intelligences' that assert different, if somehow co-operative, sensings of self, other, and world. It seems further reasonable to assume that if these different

syntactical modes of knowing together manifest the nature of human consciousness then they all deserve mutual respect and development in educating.

Such considerations of meaning-formation can be considered as a 'microcosmic' level relative to narratives of meaning as 'cultural stories' that establish meta-levels of meaning. There are 'stories' which 'narrate' meaning on pervasive collective levels such as <u>The Odyssey</u> and The <u>Bible</u>. This meta-level of 'narrating meaning' asserts intricate composite associations of difference and causation that establish potent, though often unconscious structures of belief about the 'realities' of self, other, and world. This culture-founding level of meaning making presents a version of 'the facts of truth and history' that act as dominant social standards for modes of asserting 'proper' meaning. One particularly curious and important characteristic of the more reductive versus the less reductive modes of sensing and expressing meaningful association of phenomena is that each can be deployed to 'read' the other. The text of <u>The Bible</u> can be read or interpreted through a more metaphorically poetic orientation of sense abilities or a more reductively literal one. Both methods can also be applied to the scientifically conceived theory of "the origin of the species through natural selection." Educational efforts whose teaching does not elucidate these distinctions about the narrations of meaning effectively disables diversified engagement of one's sense abilities. Schooling that is not self-conscious of its own 'narrative modes' for conveying meaningful knowing will tend to both confuse these modalities and deprive students of conscious capacity to choose between them in expressing their individuating sensing of self, other, and world.

<u>Enhancing Modes of Knowing by Differentiating Dynamics of Understanding</u>

Obviously the preceding differentiation between instrumental instruction and hermeneutic teaching is untenable as an absolute distinction, as would be any such definitive separation of 'oppositional,' 'reductive,' and 'constellatory' modes of knowing difference. Yet the learning of 'ways of knowing' can be readily regarded as a 'structuring' of conscious capacities for 'applying intelligences'—a configuring of functions of intellect. Differentiation between styles or heuristics of interpretation is in effect distinguishing between patterns or 'structurings' of understanding what is perceived as knowledge. Knowledge as data, as facts, figures, formulas, or descriptions always manifest or imply some particular methods of knowing, some bias toward certain ways of investigating and interpreting the differences of phenomena—i.e., that of fixed, singular, quantifiable status. An historical date is comprehensible as knowledge only in terms of linear causality in sequential time frames—the world as history is known through certain methods of establishing reality and causality. That version of reality need not necessarily compete for hierarchical dominance with other 'sensings' such as knowing the world as 'field of ethical relation,' or as human psychological representation of an ultimately unknowable existence, or as a concurrent field of multiple universes between which time<>space relations are discontinuous.

Thus to know knowledge is not simply to remember and reiterate data but to configure data using specific methods of analyzing, ordering, and interpreting—in ways that emphasize specific applications of

intelligences. The 'meanings' of data must be contexted by dynamics of perceiving, thinking, valuing. Learning typically takes place in contexts where these dynamics are implicit in the structures of teaching. But it can occur in a teaching context that makes the structurings of self, other, world and intelligence it favors explicit—a primary 'subject' of study and knowledge. To bring the knowing of knowing (epistemology of epistemologies) to conscious consideration requires making distinctions that are ultimately, like that made above between instruction and teaching, rather 'artificial.'

The same phenomenon, experiences, thoughts, emotions, and objects can be approached with various emphases on aspects of human sense abilities through using various criteria for investigation, analysis, and interpretation. Such differentiation does not necessarily imply that these sets of criteria represent separate, unrelated, competitive modes of knowing or being. That is to say, such distinctions tend to be an 'artifice' made for the purpose of illustration rather than to represent some literal reality of absolute difference between 'ways of knowing.' That is to assert, the mind's operation appears to derive from generation of the full range of sense abilities of intelligence. Thus even though aspects of these can be emphasized by character and conditioning, they are typically all present, all involved whether consciously or not, in consciousness. But we cannot appreciate or enhance their specific qualities if we do not conceive them as somehow distinct. Engaging different worldviews and theoretical constructs thus can be considered an 'exercising' of various aspects of one's sense abilities rather than a search for the ultimate truth. Education in this regard need not be focused on the true versus the false, the right versus the wrong. Rather, it can enhance the value of each perspective on knowing and valuing by contrasting it with others. What was once termed a "liberal education" represented attempts at such 'elucidating various sense abilities' under the categories of differentiated academic disciplines. Yet 'knowing variously' can be said to require more than a separation of sense abilities into 'subjects of knowledge' that are then 'studied' if these are only to be approached through oppositional and reductive modes of 'making meaning.'

Archetypalities of Knowing and Knowledge
The notion that there are some distinguishable modes or styles for knowing can be posed using a concept associated with the term 'archetype.' Derived from the Latin roots *arche* and *typum* for indicating an original or elemental pattern or prototype. This word has been used in both psychological and literary theory (Carl Jung, Northrop Frye) to indicate a basic, long existing or archaic, underlying pattern from which many variations are derived. The various modes in which humans perceive, think, feel, and express can be regarded as having archetypal characteristics or 'background patterns.' Thus archetypal distinctions can be made between abstract logical reasoning and seeking understanding by direct, tangibly physical manipulation of objects and their interactions—represented by the terms theoretical and practical knowing or knowledge. A most basic distinction of archetypal modality in knowing is between reduction to singularity and amplification to plurality. This difference can be characterized as knowing by one-ness or many-ness. Knowing entities or events by

oppositions or exact definition tends to reduce them to singular status. Thusly one says, "I am Joe," or, "That is the door," or "this is an atom." More pluralistic knowing emphasizes composite status, such that the term atom is understood to 'stand for' a composition of elements that are in turn composed of others, arranged by various 'forces' and relationships. This latter, more pluralistic mode tends to create 'fields of identity' that overlap with others because the 'parts' of one are also aspects of another. The difference here is also represented by positing causality in linear, progressive sequences versus as events emerging from a concurrent constellation of factors. Thus there appear singular and pluralistic archetypal modes of knowing. Yet obviously both are distinguished in relation to each other. One-ness stands in contrast to many-ness. Many-ness derives from associating one-nesses. However, in the absence of some conscious awareness of the difference between these modalities of posing identity or status much confusion can arise about 'who is saying what.' Empirically scientific knowing derives from the singularly reductive methods of quantification. Poetic knowing derives from the amplifying methods of metaphoric association. But if the archetypal differences in these manners of knowing are not acknowledge and validated then an argument about which one presents the 'singularly true status of existing' readily results. An archetypal perspective on knowing and knowledge allows one to avoid becoming entangled in arguments about 'what is the right or wrong, true or false' method of knowing.

Human knowing as portrayed in Western philosophical thought tends to be posed either as ontological, being 'of that which is,' or else as epistemological—knowing that is not 'of the actual things of the world' but rather 'of human symbols for those things.' In the ontological view humans can actually 'know' things and phenomenon directly—knowledge is 'of those things' as 'facts' or literal existence. In the epistemological view, humans can ultimately only know things and phenomenon as sense perceptions and the concepts, symbols, images, etc., generated to represent those things—knowledge as symbolic psychic content. The ontological perspective asserts that there are 'actual facts' that can be known and exactly expressed in language and the formulas of mathematics and science. The epistemological perspective holds that humans can never be certain that these expressions are the same as what they are supposed to represent. These two views of the nature of knowing can be considered archetypal modes from which many complex theories are derived. They are in one sense 'archetypal opposites' or seemingly opposed 'archaic patterns' for knowing. But once again such distinctions can be regarded as 'artificially' absolute because it can be readily argued that neither is ultimately distinct form the other. And taken together they can also be useful in 'understanding understanding.'

When attempting to differentiate among modes of analysis and interpretation as archetypal styles for knowing and understanding it can be helpful to continue posing contrasting pairs—such as ontological and epistemological, reductively linear and non-reductively constellative. But such parings that indicate a contrast in the manifestations of knowing and knowledge need not be regarded as binary oppositions of exact difference—rational and irrational need not necessarily be understood as defining each other through antipathy. Similarly, proposing a consistently systematic or standardized formula for 'how to differentiate human sense abilities' as modes of knowing, favors a reductive syntactical mode of ordering differences. Such a 'singular contexting' of

knowing and knowledge would contradict the notion that perceiving and meaning making are composed by diverse sense abilities in interactive and indefinitely variable co-operative associations. It proves important then that terms for modes of knowing and distinguishing knowledge not be consistent with any one archetypal mode or syntactical style of 'making meaning' or 'structuring logic.' The notion of an archetypal perspective is not meant to pose opposites but rather variable types or styles of patterning—categories that might well overlap or inter-relate rather than be utterly different or opposed.

A guiding reference when attempting to pose contrasting but non-oppositional pairs can found in the concept of "deconstruction" (Jacques Derrida). This method of revealing the complexity of meaning making in language seeks to reveal how definitions are derived from oppositions, the most simple form of which appears in statements such as black is the opposite of white, good is the opposite of evil. But this way of making meaning readily becomes hierarchical, with one term in the opposition being privileged as superior. Good reflexively comes to be known as superior to evil. The either > < or-ness of binary oppositions seems to encourage such privileging. But there is no evident necessity to impose such preference upon the differentiation. Contrasts allow for distinction, distinction is necessary to differentiate knowing as knowledge, as 'something known.' However, the assumption of inherent or implied hierarchies of value in distinctions requires a heuristic or 'interpretive bias' that is being 'imposed upon the difference.' That could be termed a hierarchical bias. That tendency seems to result from an archetypal emphasis upon knowing by way of reductive one-ness and causality as linearly progressive. But knowing difference does not have to become an automatic imposition of singular statuses that are intrinsically oppositional and competitive, thereby prompting hierarchical ordering and valuation.

When difference is posed in a less oppositional manner, say by three or more comparisons, then a different dynamic of knowing tends to arise. If black and white are differentiated in relation to brown, a triangulated set is posited that resists oppositional definition. An awareness of the typically unconscious privileging posed in binary distinctions versus 'triangulatory' ones is important for knowing about how knowledge composition implies value. The 'either > < or' association asserts an archetypally binary opposition which tends to force a 'choice' between the opposing poles. A 'triangulation' of differences between three different but mutually defining references, such as moral<>immoral<>amoral expresses an archetypally more plural knowing in which assertions of value will necessarily be more complex. The triangulating mode tends to assert that whenever an oppositional pair are posed, such as good><bad, a mediating third position, such as amorality, is intrinsically implied, though often not acknowledged when the method of knowing is oppositional. Both the triangulating reference to a third and the constellatory reference to even more aspects of 'contexting meaning' tend to pose multiple meanings in any given set of differences or 'knowledge.' In this sense knowledge and meaning are derived from both likeness and unlikeness discernable when references to things and phenomenon are 'constellated' in non-binary sets or associations. The archetypal mode of triangulating or constellating contrasts still posits difference that can be opposing but is not dependent upon opposition for making meaning. Certainly both oppositional and constellatory modes of seeking to know and understand are

useful for generating knowledge. Furthermore, in consideration of the contrasts between them, which are not necessarily oppositional, knowing about how one knows is made more complex.

Another illustration of archetypal range in a mode of knowing can be made around the notion of dialectics. The term derives from the Greek *dialektike*, translated as 'art of debate' and related to *dialektos,* for speech. A general meaning for "dialectic" is given as "the art or practice of arriving at the truth by disclosing contradictions" (American Heritage Dict. p. 391). Dialectical method thus is often posed as the 'resolution' of contradiction or conflict that can 'reveal' a more accurate or 'true' status. This interpretation expresses an assumption that contradiction or inconsistency in the progressive sequence of a rational description necessarily represents a false or inaccurate knowing. Some assert that dialectical change results from the engagement of a "thesis" and its opposite, an "antithesis," resulting in the two antimonies progressively resolving into a "higher form of truth." The preceding opposition is thus resolved, ceasing to exist logically. This mode of understanding privileges a progressive view of the refinement of knowing through sequential resolutions of conflict or contradiction. Yet dialectic is also ascribed a meaning as "the contradiction between two conflicting forces as the determining factor in their continuing interaction." That posing of 'dialectical activity' suggests not a resolution but an on-going dynamic of relation generated by contrast that can pose the 'meaning of contrast/conflict' as knowing the 'relational activity' it generates, rather than in its resolution to a non-contradictory status. Here then are two aspects of the archetypallity of 'dialectical knowing'—one composing a progressively linear mode of reductive understanding and the other an ongoing, bi-valent movement between contrasts that makes their interactive relations accessible to knowing. The latter more ambivalent mode can be associated with 'triangulation' in that it poses three points of reference as concurrently configuring meaning—the contrasting aspects and that of their interaction or relation. In contrast, the oppositional mode of dialectic reduces the opposition to a one-ness, the "synthesis," that then becomes a thesis that can be the basis for a subsequent opposition and resolution.

The differentiation of 'ways of knowing' represented by those categories of schooling once termed "the liberal arts" have tended to become progressively more divided into ever more specific sub-specialties and thus numerous during the 2oth century. Yet these seemingly more specific loci of meaning making still tend to overlap in practice, some actually evolving from 'cross over' or hybridization of existing disciplines. The more such distinctions there are, the greater the emphasis on 'inter-disciplinary' study and understanding—the more distinctions and possibilities of contexting knowing become expressed. While such academic disciplines such as mathematical and literary studies focus on different topics that suggest employing different primary 'sense abilities of intelligence' or mental faculties, it is important to remember that both can be approached in archetypally reductive and definitive manners. Shakespeare can be 'read' as a mathematical code of fixed meanings disguised in metaphorical language and story plots. The distinctions between ways of knowing, as between topics of disciplinary study, tend to be more vague than one might expect. Thus aspects of 'ways of knowing' or 'narrating knowledge' are posed here in various contrasts in an attempt to exemplify the range of

their 'archetypallity.' To assist in contexting learning so that such distinctions about knowing are made explicit, the following associations of modes and terms relative to education are offered. Some of these contrasts are restatements of similar notions so that the 'categories' posed overlap—just as do contexts for generating 'sense of self' or identity. The intention here is not to imply there is a 'right and wrong' way to present knowing. Rather, this list is intended as a reference to prompt reflection on what modes are or are not getting emphasized in teaching and schooling. After all, the goal of educating can be "excellence" but if it persons are to excel as individuals, then they will need to be presented with clearly differentiated modes of knowing.

Distinction by Binary Opposition and by Associative Triangulation or Constellation

Distinction by Difference and by Likeness

Distinction by Exclusion and by Inclusion

Distinction by Abstract Concept and by Tangible Example

Thinking as Rational and as Intuitive Activity

Thinking as Linear and as Bivalent Dialectical Process

Thinking as Conceptual and as Figurative

Thinking as Judgmental and as Analytical

Thinking as Narrating Differences and as Constellating Correlations

Thinking as Habitually Reactive and Inventively Investigative

Thinking as Abstraction from and Embodiment of Phenomena

Logic as Formal and Informal

Logic as Rational Consistency and as Relational Complementarity

Logic as Mathematically Equational and as Metaphorically Interpretive

Logic as Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

Logic as Linear and Recursive

Logic as Causal Explanation and as Associative Meaning

Logic as Reductive Exclusion of Contradiction and as Inclusive Rational Relation of Contrast

Intelligence as Conscious and Un/subconscious Activity

Intelligence as Intellectual Capacity and Aesthetic Sensitivity/Expressiveness

Intelligence as Computational Function and Interactive Sense Abilities

Intelligence as Singular and as Multiply Configured Capacity (Intelligences)

Intelligence as Spatial, Musical, Mathematically Logical, Somatic, and Emotional

Intelligence as Interpersonal/Of Self and Interpersonal/Of Others

Intelligence as Inherent and as Developed

Intelligence as Constant and as Contextually Variable

Intelligence as Individually and as Collectively Generated

Intelligence as Reproductive and Inventive

Understanding as Correct Answers and as Conceptual Facility

Understanding as Mimesis/Reiteration and as Poesis/Creativity

Understanding as Conceptually Abstract and as Aesthetic and Emotional

Understanding as Quantifiable and as Qualitative

Understanding as Simple and Complex

Understanding as Reflexive and Reflective

Knowing as By Reductive One-ness and By Pluralistic Many-ness

Knowing as Rational Analysis and as Intuitive Response

Knowing as Sensation and Cognition

Knowing as Reflexive Memorization and as Reflective Analysis

Knowing as Definitive Understanding and as Contingent Reference

Knowing as Transcendent and as Immanent

Knowing as Method and as Methods

Knowing as Objective and Subjective

Knowing as Of the World and as Of Human Representation of the World

Knowing as Reflexive and Reflective

Knowledge as Ontological Fact and as Epistemological Representation

Knowledge as Tangible and Intangible

Knowledge as Universal Truth and as Context Dependent Relative Reference

Knowledge as Fact/Data and as Symbolic Representation

Knowledge as Quantifiable Cognitive Performance and as Qualitative Understanding

Knowledge as Disciplinarily Defined and as Interdisciplinarily Valid

Knowledge as Of Simple Linear and Complex Concurrent Causalities

Knowledge as Value Free and Value Laden

Knowledge as Data and as Individualized Understanding of It

Knowledge as About How Things Are and How Things Are Supposed to Be

Expression as Literary and Oral

Expression as Linguistic and Pictoral or Gestural

Expression as Rational and Intuitive

Expression as Argumentation and Discussion

Expression as Monologue and Dialogue

Expression as Eloquence and Catharsis

Expression as Consciously Intentional and Unconsciously Enacted

Teaching as Elucidating Individuality and as Instructing Standards

Teaching as Instrumental and Hermeneutical

Teaching as Knowledge Transfer and as Inducement of Knowledge Generation

Teaching as Developing Intelligence and as Differentiating Intelligences

Teaching as Authoritarian and as Collaborative

Teaching as Directive and as Responsive

Teaching as Affirmation and as Confrontation

Teaching as Dictation and as Conversation

Teaching as Monologue and as Dialogue

Teaching as Directing and as Learning About the Other

Teaching as Projection and as Reflection

Teaching as Leading and as Accompanying

Teaching as Inducement and Instruction

Learning as Memorizing and as Expressing Understanding

Learning as Mental and as Psycho-Somatic Process

Learning as Active and as Passive Process

Learning as Personal and as Co-operative Interpersonal Process

Learning as Teacher and as Student Responsibility

Learning as Correct Performance and as Making Mistakes

Learning as About Self and About World

Learning to be Ethical and to be Analytically Critical

Learning as Obedient Reiteration and as Reflective Responsiveness

Learning as Being Directed and as Teaching One's Self

Learning as Neuronal Brain Activity and as Emergent Property of Relation Between Intelligences

Learning as Proper Socialization and as Evolving Awareness of Self < > Self and Self < > Other/World
     Relations

Learning as Developing Self-Governance and Radical Self-Exploration

Learning as Work and Play

Education as In Service to Cultural Values and to Socio-economic Structures

Education as In Service to Personal Competitiveness and to Collective Cooperation

Education as In Service to How Things Ought to Be, How Things Are, and How Things Might Be

Education as In Service to Obedient Civility and to Independent Citizenship

Education as Social Indoctrination and as Individualized Self-Investigation

Education as Conformist with and as Subversive to Dominant Hierarchies of Social Power, Economic
    Privilege, and Philosophic Concepts

Education as Leading Out, Leading Towards, and Leading Back In

Education as Formal and Informal Learning

Education as Specialized Schooling and as Lifelong Broad Spectrum Learning

These contrasting associations characterizing aspects of knowing, learning, and teaching are not meant to present technical terms or fixed categories. These are only examples of the varied and overlapping ways approaches to aspects of educating can be posed. A pluralistic pedagogy needs attend to such variations in the dynamics conceiving, presenting, and evaluating educational efforts. When approaches are contexted in narrowly exclusive or oppositional ways two significant consequences for pluralistic society seem likely to result. Firstly, the characteristic emphasis and associations among intelligences in some persons is likely to be repressed or go undeveloped. Secondly, biases in valuation derived from the dominant methods of knowing and definitions of knowledge will remain unchallenged by contrasting ones. Learning will become more a matter of reiteration of unanalyzed perspectives and processes. Persons so educated are then less capable of both 'thinking as' and 'thinking for' themselves. Such persons are less able to act as responsibly discerning citizen members of egalitarian and democratic society. The loss of developed complexity and individuality in persons becomes the loss of diversified vitality in the society.

<u>Performatively Reactive and Entrepreneurially Creative Intellect</u>
    A last approach to diversifying modes of knowing and knowledge in teaching is presented here as an archetypal range of 'intellectual character.' Personal intellect can be encouraged through teaching styles that encourage it to be 'efficiently reactive' to certain types of mental challenges. That is to say, it can learn to perform certain procedures and apply specified formulas of logic and theory when presented with certain types of tasks or problems. It can be schooled to engage those tasks in ways appropriate to predetermined consequences. That function of intellect could be termed 'reactive' in that it becomes adept at reacting efficiently to specific contexts and requests. Such prescribed 'intellectual performance' is intrinsic to 'doing jobs' or 'playing roles' that are established around routines. Becoming adept at such predetermined performance

can even be developed relative to the distinctive disposition of emphasis among one's diverse intelligences. That is, individualizing aspects of intelligence can be developed for the purpose of reactively performing specified tasks.

What is commonly indicated by the term 'creative' or 'creativity' appears as a rather different mode of intellectual activity or application. Application of personal intellect to a more creative or inventive expressions, relative to the normative thought and work of other persons, requires capacity and motive to 'think beyond established patterns.' It must avoid performing in a reactively or reflexively habitually manner. Such inventive or creative conduct can be understood as 'entrepreneurial.' An entrepreneur is one who "organizes, operates, and assumes the risk for a business enterprise" (p. 457). Such activity is associated with 'being enterprising,' 'going it alone,' and 'taking initiative.' Enterprise, and thus entrepreneur, derive from the Latin *inter*, for between and *prendere*, for to take. One can detect notions here of 'taking the between' or perhaps 'prizing the between' and 'the prize of being between.' Thus an 'entrepreneurial intellect' can be regarded as an independent or autonomous composition of sense abilities that co-operate in being 'enterprising' by 'seeking new understanding,' or 'investigating the betweens' of standardized and habitual beliefs and social structures. A pluralistic, democratically egalitarian society could well be regarded as requiring a considerable participation of such 'entrepreneurial engagement,' not only in economic contexts, but in intellectual and communal ones as well.

However, dominant social structures tend to become most effective as allowing but directing such entrepreneurial intellect so that its expressions invigorate but do not significantly challenge the established power orders and cultural beliefs. A genuinely pluralistic purpose of educating would have to emphasize the validity of entrepreneurial intellect that was not so confined and subservient.

Contexting Educational Efforts and Schooling Environments for the Broadest Stimulation of Intellect and Sense Abilities

Negative and Positive Dynamics of Learning: The Need for Error

Learning is readily assumed to be a 'positive' phenomenon, as in the 'acquiring' of the 'thing' knowledge. To learn is also reflexively considered to be a consequence of 'getting it right,' of 'knowing the correct answer.' A 'right' answer is also considered a 'positive' one. Thus one tends to receive 'positive feedback' or affirmation for 'proper understanding' as 'correct answers' and 'negative feedback' or denigration for 'incorrect answers' or 'improper performance.' But this contrast can be seen as deriving from a superficial or naïve assumption. If knowledge is the knowing of differences meaningfully ordered by syntactical methods and criteria of associations, then to learn is as much about awareness of what 'is not' as about 'what is.' It is derived as much from 'how things do not associate' as from how they do. Emphasis upon 'getting it right' and association of failure or lack of intelligence with 'getting it wrong' obscure awareness of how one learns. Being

judged 'right' or 'wrong' has little to do with *how* one 'gets it right' and why what is correct, true, or accurate is considered to be so. A student that 'learns to give the right answers' might actually learn very little about 'how to learn about knowing' or even why those answers are accurate. He or she might simply develop a sort of 'knack' for 'learning the formulas' or even 'intuiting what is wanted.'

It can be asserted then that emphasis on the process of perceiving, sensing, analyzing, interpreting, and expressing involved in 'seeking an answer' are even as important to 'learning to learn' and 'knowing about knowing' as is the status of 'being correct.' It would then appear as important to context teaching and learning around the ways one seeks to know and understand by applying one's sense abilities in various modes of distinguishing and methods for interpretation of difference as to focus teaching upon 'getting the right answers.' Such emphasis would require allowing students to proceed along 'incorrect' tacks of investigation, reasoning, and expression so that they could then reflect upon 'how' their attempts 'miss the intended mark.' Such an approach will also allow them to see that while their efforts might prove 'incorrect' for the 'lesson given,' they might 'arrive' at some interesting and compelling 'answer' nonetheless. It might allow them to learn about their habituated patterns of thinking and the particularities of the disposition of their intelligences. Allowing the misapplication of procedures, development of erroneous rationales and proposal of unorthodox interpretations without condemnation can encourage experimentation. It bears remembering that there would be no changes in human knowing, after all, if many 'wrong answers' did not turn out to be 'correct'—in spite of 'established truths.' Thus to emphasize error as negative and valueless is of dubious pedagogical value if the aim of teaching is a development of autonomous intelligences capable of independent investigation and critical analysis.   To manifest an 'entrepreneurial intellect' one needs to 'feel free' to experiment, to engage problems in 'enterprising' ways—to be 'wrong' repeatedly without discouragement. And to 'do everything well' but get a 'wrong answer' must surely be as important as 'doing it all wrong' and getting a 'right answer.'

Varying Various Educations

It can be said that there are many educations in so far as persons are educated relative to various functions and purposes. One could suggest social, technical, physical, intellectual, artistic, and even emotional educations, each configured to instruct and train persons for specified behaviors and performances. Each could be contexted and conducted so as to place more or less emphasis on such concerns as conformity to precedent rather than inventive creativity, developing new capacities or repressing old habits, refining skills or inspiring motivations. But even within an overtly specified process of learning such as 'technical training for engineering,' each of these educational categories will necessarily still receive some emphasis. Even the education of an engineer will involve some social, physical, intellectual, and emotional conditioning, however covert or unintentional. Thus there are also those aspects of any education that are implicit rather than explicit, and often imposed without much conscious or deliberate intention. Whatever the explicit intentions of 'an education' might be, much 'conditioning' and 'content' are conveyed by structural factors in the physical

environment, modes of instruction and performance evaluation or assessment, language usage, social etiquette, hierarchies of authority, competitive or cooperative character of association with others, and so forth. Thus the types of educations, their purposes and indoctrinations, are typically more complex and often contradictory than overtly acknowledged. There arise then two general categories worthy of receiving variable emphasis. One concerns questions of how the overtly specialized education presents a diversified perspective on and investigation of its particular 'field of knowledge and practice.' The other concerns how much attention is given to diversifying conditioning of less prominently featured types of thinking and acting. The education of medical doctors has been more recently revised to emphasize both interpersonal intelligence and business management—subjects previously neglected in a more narrow emphasis upon medical knowledge and procedures.

Situational and Abstract Learning Contexts

Teaching < > learning dynamics can occur in intimate association with the 'subject of study' as it is encountered phenomenally in the world. More often they are contexted as abstractions. The majority of topics typically studied in school are engaged in the form of information and concepts rather than tangible presences. Courses having the title "social studies" are intended to educate students about the structure, history, and functions of socio-cultural life. But these 'subjects' are studied in relation to a 'society' and 'world' that are 'out there' beyond the immediate context of school. Seldom are students taught to study these concerns by analysis and reflection upon their immediate lived experience among their peers, in family and at school, all embedded in commercialized consumer society. Thus notions about 'society' they study are abstractions that can be carefully crafted to give selective presentations of someone else's (the textbook writers') view of social and cultural life. However, it is also possible to move the context for such study out of the inherently abstracted school environment into the more immediate one of complex socio-economic activities. Thus 'the classroom' that is typically 'removed from' the situational context of the subject matter can potentially be situated next to or even within that context. Study in the 'removed' context of schooling would seem likely to limit the variety of sense abilities of intelligence engaged as well as the motivation derived from intimate, immediate encounter with the phenomenon being studied.

Some subjects of study are intrinsically abstract relative to real world experience, such as more advanced mathematics and analytical philosophy. Thus engagement with them might well be more immediately situated by the symbolic iconography of formulas and numbers or theoretical texts. But early math studies can readily be 'made tangible' than it often is, such that teaching involves more visual and spatial references (the so-called "Singapore Math Method"). Even advanced math might be more immediately situated by being studied in relation to the industrial or engineering contexts where it is actually utilized. Geometry is particularly suited to being situated 'in context' by application to the literal objects of any physical environment. Even in technical training or vocational schooling much instruction is often abstracted from applied contexts. In relation to the

development of the potential range of intelligences and inspiring the particular disposition of them in individuals, 'real life' situations where the subjects or skills studied are functionally encountered provide more complex stimulation of mind and body. The interactivity of brain and mind functions is invigorated by vivid 'hands on' experience in 'enacting' the modes of knowing and applying the knowledge involved. Simulated or 'virtual realty' methods are often employed to enhance theoretical and abstract study but these seem likely not to provide the sort of relations between sense abilities for which the human brain and consciousness are evolved. Among those subjects studied in abstracted school environments, artistic creation and theatrical performance, along with laboratory sciences seem among the most 'dynamically situated.'

However, when it comes to the more epistemological study of how humans know, the more immediately situated environment might well be one abstracted from ordinary contexts and attitudes. Understanding of the dynamics of knowing and knowledge as configured by overtly symbolic rather than literalistic methods of sensing and organizing difference-as-knowledge produces markedly abstract bases for understanding. Reflective analytical examination is not readily developed 'in the midst' of practical concerns. Thus some 'altered state' of consciousness needs be induced to effectively and affectively situate a student's awareness relative to ways of knowing and behaving that are typically 'automatic.' However, if the objective is to more directly encounter the dynamical activity of what is being studied it needs to some how become immediate. 'Ways of knowing' are 'ever present' in/as human consciousness. Thus the 'practical theater of study' is one's self or the immediate collective of persons 'doing knowing' as they study its archetypal characteristics and methodologies. To appropriately situate effective study of the ways 'visual art' know self, other, and world would then require both analysis and reflection upon 'actual artistic expressions' as well as engagement in the process of creating such expressions. Thus an art history course that exposes students to lecture, textual descriptions, and photographic reproductions is not well situated to induce an experience of 'artistic ways of knowing difference.' However, such contexting might well convey an appropriately abstract sensing of a particular perspective on the causal relation of historical events involving styles of artistic expression. In a somewhat different regard, 'artistic history' can itself be abstracted from the fuller range of social, political, intellectual, religious history and presented as 'a history of artistic styles.' But such an abstraction removes one's encounter with the history of 'artistic ways of knowing' from the actually situated context in which it was being deployed and interpreted. A broad understanding of the role of 'the epistemology of art' in society and historical events is likely to be severely curtailed by such a narrowing of the context for study.

Again, these notions of 'situated learning' and 'appropriate abstraction' relate not only to considering 'where' in life or experience a 'subject of study' can be most immediately encountered, but also to which situating is likely to engage which sense abilities and intelligences more effectively. Given the notion of differing dispositions of intelligences among individual persons, no one contexting is likely to effectively stimulate them all. Highly literate and technological societies necessarily increase emphasis on both

specialization and abstract technical learning. That emphasis can readily obscure the significance of immediately situated experiential study as well as the role of symbolic and so-called 'imaginative' or 'creative' expression in developing more abstract faculties of intelligences. As a consequence the latter modes of learning/knowing are often denigrated in the context of institutional schooling when formalized to promote performance in abstracted learning for subjects such as math, science, and technical literacy. In addition, though teaching subjects like math in particularly abstract contexting might promote the development of some students having dispositions of intelligences that are effectively stimulated by such contexting, it might well frustrate others. There might be many whose intellectual dispositions would excel at math if it were more immediately and tangibly contexted. There appears an important interplay between specialized emphasis on topics and methods, broad engagement of diverse but cooperative sense abilities, and the conditions created for learning in immediately situated versus abstractly represented contexts.

Formal and Informal Contexts for Learning and Teaching

In addition to considering the above concerns about abstracted versus immediate contexting, distinctions can be made about roles of formality in learning. Though much of this discussion refers to education in formalized contexts, such as school or university, learning and teaching need be regarded as existing in much less institutionally formalized circumstances. In considering contexts for learning a spectrum of situations ranging from utterly unstructured to casually organized and finally to specialized institutionality can be posed. Learning occurs in every sort of context, from social environments such as family to physical ones such as uncivilized or wild nature. Intentional teaching might or might not be involved in learning. It can be contexted by the forms of a job or task, by an apprenticeship, as one-on-one instruction in sports or music, as self-motivated exploration or compulsory performance. Learning contexts can even be circumscribed as taking place 'outside ordinary reality,' in the sense of a religious or spiritual education involving ritualistic or altered states of consciousness. What seems important to acknowledge about learning is that it always 'takes place' in some context, is always influenced by setting and surrounding attitudes. Such would seem particularly true when a context is overtly contrived expressly for the 'purpose of educating,' as is the case with institutionalized schooling which tends to 'take place' in a 'place' all its own—both 'inside' and yet 'outside' the larger social context.

In contemporary society, learning has become associated almost exclusively with institutional schooling in such specialized settings that deploy specialized instruction. Though persons learn to 'do things' outside of school, such as play sports or musical instruments, formal instruction is often still involved. But there seems a pervasive assumption that significant learning occurs 'in school.' The reliance on graduation certificates and diplomas as proof of being educated emphasizes the bias of this association. And since the systematic, hierarchical dynamics of institutional schooling tend to assert such primary authority over learning, the indoctrinational effects of schooling are compounded—if school or 'teacher 'says it is true' then it must be so

since that is where 'the truth' is taught. That socially structured assumption of about the authority of formal schooling readily promotes it as superior to learning 'at home' or 'among friends.' School tends to blithely assert this authority with no reflection upon the dissonance and disruption it might engender between students and their families or their 'cultural heritage.' Similarly, the learning that occurs between young people in their social associations seem to be virtually ignored in schooling except when it conflicts with institutional authority. The actualities of socialization seem typically ignored by the curriculums of schooling except perhaps as an abstractly ethical issue about how persons 'ought to behave.' Yet attitudes about learning, teaching, priority of concerns, and personal intelligence developed at home and in social contexts can clearly assert great influence over how readily students develop their intelligences in school. Thus formalized schooling that does not 'take into account' how it contexts learning in relation to other 'life contexts' of the students 'subject to' its 'leadings forth and toward' appears naively constituted. It is likely to be unaware of factors in the experience of students that effect how they engage the intended context of learning in school.

This concern also relates to the issue of 'hidden curriculum' mentioned above. Though formalized schooling is conceived and implemented to produce specific effects on students there are likely always some unintended or unacknowledged consequences. 'Hidden curriculum' can be intended but not overly acknowledged. But it can also be associated with 'tacit' or 'incidental' learning that occurs as a consequence of the formal contexts and structures of schooling and educational methods. Students schooled in a daily format of hourly classes terminated by bells learn to not extend their present study beyond the scheduled time—they are 'schooled' into thinking and behaving in certain ways by the schedule. Similarly, they are 'tacitly taught' to divide their methods or topics of study according to the scheduled times and course descriptions. A self-reflective education needs ever be wary about what tacit or incidental learning might be occurring as a result of its formalities. One over example is how the social relations of young persons are largely configured by the formalities of schooling in which they encounter each other. They develop their social identities and personas within or around the artificially abstracted formalities of schooling. That is not a 'real life' context for socialization. In another regard, another consideration for how to formalize school involves when and where to emphasize informality for the sake of facilitating particular modes of learning.

These potentially differing effects of more and less formal contexting for learning could well be crucial to the elucidation of the individuality of diverse personal sense abilities. Given an inherent diversity to how the sense abilities of knowing are composed in different persons, it would seem likely that some will learn more readily in more formal contexts while others will prosper as learners in less formal ones. Put another way, some formalities are likely to promote development in some persons while others respond more readily to different formalities—or informalities. The concern here is about which contexting promotes development of a sense of self that both invigorates' and inspires' personal intellect so that it 'takes the enterprising risks' necessary to learning new and different ways of knowing—despite anxiety, initial ineptitude, and even prolonged frustration. Thus a society that seeks to educate individuality in relation to egalitarian values might well need to emphasize a

considerable diversity of informal as well as formal contexts for learning. A 'school day' that is all routine procedure dominated by clocks and bells does not seem to address these concerns.

Evaluating Educational Efforts At Contexting Learning Variously within Egalitarian Culture

From the foregoing considerations of the roles of personal identity and individuality in society in relation to variable dynamics of knowing and learning, some questions can be posed to guide an evaluation of educational efforts. Assuming that the broadest interests of individualistic, egalitarian, democratically pluralist society require the promotion of self-reflective and methodologically diverse modes of personal intelligence, what 'standards for education' are thereby appropriate? How best to describe a pluralistic pedagogy suited to enhancing individual self-knowing that facilitates interpersonal respect for difference or otherness? What is teaching like that promotes a sophisticated political awareness of egalitarian concerns derived from complex self < > self relations?

These questions initially prompt an observation that education has at least two distinct functions. The more overtly acknowledged one is that of 'instructing' persons in the cognitive skills valued by society. Persons thusly need certain 'know how' to participate in literate, technological, bureaucratized culture. The most basic reference to such skills is represented in the phrase 'the three R's of writing, reading, and arithmetic.' But no degree of developed capacity to 'perform' the skills of literary and computational intelligence will address the concerns of what makes an appropriately cognizant and empathic egalitarian citizen. Education must also enable such a citizen to contend with his or her responsibility to understand and participate in guiding a stupendously elaborate and intricate interplay of hierarchically competitive socio-economic forces. Technical 'know how' that is not developed in service to such personal responsibility is likely to become a 'servant' to whatever social and economic powers are dominant in social structures—both acknowledged and not. Educational efforts that do not foreground this issue are thus necessarily engaged in implicit service to dominant forces or 'power structures.' And, as has been asserted, such forces are often not attuned to broader cultural values—particularly values for egalitarian individualism as the basis for collective community. Huge governmental and corporate bureaucracies tend to regard themselves as superior entities relative to those the persons they 'manage,' much like psychological complexes are said to act within individual psyches. They act as 'inflated' egoic functions purporting to be the identity of the groups they 'head.' Thus again it is asserted here that only the education of extensive self-awareness in individuals might enable them to avoid reflexive capitulation to such social and economic 'embodiments of power' in public life.

Distinguishing Skill Learning and Analytically Reflective Development
To attempt to distinguish between teaching specific cognitive skills and developing broadly reflective analytical intelligences is once again rather artificial. Analytical reflection, considered as capacities for 'looking back at' or 'from the side upon' what and how persons think and act could be regarded as a 'cognitive skill.'

But since it appears to require insights into how various intelligences interact to produce habituated assumptions and behaviors, it might better be described as a meta-cognitive skill—a skill for knowing and evaluating the effects of how other skills are engaged, and then to what social, political, or psychological purposes these are employed. Skill learning in the specialized sense of math, reading speed, and data retention, proper speech, and civil conduct can be presented to children as what is required of a person to be approved, socially acceptable, or economically successful. But the development of formalized cognitive skills can also be presented specifically as an important means of knowing self, other, and world independent of social standards and economic imperatives. When this distinction is not made explicitly then the emphasis upon conformity to social standards as the motive for learning is likely to dominate, given the pervasive impulse in persons to affirm self value by seeking collective approval.

Thus educational efforts need to be assessed for effectiveness in 'teaching basic cognitive skills' and 'meta-cognitive analytical reflection.' But how effectively those efforts are in service to knowing for the sake of knowing self, others, and world *as an individualized person/citizen* is equally significant. A person manifesting excellence in diverse cognitive skills and reflective analysis but that does not apply such capacity to reflective engagement of self < > self and self < > other relations might readily be conditioned to act in service to hierarchical order rather than egalitarian social order. It might then be said that educational efforts must be evaluated for the 'intelligently reflective development of complex sense abilities in relation to individual character and its engagement with egalitarian social responsibilities.' In this regard it must be remembered that the empathic capacity of persons to 'identify' with others appearing radically different requires some contexting for emotional relation. Rationalistic or moral assertion of idealized ethical responsibility alone, like its cultural predecessor of religious obligation to a ethically moral divinity, do not appear sufficient to engender adequately motivated egalitarian citizenship. The numerous examples of ethnic and racial conflict even among citizens of nations legally based on pluralistic egalitarian social principles testify to this actuality. The competitive and isolating effects of enhanced personal liberty (the culture of individualism) appear to require some more 'internal' personal motive to generate a communal affinity that 'feels' the interests of others (even radically different seeming others) to be similar to one's own despite difference.

Thus the notion of requisite 'skill learning' can be extended to include 'emotionally responsive and expressive skills.' Such skills involve aspects of human sense abilities not much activated by computational and objectively analytic scholastic development. A curriculum of 'the arts' can be seen as related to such 'skills of emphatic feeling and expression.' However, the ways in which 'artistic endeavor' is contexted is again significant. 'Art' as dominant style to be imitated, or as diverting entertainment, is unlikely to enhance discovery of unfamiliar or 'hidden' aspects of selfhood resulting in serious reflection upon the diversity of personal identity, modes of knowing, and the 'natures of realities.' Artistic creativity engaged as a modality of exploring one's feelings and thoughts about self, other, and world can activate intuitive and aesthetic reflection that has distinctly different significance from art as skill performance relative to standards. Leading persons 'out' and

'back in' to encounters with the strangeness and radical otherness of self needs be a 'goal' of educational efforts. In this respect, as in development of epistemological and psychological analytic reflection, educating must in some ways be confrontational to the habitual sense of self, others, and world in so far as egoic assertion denies the diversity and complexity that constitute much of their commonality.

Content, Performance, and Purpose: Evaluating the Whats, Hows, and Whys of Teaching and Learning

An attempt is made here to differentiate what about educational efforts can be evaluated more directly versus what must be judged more indirectly. Schooling can be regarded as having fairly specific objective of developing certain skills and levels of performance—its 'whats' and the 'hows' of accomplishing those. More generally it has the task of accommodating persons to both their intelligent individuality and social responsibility—its primary 'why.' In the latter respect, educational efforts to teach as both 'leading toward' and 'leading out' can be evaluated for their 'service to cultural purposes' only by reference to the conduct of persons who have 'undergone' that educational process. An intention to do so does not guarantee the result. It must be asked, then, if persons so educated actually perform as empathetically motivated, intelligently diverse, mutually respectful, effectively co-operative, complexly reflective, and skillfully competent citizens. 'The test' of educational efforts in egalitarian society is thus made by gauging how egalitarian the society actually is.   Since egalitarian values in pluralistic society are inherently 'at odds with' certain power interests and societal forces, it would be foolish and unfair to expect persons to be 'ideally ethical' or 'virtually equal' much less somehow inherently reasonable and fair. Students are intrinsically, unavoidably caught between competing indoctrinations in their overt and covert, implicit and scholastic, formal and informal, social and economic schoolings. The interests of family and its immediate cultural values, of 'corporate culture,' consumer economy, nationalist hegemonies, and social class stratifications are all, quite 'naturally,' to some degree incommensurate with standards for egalitarian society. One needs note only the time children spend watching commercial television and that consumer advertising is now allowed within the physical contexts of public schools to assess the extent of corporate power in contemporary society.

Given the prevalence of such hierarchically competitive, un-egalitarian interests in pluralistic, capitalistic society, educational efforts are understandably pressured to serve their purposes. Those seeking control of personal consumptive habits for the sake of 'market share' and material gain are not much interested in the individualizing of personal sense abilities and analytical reflection for the sake of creating autonomous citizens. Thus it is one of the distinguishing aspects of pluralistic societies that persons need to be conditioned to resist socio-cultural conditioning if the social order is to actually approximate such values. Educational efforts and schooling in such a context must necessarily 'assert defiance of' many other 'forces of socialization.' But in so far as history and psychology indicate that enforcing equality is not feasible, egalitarian society depends not on coercion but choice and self-motivated co-operation. Thus any attempt to evaluate educational efforts by the criteria presented here needs respect the great difficulty confronting the promotion of such emphasis on teaching

styles and learning contexts within pluralistic, democratic social milieus. An educational effort that attempts to socialize its students to values that encourage them to be skeptical about the values they are being socialized to cannot be efficiently systematized. That being said, it is not to test scores that one would first turn to evaluate educational efforts but to the behavior and expression of students—with/in their personal selves as well as with/among each other and in response to the larger society. What do their behaviors and attitudes indicate about their development as citizens able to deploy diversified intelligences, reflective analytical capacities, and empathy for others? Do they respect each other to the extent that they learn from each other and assist others to learn? Are they able to assert their individuality in spite of collective pressures to conform? Do they respond with enthusiasm to the styles of teaching presented to them? Do reflectively interact with, conform to, or reactively rebel against the contending indoctrinations of competing cultural, social, and economic forces? Students that are bored, confused, disrespectful, intimidated, or even passively obedient are not being well served by the 'leading forth,' 'leading toward,' and 'leading back in' with which they are presented. And in the end, it cannot be reasonably asserted that such a status is 'their fault.' The failure of students to develop these capacities in a society based on pluralistically egalitarian values is simply the failure of that society.

How young persons experience and interact with popular commercial 'culture' can be said to be a much greater concern than is typically acknowledged since that is the source of the most potently asserted 'educational' indoctrination in contemporary society. While public education can be said to necessarily avoid direct confrontation with how upon religious attitudes and practices effect personal identity and social relations, it cannot ignore the forces of commercialization of personal life and effectively shepherd the development of autonomous citizenship. It is not psychological reasonably to assume that children and youths are capable of encountering yet resisting the manipulations of commercial advertising and its attempts to associate personal identity with product brands and consumption for the sake of induced appetite satisfaction. Educational efforts that do not confront the manifold influences of 'popular consumer culture' on personal 'sense of self' and even development of sense abilities, are destined to be grappling with effects and affects in student behavior that are otherwise unexplainable. School cannot begin to compete with the manipulative advertising of commercialized popular culture unless it confronts its effects directly. Statistical analyses suggest that many children spend as many or more hours 'plugged in' to commercial forms of popular media each day than they spend at school. In some instances school time is effectively devoted to 'consuming popular culture.' This phenomenon is noted not because commercialism is being judged a 'bad thing,' but rather to acknowledge how potent an influence it is and that it is inherently a manipulative and seductive influence—particularly on young persons. This is relevant to assessment of educational efforts in democratic, egalitarian society because persons who do not learn to differentiate sense of self and world from the manipulations of commercial advertising will not be able to distinguish either their individual interests nor those of society from corporate sales strategies and a tendency to regard commerce as the primary purpose of society. Given the intensity of advertising directed at children, one could well assert that their sense of self, other, and world is presently more effectively 'schooled' by

commercial interest than by public education. Thus when students appear more interested in the appeals of commerce for their attentions and enthusiasms than for learning in school, it can be said that they are being 'failed' by the educational efforts directed toward them. Contemporary schooling must confront this inherent competition with the 'schooling of popular commercialism.' This imperative is simply a 'fact of life' given the context of pluralist society and capitalist economy (Teaching as a Subversive Activity, Postman).

Returning to the more specific goals of schooling, both teaching and learning can be assessed for how effectively the 'whats' and 'hows' of schooling are conducted. There is the typically emphasized quantitative mode of 'testing' that seeks to quantify how much students have learned correctly according to uniform standards. But there is also a more general level of 'performance' the requires more qualitative assessment. One can ask if the 'content,' the 'what' of the subjects emphasized in schooling, address a diversity of personal sense abilities and the development of their intelligent interactivity. Efforts at judging personal performance, the 'how' or 'how well' of schooling, can be directed at both sides of the 'educational relationship' composed by the educator and educated, teacher and student. Teaching pedagogies can be evaluated for how effectively they present 'content' such that it elicit the intelligent involvement of different person's individualized sense abilities. A teacher's style can be evaluated for 'how' diverse it is in its manifestation of modes of knowing and methods of interpretation.   On the student side of the relationship, individuals can be evaluated for 'how' they engage and respond to the 'content' and its presentation through teaching. Though student motivation and performance can be regarded as to some degree responsive to reward and punishment, it seems important to place the majority of responsibility for the involved, individualized response of students to the presentation upon teachers and the pedagogy that guides them. Schools that judge their success upon those students who appear to prosper in their particular version of institutional contexting for learning, adjudged by quantitative testing, while tending to fault or ignore those who are flunked out or quit, can hardly be said to evaluate their educational efforts in the terms offered here. Such schools are not evaluating their 'performance' in terms of 'serving the purposes of egalitarian democratic society' but rather in terms of only those who 'succeed as intended.' Such standards for successful schooling merely reaffirm the assumptions that originated them. But what actually are those standards, what are the 'whys' producing 'hows' of schooling that result in such disparity of student performance? If some students achieve the established standards and that is taken as proof of the success of schooling, regardless of the fact that many fare poorly or actually quite school, then such schooling could be said to effectively be generating a hierarchically stratified society of the more and less educated. Let it be judged then by the full spectrum of its results, not upon only one aspect of those results. Schooling that functions for the success of a few is not serving the interests of even a remotely egalitarian collectivity.

Evaluation in terms of purpose is as important as evaluation of the effectiveness of specific pedagogical practices in teaching effective performance of quantifiable skills. When academic success is judged merely in terms of such performance, then the purposes of educating are narrow indeed, however inflated the rhetoric asserting its importance. When the primary or guiding purposes of educating are not explicitly stated, along with

the inherent conflicting interests these involve, neither teacher nor student can be said to responsible for the results. Both need to know not only the 'whats' they are expected to perform but also the 'whys'—even in so far as there are contradictions between aspects of those whys and hows. If they do not confront and embrace those contradictions of subject, method, and purpose, then all will act that much more unconsciously and naively. Teaching and learning that do not 'take place' within the conflicts of personal selves against the background of broader cultural purposes, with both being contexted among the competing forces of social structures and economic interests, cannot be said to be an appropriate education for democratic citizenship. Here it is worthwhile to recall the psychological notion of the double bind. Just as persons must intrinsically contend with radically contrasting demands and expectations imposed upon them by family, personal relations, and society, so too schooling must 'serve' a society that has intensely conflicting expectations of it. There is no way around this in pluralistic society. But schooling that presents an honest and practically complex attitude about this inevitability will provide a much more sophisticated psychological model of self-knowing and self-governance to its students.

Admittedly the 'terms for evaluation' of educational efforts suggested here appear impractically vague, lacking systematic specificity and 'testable' criteria. Yet few would likely care to discard the social values and purposes these references for evaluation are offered to promote. Perhaps this conundrum of how to 'grade' the 'performance' of 'schooling' makes the point that education in accord with fundamental cultural values is not primarily about 'learning that can be tested.' Rather, it could be said to be about the diversity of individualized persons, the collaborative inter-personal behavior of those persons, and the qualities of the collective society generated thereby. Toward those ends, 'what' is taught seems much less critical than 'how' it is taught. That is, the style of teaching and modes of learning it thereby produced might be far more significant than quantifiable performance in specific skills favored by commercially motivated interests. Admittedly, educational efforts that could be affirmed by these criteria for complexly intelligent self < > self and self < > other relations are not viable in any narrowly configured context or methodology of schooling. Rather, some complex of inherently overlapping, even inconsistent modes and contexts are appropriate. The style of teaching that attends to such purposes cannot be progressively programmatic or uniformly enacted by different teachers. An 'honest education' that privileges individuation and egalitarian co-operation cannot be tidy, systematic, and simplistically 'testable.' It would necessarily be diverse, multi-directional, self-reflective. Thus some contrasting and complimentary pairs of references for what the dynamical character of such educating, schooling, and teaching might emphasize are offered.

Competitive Performance and Co-operative Endeavor

Individualized Expression and Standardized Communication

Economic Competence and Sophisticated Citizenship

Practical Skills and Autonomous Analytic Reflection

Conformity to Standards and Individuated Personal Survival in Spite of Same

Self Knowing and Knowing Others and World

Personal Advancement and Egalitarian Compassion

Instrumental Performance and Emotive Aesthetic Creativity

Popular Culture and Historical Culture

Equality of Persons and Inequality of Individuals

The Ideal and the Real

Political Strategy and Social Conscience

Conscious and Unconscious Motives

Objective Quantification and Subjective Qualitative Valuation

Graded Advancement and Individualized Life-long Learning

Standardized Techniques and Adaptive Invention

The Truth and Truths

Reality and Realities

Cultural Ideals and Societal Actualities

Socio-cultural Narratives and Personal Narratives of Meaning

Collective, Personal, and Individualized Identities

Specialized Cognitive Skills Performance and Cooperative Engagement of Multiple Intelligences

Formal and Informal Teaching/Learning

Applications of Formal and Informal Logics

Abstract and Tangibly Situated Learning

Negative and Positive Learning

Meeting Compulsory Demands and Engaging Self-motivated Study

Scheduled Schooling and Indefinite Projects

Scientific Causality and Symbolic Meaning

Performatively Reactive and Creatively Entrepreneurial Intellect

Engagement with Popular Culture and Overtly Induced Abstraction from It

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Chapter 3

Learning The Old Ways
Archaic Cultural Contextings of Education for Becoming Oneself, among Others, in the World.

Given that the purposes and means of educating always have a cultural background then learning is always directed toward values and goals for 'becoming a responsible member of society' as well as for 'being an individual' according to a given socio-cultural milieu. There are different notions about what is involved in 'becoming one's self among others' as well as how the reality of the world one is to inhabit is constituted. Thus considerable difference in educational efforts between cultures can be anticipated. Two questions arise from this observation that the next five chapters attempt to address. The first query concerns what appears to typify the most ancient modes of educating and what relevance their 'whys' and 'hows' might have for directing learning in contemporary contexts. The second question regards the history of educational efforts in Western societies and what influence that background might exert on present efforts. This chapter considers a few aspects about 'schooling the self' in pre-modern or archaic social contexts.

The term archaic is employed here to indicate what appears to be the most ancient type of social structuring. In general, such societies are constituted in localized, typically ethnically homogeneous populations having a common ancestry, occupations, and interest that configure a tribally based community. Continuity in such socio-cultural contexts is maintained through trans-generational adherence to traditional beliefs and practices rather than systematic procedures of law. Such 'traditional societies' are considered archaic or 'original' firstly because such structure appears to be the most ancient, and secondly because it establishes collective identity in reference to mythologized tradition rather than in to historical literal historical events. Such societies are thus less prone to the radical change or pluralism more typical of modernist ones. Modernist societies, with their emphasis upon innovation, thereby come to be associated with a progressive attitude that is significantly ambivalent toward tradition. While rigidly hierarchical civilizations (i.e., ancient Sumerian, Egyptian) are not thusly modernist, neither are these classed here as archaic. Reference here to societies as archaic is meant to indicate those in which communality is as, or more primary as a value and function of interpersonal relations than hierarchical stratification of roles or caste. In this distinction the archaic tend to be more horizontally and radially structured than vertically around rigid and specialized classes. The archaic also tend to be more orally centered than literary.

Admittedly, any educational effort must have some 'form.' Thus learning as contexted by archaic social structures necessarily expresses some 'formality.' However, the use of the terms formal and formalized in reference to more modernist, institutional contexts is meant to designate a pronounced degree of uniformity of educational efforts (schooling) established in separation from daily life and its immediately situated, relatively incidental modes of teaching < > learning. A more informal context for teaching and learning would thus be regarded as one that is not overtly separated or distinguished from other important functions of daily life.

Learning in the informal context can thus be regarded as more incidental to typical life activities as well as more immediately situated within the practical contexts for skills and information being 'acquired.' In the simplest manner, one thusly learns some skill, like house building, while houses are being built, not as an abstracted process in a classroom. Most practical or ordinarily functional learning appears to occur in this manner. Formality in contrasts is meant to indicate both procedures and situations specifically designed for teaching, instruction, and learning.

However, there does appear a rather special contexting for learning in traditional societies that has corollaries to the abstracted, specialized formalities of schooling in the modernist mode. Archaic practices tend to assert some differentiations between learning relative to practical concerns versus about traditional knowledge of the mythical background origins and purposes for world and society. This latter approach to developing 'functional members of the community' is more ritualized, more psychologically symbolic, and concerns the underlying relations between society and the cosmos, between human and non-human intentionality in the world. The often elaborately ritualized character of these ventures into 'extra-ordinary knowing' present a distinctively formalized structuring that is abstracted from daily life contexts. There are significant interactions, however, between this mythical realm of knowing and understanding and that of socialized identity and purpose. Personal identity and status *in society* often undergo significant re-orientations as a result of participation in the symbolically gestural, often physically and emotionally challenging ritualized enactments. Thus there is overt interplay between the more informal ordinary context of daily life and the extra-ordinary references engaged in the ritually formalized ones. These characteristics of how archaic societies context learning provide some significant implications for contemporary educational efforts.

Educational Context as Culture and Environment: Socio-environmentally Embedded Learning

In those societies indicated here as 'archaic,' which are discourse, learning, and knowledge are typically engaged orally rather than in writing, there often appear forms of 'collective attention' to what and how children learn. That is to say, children are often 'collectively' parented and educated within the context of daily communal concerns and activities. Any and even every adult a child encounters might feel some way authorized to contribute to his or here education as a result of an attitude of shared, communal parenting. All adults are thus at least potential teachers and 'schooling' might occur in most any circumstances. Also there appear various emphases on when in life a child should learn about certain tasks in specific contexts. In traditional societies learning is often significantly structured around distinctive roles for males and females. In some agricultural societies aspects of farming were gender-associated, with males preparing the ground and females planting it. There appear also categories of distinctive group association around religious and ritualistic responsibilities as well as functional activities such as crafts. Thus there can be significant differentiation of roles and accompanying knowledge even though learning is not necessarily specialized and abstracted. Members of such societies might not have to study elaborate text books and take exams, but there is extensive social, technical,

and mythical knowledge they must 'acquire' if they are to survive physically and flourish socially. What is distinctive about their learning is that is tends to be immediately embedded in social contexts and natural environments. One thereby learns about society in it. One 'studies' and develops the capacities for survival within nature. The interplay of psychical and somatic processes constituting the sense abilities of intelligent consciousness would appear then to be receiving the broadest possible range of stimulation relative to social, technical, and cultural learning.

Such a continuity of psycho-somatic stimulus for leaning in some respects contrast to the more abstracted, cerebral placement (or dis-placement) of intellectual development modern schooling. Learning by observing and doing might be regarded as 'embodying' concepts and meaning and would thus engage a greater diversity of modes of intelligence that abstract conceptual study alone. Abstract conceptual engagement with 'ideas about' phenomena detached from those phenomena, as a mode of teaching would not appear typical to traditional cultures. Given an environmentally embedded context the sensory intelligences of 'the body' are engaged in an immediate deliberative 'feedback loop' with cognitive functions, the complexity of which is incalculable. The potential difference between abstracted mental learning and this more psycho-somatic style can be illustrated by the difference between literally learning to drive an automobile in contrast to attaining understanding of rules for driving by reading, studying diagrams. Further, the characteristic of experience for both 'teacher' and 'student' in immediately embedded contexting would seem likely to differ significantly from that of 'classroom' learning.

It appears that teaching < > learning dynamics in archaic context often took place by way of extended initial periods of the 'student' being present during and observing an activity without any theoretical explanation of the concepts or dynamics involved. That is, long term exposure to and observation of 'what is to be learned' appears to have been the preferred method of 'teaching,' Learning thereby appears to be derived from observation and practice more than abstract analysis and instruction. In a somewhat different approach, the student performs an activity for extended periods before any explanation about its meaning or relation to other activities is given. This mode is used in many spiritual or religious studies, such as when Tibetan monks might perform prayers, chants, and other enactments for years before receiving complex conceptual orientation to them. Emphasis is not placed upon why they are doing what they are told to do. Such teaching modes seem to offer both an opportunity to struggle with an activity without abstractly defined expectations or constantly being corrected. In some cases it would appear emphasis is placed upon 'getting a feel for it' before engaging more abstracted interpretations of and commentary upon the activity. Much of the learning thus takes place by observing and then doing—as opposed to under directive instrumental instruction. This 'pedagogy of learning by example' seems to require the 'student' to spend considerable time in the presence of the 'teacher' so that he or she can 'learn by observing' or perhaps 'absorbing' method and skill. Such a mode of teaching appears also in the apprenticeship><master relations of organized craft guilds. In the latter contexting, the apprentice would often have to spend some years 'in the presence of' the 'subject to be learned' before actually beginning to 'do

it.' Such a pedagogy appears frustratingly slow and inefficient to contemporary attitudes structured by industrial technology and electronic media. Yet it might indicate a mode of engaging a wider set of sense abilities for learning. In so far as it does not emphasize instrumental instruction and 'postpones' direct engagement of the abstract mechanical intelligences, it would appear to allow more time for the somatic, emotional, and symbolic ones to become engaged. It is evident that making distinctions about categories of knowing and knowledge, as well as contextings for who 'studies' them when and how, is characteristic of human culture and society. What varies between societies is how categories are configured and what values are attached to them in some hierarchy of importance. In archaic societies there appears a fairly mutual emphasis on learning about pragmatic concerns with instrumental function, such as procuring and preparing food, and knowing those activities through conceptual, spiritual, mythic, and psychological modes of interpretation and understanding. Such a conjunction of 'understandings' of even the most practical of activities suggests an attempt to involve a broad spectrum of sense abilities or intelligences in engaging them.

Formalities of education in more modernist societies tend to be situated in their own separate context where teaching is conducted by narrowly specialized instructors otherwise unknown and unrelated to their students. Furthermore, modernist schooling is often ostensibly secularized so as to deny any spiritual, mythical, or religious role for study. Schooling is even asserted as a 'socially neutral' and apolitical—as if it's inherently indoctrinational role could actually avoid inculcating social and political ideas and values. Some immediately obvious distinctions about educational context in archaic cultures then are that teaching and learning are embedded in both pragmatic and mythical contexts, as well as conducted by familiar adults who have usually have obligatory relations bonds with those learning. This also means that the 'teachers' tend to be familiar with the individuality of the 'students' and are able to confer with each other about the long-term development of their sense abilities and character. In addition, there would appear to be more relationship between parents and 'teachers' in the archaic communality. And lastly, the socially embedded contexting of 'schooling,' informal as it is, suggests at least implicit acceptance that teaching and learning are inherently structured by social and political values.

Cultural Narratives and the Archaic 'Why' for Learning: Mythical Meaning and Motive for Being and Doing

A perennial question for human consciousness seems to be 'why are we here?' One general response is 'to live a good life.' What a 'good life' is has rather divergent cultural definitions, however. What makes life 'good' or meaningful depends upon how it is contexted in particular cultural imaginations. Every culture maintains over-arching 'narratives of meaning' that figure the larger background for meaning in social structures and the lives of individuals. The narratives of the Christian Bible have been central references for social and personal life in Western societies over many centuries. The significance of such fundamental narrations of meaning, or meta-narratives, was foundational in archaic societies. That is, such narratives were openly regarded

and revered as expressing the 'origin of everything.' As such these narratives are extra-ordinary, super natural, or mythical because they assert the creation of the time of the present from some other 'time' out of which the functions and purposes of present time emerged. In the broadest sense such narratives provide an understanding of 'thy things are the way they are' and also 'what humans are here to do.' Human motive for learning to become a member of one's culture and society were thereby given a collectively shared impetus.

Motivation of students to involve their intelligences in learning in contemporary educational contexts often appears as a difficult challenge for educators. It may be worth noting then that learning contexts in archaic or traditional societies not only 'take place' in 'real life' context but tend to involve overt references to the over-arching cultural narratives of meaning. Even the most practical endeavors in such societies tend to be understood in association to all-embracing cultural values and stories rather than abstracted functions, personal interests and appetites. Learning to farm or hunt tends not to be approached simply to 'put food on the table' but as part of the purposes of human relation to nature and the cosmos. Humans are assured by such narratives that they were meant to be and do as their culture does. Thus most aspects of social structure and activity that one must learn 'about' or 'to do' is given meaning by potent, traditionally venerated images and stories that assert the importance of what is being learned relative to cultural identity and the cosmos. Such contexting would seem to provide more impetus or motive for leaning then might the bare needs of material survival and social acceptability alone. An archaic person appears to have been assured that he or she was learning not just for the sake of conformity or to survive in competition with others, but to fulfill a meaningful purpose in the larger world. In pluralistic modernist societies where education tends to be posed as secular and the scientific cosmological perspective it offers is restricted to positing an unintentional, perhaps random creation, the context for motivated learning will obviously be quite different. Is it impossible for such a cultural view to provide the sort of purposeful narratives background for life that archaic culture did?

Mythologists Joseph Campbell's vast considerations of world myth, or the meta-narratives cultures tell to assert a larger-than-societal context of meaning, led him to propose several "functions" of such 'tellings.' He identifies a mystical function in which myth introduces the individual to the "mystical" dimension of being, "to awaken and maintain in the individual a sense of wonder and participation in the mystery of this finally inscrutable universe" (Campbell, Atlas of Myth Vol. 1. 8). Next he identifies a "cosmological" function that seeks to imbue the cosmos itself with such 'mystical participation' and significance. Thirdly, he describes how a cultural mythology serves to infuse the local social and moral order with the mythical potencies of a 'mystically experienced' cosmos. Lastly Campbell discerns a "pedagogical" function that conducts individuals in social harmony through the successive passages of human life with mythically contexted rites, roles, and customs.

These "functions of myth" in narrating meaningful relations between persons, society, and the world have contrasting, even contradictory 'objectives' in serving both the interests of the collective society and the independence of the individual. As traditional mythic narratives tend to assert the socio-cultural imagination of

collective life as being inclusive of individual life, they also pose a submission of human culture to some cosmological 'more-than-human' totality. In this manner the significance of society is affirmed in its derivation from and dependence upon the powers of the cosmos. Yet these narratings of meaning also tend to assert that each person has an individual relationship with the forces of that cosmos, thereby affirming a meaning to personal life independent of social status. The persons is led then both 'into society' and individually 'toward the mystery of the cosmos.' Campbell states that "mythology and the rites through which its imagery is rendered open the mind, that is to say, not only to the social order but also to the mystery dimension of being." Here he indicates that archaic myth and rite serve to illustrate specific local "social order" but also have, as he calls it, a more universal "psychological function" that brings personal human consciousness into relation with the pluralistic complexity of psyche and totalistic being. Thus the mythical perspective on both 'local' and 'cosmological' contexting for human existence serves to generate an *inclusive* field for the divergent aspects of being to which it seeks to give meaning. It validates the often conflicting aspects of individual and collective life within a larger field of relationship to existence. One could say then that a 'mythical perspective' is only at odds with a scientific one when the latter seeks to assert a supreme claim to defining reality and meaning. When the exclusively materialistic causality of scientific reason is the only valid reference for narrating a sense of meaning for life in society and the cosmos, then the inclusive embrace of mythical meaning and the personal motive it can supply are invalidated.

This observation suggests that in modernity the cultural narratives offered to people about why they should make an effort to learn about and understand self, other, and world are potentially inadequate to the psychological needs of individuals seeking motive to do so. In reference to this aspect of archaic culture, it might be that education in contemporary society are frustrated by lack of emphasis on an overarching narrative of purpose that articulates relationships between personal, collective, and cosmological purpose (The Ends of Education, Neil Postman).

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Chapter 4

On The Way(s) to Learning Modernity:
Preludes to Modernist Self Configuration, Social Structure, and Intellectual Method in the Contest between Reason and Idealism

The objective of discussing how best to orient contemporary educational efforts to schooling selfhood in ways appropriate to egalitarian social pluralism is approached here through some historical perspective on how notions of selfhood and intellectual understanding have evolved in Western contexts. This chapter asserts a crucial origin for Western style self-identity and intellectual method in the ancient Greek emphasis upon rationalism. The brief overview of the role of this emphasis on intellectual method and its effects upon cultural values is considered essential to understanding the contemporary contexts for educating and schooling selfhood. Appreciating the challenges of educating in the radically secular, pluralistic societies of modernity, with their materialistic sciences and primary emphasis upon individuality, requires understanding the purposes to which reason has been applied and the productively creative competition for asserting 'final truth' that has resulted. The preceding chapter suggested an archaic cultural 'motive for learning' that stressed relation to traditionally designated collective and cosmological mythic references—those over-arching 'whys' for human being and doing. Those 'hidden forces behind the ordinary appearances' of the world that gave meaning and purpose to life in archaic perspective become rationally interpreted empirical phenomenon in scientific modernism. Thus a shift toward modernist emphasis upon rationalism and individualism poses significantly different concerns for what motivates learning and thus the 'how' of educating. Instead of primarily promoting personal association with traditional beliefs that constitutes social cohesion, there is an increased emphasis upon personal autonomy and choice. The 'why' for educating now must address promoting a personal autonomy capable of rationally questioning the very basis for socio-cultural indoctrinations of selfhood. The 'how' of education thereby becomes involved in concerns with intellectual abstraction in a way that the archaic modality was not. That emphasis upon rational capacities to analyze and choose in accordance with personal intelligence and conscience will be shown to necessitate a more pronounced degree of abstract formalization to schooling. However, there remains the persistent and also necessary impetus to assert unifying cultural values and socialized standards that have an idealized quality.

Thus 'the way to learning in the modern way' is considered here in specific reference to the interplay between the application of non-contradictory, self-consistent reasoning and the assertion of an ideal or absolute status of truth and reality. The perspective taken, in short, is that reason or rational analysis, as a mode of making differentiations, is not inherently idealistic or ultimately conclusive. However, in the history of Western intellectual 'tradition' it has tended to be applied in a reflexively reductive manner for the purposes of validating idealistically reductive, singular, and absolute status for truth and reality. An overview of some salient aspects of the origin and development of this tension between intellectual method and idealistic purpose is thus essential to considering how better to orient contemporary educational efforts around this potent underlying dynamic in

modernist attitudes. The issues and their relations cited below could readily be expanded upon but are presented in outline form for the sake of succinct presentation of this thesis.

Differentiations of Individual Autonomy from Collective Continuity:
From Traditional to Rational Identity in the Egalitarian Shift toward Modernity

How 'a' person, and particularly a personal individuality, is differentiated from the social collective, and with/in the world or cosmos, can vary significantly. As noted, in the intimate communality of archaic cultural context, persons do not appear to be overtly differentiated as 'separate units of society' in the overt way contemporary social structures tend to identify them. Rather, persons in traditional cultures appear more intimately identified with/in family, clan, and moiety units of the collective. The emphasis on 'the person' as elemental unit of social collectives, and particularly upon the individual autonomy of all persons, is a prominent and distinguishing trait of Western societies. How and why that emphasis came to be central to Western cultural values and social structures is then necessarily influential on how selfhood is conceived and educational efforts evolved to condition it. The differentiation of persons as autonomous individuals of relatively equal importance has a particular historical relationship with the ways schooling, teaching, and learning the dominant forms of knowing and knowledge are conceived in contemporary Western societies. It is proposed here that this relation involves an emphasis upon the ability of personal intellect to 'abstract' itself from society and world to perform reflective analysis upon these realms in which the self appears to be embedded. Identifying the person as 'an individual' that is capable of existing 'apart from' the social collective establishes a radical status of the self relative to more traditional cultural contextings for identity.

Understanding the role of emphasizing individuality and autonomous intellect on socio-cultural development requires examining what appears to constitute individual autonomy. It is proposed here that the development of a rationally analytical intellect and sense of personal responsibility for ethical morality generate a basis for such 'individualized self-conscious independence of action.' Thereby motives, actions, and consequences can be more overtly examined in contrast to societal standards and traditional beliefs. It is further asserted that the distinctions about self, others, and world necessary for this autonomy contribute to an inherently 'anti-social' or non-conformist aspect of independent personal thought and action. Privileging personal individuality of consciousness and conscience as the locus for making distinctions about reality and morality tends to set the person-as-individual in conflict with the society as arbiter of truth and propriety. Socio-cultural cohesion as maintained in the

continuity of traditional belief and practice thus comes into competition with the assertions of autonomous individualized intellects and consciences. Finally, any impulse to derive identity from such individualized autonomy shifts both the capacity and responsibility for 'knowing the hidden forces' of self, other, and world away from collective mentality or specified social authority and toward the individual person.

Through emphasizing autonomous rational intellect persons become 'empowered' to self-consciously challenge the ways of knowing and forms of knowledge dominant in the very culture and social structures that have originally identified them. Such a 'move' is intrinsically a 'redefinition of self' in so far as selfhood is socio-culturally defined, except in so far as cultural values affirm a role for such autonomy. Such assertion of selfhood acquires an enhanced quality of competition with social standards as well as with other similarly autonomous intellects. An individually asserted radical skepticism about the valid basis for asserting the real, the right, the true, and the good is activated, resulting in a potential increased transference of authority from the collective to the individual. Clearly these are aspects of social dynamics the can contribute to an egalitarian social order. Personal perspective, thusly 'alienated' from reflexive acceptance of social conformity by asserting its intellectual and moral autonomy, also risks 'self-alienation' from its pre-existing socially identified status of self. Such an enhanced quality of alienation is here associated with the general mentality of modernity. Thus some speculation on how 'we' got 'here,' in this context of alienating individualized autonomous self-hood, from some ancient 'then and there' of more collectively identified selfhood is relevant to understanding the impulses behind present educational motives and practices. In summary, this shift can characterized as a move from self-identity composed predominantly within traditionally defined references for collective identity (mythical, religious, political) toward an emphasis upon rationally composed assertion of self-identity by both society and increasingly autonomous persons.

Acknowledgment needs be made again that these references to historical influences on the development of individualist values and educational efforts in Western cultures are not intended as 'the history of identity and schooling.' The intention behind this brief and recklessly simplistic survey is to track some seemingly significant yet neglected themes. If this effort proves accurate, then it might stimulate closer associations of these themes with a reassessment of motives for and contextings of contemporary educational efforts. In addition, the method used here to trace some heritage of intellectual and social concepts related to individualizing education is not focused on a progressively linear historical sequence. These themes emerged, merged, mutated, regressed, reemerged in complex and rather chaotic ways in diverse, and often contemporaneously concurrent contexts. Their 'history'

does not present as a singular narrative of 'reasonably consistent progress.' Thus the conceptual emphasis of this tracking of intellectual style and its relation to individualism is not presented with extensive historical specifics or attempts at precise chronology. The concepts and their historical contexts referenced here are elaborated in many scholarly works, each of which examines historical developments from the perspective of particular criteria. A selection of such references is provided in the bibliography.

In order to substantiate these claims about a shift toward rationally composed identity and its effects on educating selfhood, an important distinction must be considered about how knowing and knowledge have been asserted.

A Contrast between Knowing and Knowledge in Western History:
Between Faith in Idealized Truth and in Reason

The ensuing historical references for concerns in contemporary education require qualification. Attempts to specify historical periods as having some defining character are necessarily reductive of their complexity. The use here of the terms 'archaic' and 'traditionalist' to designate a general cultural and social modality is only vaguely historical. It is meant to suggest that, prior to development of certain 'civilized' social structures, all cultures were essentially archaic and traditionalist. References to 'ancient Greece' are somewhat more distinct, here indicating the "Classical" period of Greek culture around the fourth and fifth centuries before the "Common Era." It is the span of time from that context to the present that is here referenced as Western history. Terms such as Medieval, Reformation, Renaissance, and Enlightenment, used as characterizing designations of European historical periods, are ranked in a historically sequence. But specific dates for these supposed ears, as well as assertions of what characterizes social, political, and intellectual events during them, vary considerably. When inquiring into what is meant by 'modernism' one encounters similarly varied emphasis. In general, the many characterizations of 'the modern' in historical analysis from economic, literary, sociological, and scientific theories consistently indicate radical departures from previously long accepted knowledge, beliefs, and social structures. To describe that shift summarily one could describe it as 'the end of traditionalism.' Modernity is thusly associated with remarkable disruption of historical precedents for personal identity and social order.

In one very general sense then, 'modernist tendencies' can be regarded as iconoclastic. Thusly figured, modernism is an impulse that becomes a sort of anti-traditionalist tradition—it 'breaks the

icons' of established belief and authority, religious and secular. It might be said to begin in a rebellion to the confining effect of traditionally promulgated knowing and knowledge about self and world. Yet this characterization of what is modernist can be seen as having its origins in the radical abstractions of that ancient Greek philosophy whose rationalist method of evaluating truth and accuracy inevitably challenges established beliefs. Thus the iconoclasm of modernist attitudes is here associated with the intellectual methodology of Socratic rational analysis. It is for this reason that Western history is here regarded as, for the purposes of the present argument, effectively beginning with aspects of ancient Greek philosophy. However, the emergence of that mode of thought as a defining element of Western cultural identity and social mentality arose only gradually and in relation to many other factors. It can be seen as emerging most overly in the era of the Renaissance. More typically the 'status of modernity' is associated with the broad intellectualization of social and political thought during the Enlightenment. Yet the view taken here is that an essential element of what configures modernist society and identity emerges and evolves from the time of Socrates. 'Delay' in that emergence of this element as central to Western cultural values will be regarded here as a consequence of a contest or confrontation between rationality as way of knowing and a particular cultural attachment to a singular, all-uniting status of knowledge.

The analytically rational, skeptically hypothetical method of intellectual knowing is thus posed in contrast to a tendency to understand the world in reference to ideal and absolute states of perfection and monistic, unitary hierarchies. The concept of this contrast as historical conflict is posed by some as a conflict between reason and faith, or science and religion, and as a 'choice' between Athens (hypothetical rationalism) and Jerusalem (certain religious faith in the unifying existence and meaning of God). But it is asserted here that the underlying dynamic in those historical arguments does not actually derive from a conflict between 'godless' rationalism and irrational faith. Rather, the more distinguishing contrast is asserted to manifest between the incompatibility of hypothetical rational analysis as a means of knowing and the privileging of unchanging, unquestionable states of being or 'Truth' as the primary basis for meaning in the understanding of self, other, and world. In other words, knowing by means of rational analysis is considered here as producing inherently varied formulations of knowledge subject to subsequent further diversification and refinement. The 'truth' of such knowing as knowledge is thus intrinsically varied and hypothetical. Thus this method, so adept at questioning the exclusive and absolute claims of any codified knowledge, is inherently incompatible with singularly dominant or permanent truth claims.

Accordingly, modernism is distinguished in this perspective on Western mentality by an increasing emphasis on the rejection of ideally codified forms of knowing and knowledge in favor of differentiated rational analysis and the 'hypothetical truths' of scientific method. Thereby the 'knowing of the unknown/unseen' becomes a matter of 'reasonable conjecture' and empirical evidence assessed with an inherent skepticism about final truth claims. This increased emphasis upon a rational basis for assertions of valid descriptions of reality did not diminish the emphasis on logical consistency, or rationalistic self-continuity of explanations, however. That linkage of 'reasonable truth' with consistency in linear reasoning indicates the persistent historical preference for a unitary, hierarchically structured order of knowledge. It can also be taken as expressing an enduring dualism opposing the 'true' against the 'false' in a manner that echoes the hierarchical prejudice of religious valuation of good over evil.

It is argued here then, that the hypothetical rational method of knowing that came to particular prominence in modernity remained subordinate to a hierarchically dualistic ordering of meaning that favored one right set of conclusions about reality. Rational analysis came to be used to critique and reject the historical model of hierarchical unity under a divine entity (God) that creates and knows all but is known only by faith, not reason. Yet the mode of figuring knowledge as unitarily consistent (non-self-contradictory), tended to remain dominant in the 'ideal' of rational consistency as the criteria for validity, thus favoring a binary prejudice for consistency and against inconsistency, and, to some degree, simplicity over complexity. 'Faith,' one might say, is thusly transferred from 'the mystery of god' to 'the consistency of reason' as the basis for 'absolute truth.' The term rationalism is here associated with the extreme standard of absolutely self-consistent reasoning as the idealized basis for valid explanation.

Admittedly, this distinction is another 'artifice' for comparative understanding, not an absolute status. The tendency to idealize truth status persisted not only in relation to rational consistency but to whatever concepts or ideas persons wished to 'have faith in.' What had formerly been 'justified' by faith in God's authority (or perhaps cultural tradition) could now be affirmed by asserting a 'rationale.' Thus the concepts of reason, justice, and law are regarded as becoming the 'apostasies of God' in that faith is turned away from the 'truth of God' but toward these human-created categories for similarly absolute truth. That shift tends to transfer the attitude of belief from one notion to another without necessarily relying upon reason. The world-as-ordered-by-God then becomes the world-as-ordered-by-belief-in-reason, if not actual reasoning. Thereby, what is 'felt' to be 'true' tends reflexively to be assumed to be reasonable. Thus assertions that one decides are rational can be held to be true not

because they actually are reasonable but because one 'believes' them to be rational. This attitude constitutes and invoking of Reason as validating one's positions much as one might do the authority of God. Arguments between persons thus readily become competitions to assert the priority of dominant rationales rather than mutual efforts to apply rational analysis to disagreements.

Such shifts toward rational analysis and explanation as the basis for truth while idealizing rationalism are seen as integral to accompanying changes in the social contexts for conception of personal identity, the constitutions of socio-political collectivity, and the formulations of educational efforts. But their significance can only be adequately understood in relation to a persistent preference for idealized monistic unity, with an underlying and all pervading value for hierarchically unified understanding, continuity, predictability, and dualistic certainty.

Modernism can thus be characterized in one respect as a rebellion against traditional but irrational explanations of causality and the religious assertion of 'God's word' or mind as the ultimate authority on 'the truth.' However, that revolt tended to manifest itself in the familiar form of single mindedly seeking the 'absolute truth' through exclusively linear rationalism and scientific literalism. Religious ideals where thus displaced/replaced by ideational concepts 'justified' by idealized 'mono-logical' rationalizations. Both the religious and rationalistically self-consistent sources for truth assert a 'monology' or singular basis for it. The principle distinction to be made between these modes for asserting a 'monology' of truth and reality (idealistic faith/religion versus exclusive rationalistic consistency) is in a sense temporal and directional. The traditionalist religious orthodoxy looks 'backward' historically and, as it were, 'upward' to an 'other world' of divine powers and eternal forms for its authority in asserting order, unity, and meaning. The non-traditionalist method of radically speculative, rationalist enquiry seeks a similar sense of certainty about the real and the true, but by asserting absolute knowledge about the present, tangible here and now, citing empirical evidence and rationalized interpretations. However, it will be argued that, because the method of complexly rational analysis tends inherently to generate contrasting data and diverse interpretive theories, its versions of reality and truth become intrinsically hypothetical, it must in a sense always be looking toward the future for an 'arrival' at conclusive certainty and total understanding—an 'ideal destination' that must, by methodological necessity, remain un-attained.

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Chapter 5
Learning the Modern Way:
Conceptions of and Purposes for Education and Schooling in Modernist, Post-Enlightenment Western Societies

The previous overview of some factors considered relevant to 'modern education' does not include discussion of actual educational theory or schooling practices. There are many books available presenting the theories of historical figures from Plato onward about the whys, whats and hows of educating. Some of those historical perspectives apply more directly to the concerns of educating persons in social collectives composed around values for individuality than do others. But most of those theorists took for granted inequalities in social class, power, and privilege within inherently hierarchical and coercive social orders. Most were not culturally and socially positioned to consider that society could or ought to be constituted around the decisions of individualized persons to submit to collective authority only if their certain personal rights were to be protected. Similarly, rather few of those historical commentators would have been likely to extol a value for all persons of both genders receiving the same rigorous intellectual education throughout the entire society. More significant than what historical theorists have propounded as the 'ought to be' of educational efforts is the record of educational practice. Not until the 19th and 20th centuries were universal, relatively comparable educational effort and schooling directed at entire populations, much less for purposes of promoting a more egalitarian society. Thus both educational theory and schooling practice take on a historically unique context in the 'after math' of Enlightenment thought.

The historical thread being tracked in this writing is not primarily concerned with the 'history of educating and schooling.' Rather, the connections sought here regard how ways of thinking analytically and composing 'self reflecting models' for identity become principle factors in 'educating individuality for egalitarian citizenship.' A sense of 'self-alienating intellectual function' and thus 'complex-self' revealing intellectual methods of analytically reflective rationalism is thus regarded as intrinsic to a cultural preeminence placed on individuality. An inherent conflict between personal and collective interests is seen as being emphasized by the value post-Enlightenment Western cultures place upon personal individuality and its rights of expression. Once personal liberties were 'enshrined' in the institutional systems and legalities of nation states issues of who and how to educate, as well as to what purposes, became rather more complicated. 'Learning the modern way' thus became not only schooling persons to fulfill the demands of mechanistic and systematized technological society, but also of how to respect and empower the individualization of persons as self-responsible members of

ethically egalitarian, and increasingly democratic, social orders. Thus the hows, whys and whats of formalized educating and schooling in modernist context appear as both more complicated in their concerns, and more critical to the functioning of societies founded upon egalitarian citizenship yet remaining persistently hierarchical in their stratifications of social, economic, and political life.

Some Historical Moments in the Origins of Universal Compulsory Public Schooling

Enlightenment thought produced various assertions of the "rights of man" involving concerns for personal liberty and more egalitarian social contexts than European societies had previously manifested. These ideas proved influential in producing concerns for a more generally available formal education of citizenry—a 'public' education. A few more historical references are offered to bring this selective skeletal overview about the themes of autonomous individuality and rationalizing intellect in educational efforts up to contemporary times. Again, the associations made here have historical context, but are not posed in a strict chronology, as they do not make a neatly progressive causality for the development of modernist educational theory and practice. The factors noted and the various relations between them are much to complicated to 'align' in any simple manner. Thus the understanding being attempted in this listing requires a 'constellation' of the many aspects presented.

Nationalist Policies and Centralized Standardization of Schooling

With the consolidation of institutional nationalistic collective identities (nation states) in Europe during the 17th and 18th Centuries, systematic government direction and control of schooling began to emerge. The French Revolution brought significant changes to educational efforts, particularly a disruption of Church involvement. Education there took an abrupt, if short lived, turn toward emphasizing citizenship in a republic as equal members of society. Prussian nationalism took a strong interest in controlling educational efforts and schooling, particularly after Napoleon's defeat of German armies. Standardized teaching methods and curriculum, along with uniform testing, became institutionalized in Prussian schools. The concept of nationalistic schooling developed there was overtly directed at repressing individualistic interests and expression in favor of indoctrinating persons into service of the state. The nationalist state was regarded as providing a strong identity and purpose to its citizens and thus their being trained to obey and serve its interests was deemed an appropriate social policy for personal development—one worthy of institutionalization and legal enforcement. In varying degrees of centralized direction, control of educational efforts and schooling passed from

local, religious, and private administration to that of the state in European nations. In one sense the result was a more consistent schooling of their populations, but not one that tended to challenge existing hierarchical social structures in the radical terms of some Enlightenment social theory. The emergent nation states of later modernity tended to derive legitimacy from references to the importance of persons as citizens but also typically retained class stratified hierarchies of power that conflicted with such egalitarian values. Emerging concepts of 'public education' thus were readily adapted to manipulation of public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.

Democratic Sentiments and the Common School Movement in the United States

Educational endeavor and schooling were a varied affair in the American colonies before and after the establishment of independence from the monarchical British Empire. Yet there was much general emphasis on the importance of learning for development of moral character, civic responsibility, and personal advancement in socio-economic life. Such 'advancement' was often seen to require both intellectual development as well as technical abilities in craft, trade, and professional fields. Jefferson himself promoted a concept of graduated, state sponsored schooling while governor of Virginia. Concern for developing informed citizens contributed to an early national policy of dedicating land grants to the support of schools, particularly in rural and frontier localities where urban economies did not exist to provide funds. States issued authority for local taxation to be dedicated to the financing of schools. Initial resistance among the extremely independent minded rural populations to taxation for schooling gave way to the idea that educational effort could enhance personal liberty. Locally organized schools became a point of pride administered by local citizens, not governmental agencies. Even in remote areas students might study Greek and Latin texts and learn mathematics for the sake of their personal advancement in society.

By mid-19th century such efforts contributed to what is termed the Common School Movement. Educational effort in America thus came to be directed at all children, regardless of social or economic background, with the intention of eliciting socially responsible moral behavior and capacity to participate in both the economic and political life of the democracy. In keeping with the egalitarian values of American society, it was determined that no cost should assessed to the student—indicating that an education and schooling of personal intelligences was a common right to all citizens. This constitution of schooling was as revolutionary, compared to other historical models for educating, as the forms of government instituted in the American constitution were to its European predecessors. In addition, the educational efforts shaping that schooling tended to be focused on literate intellectual

development that included many references to the ancient Greek thought on rationalism and democratic governance dear to the framers of American nationalism. The capacity for self-expression in writing among even rurally educated persons from that time is often impressively sophisticated (testified to in letters and other documents).

Thus this initial phase of government-supported educational effort in American society was, in keeping with democratic, libertarian nationalist identity, focused on schooling for ethical individuality and productive citizenship in an entrepreneurial economy. Capacity for assertion of individual intelligence and effort were primary goals. It is significant to note that federal governance in the United States was still primarily concerned with broad national policies and as yet not institutionally dominant over State authority or local life. The contrast to the Prussian motives behind centralized schooling is obvious. Formal education in the United States took manifested a government supported but non-institutional schooling intended to enhance the capacity of persons to compete individualistically in a society generally suspicious of hierarchical order and traditional authority. It tended to increase the 'lateral' associations of individual persons in society by fostering a commonality of cultural references and capacity for expression rather than 'training in' a 'vertical' order of 'command and performance'.

As to the effectiveness of such educational effort, one can only note the extraordinary vitality of American social, political, and economic life during the decades after independence. Whatever methods of instruction and topics of curriculum were used in those locally administered schools was evidently adequate to the growth and survival of the historical anomaly of American democratic pluralism. That is not to say that those educational efforts forged a national identity capable of avoiding the cataclysm of civil war, though nether did a sense of unity for the sake of diversity perish in that conflict.

State Centralization and Compulsory Schooling in the United States on the Prussian Model

Despite aspects of democratic political structure and egalitarian legality, American society was not heterogeneous at the creation of its national self-identity. One primary antagonism developed between urban and rural economies and their related interests. The Whiskey Rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania exemplifies this contrast and demonstrated that maintaining a national unity among such independent minded folk would require shows of federal force. Yet despite some diversity of urban and rural, religious and ethnic, economic and regional perspectives, American social identity can be said to have constituted more commonality of purpose in the post-revolutionary decades (excluding the

category of a non-citizen slave class), than in subsequent periods of national history prior to the late Twentieth Century. The influx of poor European immigrants beginning in the 1830s, the effects of industrialization in creating laboring classes dependent on wages, and the economic disparities accompanying growth of corporate capitalism particularly after the Civil War, charged American society with class distinctions more typical of European national societies. Andrew Jackson's tumultuous populist presidency was an episode in the growing antagonism derived from such diverging interests.

Anxiety among dominant economic and social classes in America about the possible conduct and influence of less empowered classes converged with idealistic notions about creating a 'perfect society.' An emphatic suspicion of social hierarchy and government coercion gave a dangerous edginess to early American liberty that was predictably threatening to both those interested in nation building and those intent upon accumulating or maintaining wealth and power. The reasonable concern for how to forge a national identity capable of enduring both internal divisions and external invasions thus became allied to the concerns of dominant economic and political interests. The creation of compulsory universal schooling has clear origins in the alliance of those interests.

Beginning in the 1840s in Massachusetts, the drive for establishing compulsory public schooling, rather than the optional format commonly offered, gained its first legal and institutional status. There was so much resistance to this movement that it took over 60 years before every state in the union instituted it as law. Significantly, the model for this state-run schooling was that of Prussian state sponsored schools. The concept of educational effort as a schooling intended to create obedient members of nationalistic culture under the auspices of institutional government agencies thus became legally sanctioned and progressively promoted. From Horace Mann onward in the lineage of 'compulsory government school educators' there is much overt rhetoric about the remaking of American society in a more perfect or idealized status of national identity and social uniformity. Beginning with the Massachusetts model, the state, through government run schooling and related 'social service' agencies, increasingly inserted itself into the affairs of families and communities in the interests of such 'social engineering.' Though more recent history highlights such government intervention in the service of personal liberty by opposing racial segregation, there is much more to the story of how compulsory public schooling became an institutional agency of social policy.

Compulsory institutionalized government schooling, with increasingly standardized teaching methods, materials, and curriculum, eventually completely replaced the non-compulsory educational approach of the so-called American Common Schools. The process took many years and involved

bitter struggles. Both members of established dominant classes and immigrant communities opposed it at times. The ultimate success of the proponents of standardized compulsory schooling depended upon the powerful and persistent prosecution of the cause by a rather small number of exceedingly wealthy capitalists who overtly sought to shape education for the benefit of their economic status.

Reassertion of Social Hierarchy in Late Nineteenth Century Private Schooling

Educational efforts among the economically and socially elite classes took a distinctly private turn toward the latter decades of the Nineteenth Century. Many well known private college preparatory schools and elite universities were founded then, intended to serve the children of already prominent and powerful families, promoting their class unity and roles in business and political leadership. While there had been a variety of 'private academies' prior to and after the American Revolution, there is something different in their establishment specifically for the privileged and powerful. This development occurred even as the campaign for universal compulsory public education was moving toward its ultimate inclusion of all children—thus excepting from that regime only the more elite classes. This 'special' form and context of educational effort and schooling was to become influential in national affairs throughout the 20th century. Significantly, many who became 'architects' of compulsory public schooling were themselves schooled in this private, elitist context.

Corporate Values, Economic Culture, and the Systematization of Schooling

The history of the campaign for compulsory public schooling shows the direct involvement of some of the wealthiest businessmen of the era, acting through organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation. The corporate businessman's interest in public education, logically enough, proved to be more aligned with creating a docile workforce and product-consuming populace than in promoting autonomous individual intellect and character. There was much concern among the scions of large corporations with what was termed "over production" around the turn of the 20th century. From the point of view of monopoly capitalism, entrepreneurial small American industry was too productive, tending to flood markets and create market instability and economic crises. There were too many manufacturers and too few consumers to suit the interests of those seeking to guide and dominate the economy. In a word, there was too much competition to suit the interests of corporate monopoly.

Yet the enthusiasm generated for systematized, institutional schooling in the early part of the 20th Century has a broad base in a general public infatuation with industrial and economic progress. Business and the role of personal consumption were becoming central social ideals. Collective identity

could be said to be shifting from a nationalist basis toward that of systemic processes and consumptive economy. Notions of 'citizen-as-political-agent' or 'citizen-as-economic-competitor' were shifting toward 'citizen-as-consumer' or 'agent-of-appetite-satisfaction.' In that milieu, with the impetus of enormous funding from large corporate interests, a philosophy of systematic pedagogy aimed at reforming American society through the medium of compulsory schooling developed. Quotations from the likes of Dewey extolling the role of public schooling in developing individual capacities and egalitarian ethics are prominent in adulatory histories of that development. Seldom cited are many other statements by him and other architects of centralized institutional schooling that profess intentions to produce a more homogeneous and conformist society. Statements that baldly assert the intention to interpose school between children and parents for the purpose of 'improving society.'

The Complete Institutionalization of Compulsory Public Schooling

By the end of the first quarter of the 20th Century, the last vestiges of the non-institutionalized beginnings of the American Common School, with its typically unsystematic teaching style and non-coercive participation, had been displaced. The dominant schooling was by then more centralized, compartmentalized, systematized, and occurred in vastly larger schools and administrative districts. In subsequent decades, local school districts were progressively consolidated so that their numbers diminished markedly. While the numbers of students enrolled increased dramatically over the same period the number of citizens actually sitting on school boards shrank dramatically. The involvement of 'ordinary citizens' in educational efforts and schooling policy was diminished while its design and control by professionals became virtually complete. By the end of the century some estimated that more persons were employed in schooling who were non-teachers (administrators, counselors, analysts, legal staff, etc.). And adding to the institutional inertia of schooling was the fact of its shear economic impact. The billions of dollars spent on schooling created intricate, complex, and politically powerful interests. The 'public' administration of 'public schooling' had become a thoroughly institutionalized and professionalized system.

Schooling indeed became what its 'engineers' intended—a substitute 'family' and 'parent' indoctrinating young people into values and capacities deemed proper to a unified, if not homogenized, democratic state. It's propagandistic function, if little admitted or recognized, was to attune personal capacity and performance to the socio-economic standards of 'national identity' as a 'united free people.' Inherently that meant accommodating their expectations to the social and economic opportunities available in the society as presently organized. But it had thusly also become some

things its originators did not likely intend. It was a modern 'systematic creature,' an entity, like all 'behemoths of institutionalization,' reflexively concerned as much or more with its own preservation and promotion than any other values. A context in which the motives and efforts of individuals or even groups are likely to have little effect unless they are conscious of its inherent, or 'institutional,' resistance to change. This view of institutionalized schooling might explain more about its persistent character in spite of perennial efforts at 'reform' than any other explanation. As an 'official' extension of institutional state power, compulsory schooling cannot but assert the preeminence of social unity in service to the state. A tendency to actually suppress cultural pluralism and autonomous individuation are inherent in such an institutional identity. These implicit traits combined with the philosophy of 'social engineering' intrinsic to the conception and design of modern schooling combine to generate potent, if insidious, intentionality in its operations.

Most strikingly, a primary consequence of such schooling was the 'institutionalization of childhood and youth.' Where children had once 'learned in society' and youth had been involved in 'practically productive labor,' the effect of compulsory public schooling was to confine their social relations, intellectual development, and productive efforts to the abstracted context of institutionalized schooling.

Reaction Against Institutionalized Public Education in Reform Movements, Alternative Private Schools, and the Home Schooling Movement

Compulsory attendance of children in publicly funded, institutionally managed schools approached its apex by the 1960s. Yet that decade also witnessed the most intense and contentious efforts at 'reforming' schooling yet to appear. Much dissatisfaction with the effects or 'performance' of public schooling was expressed, along with a diversity of radically different proposals for educational practice. Many such proposals were engaged as 'experiments in alternative education' over the next decade. These 'experiments' or related attempts at 're-forming' schooling had little impact on its general formulations, however.

Over 90% of children in the United States are said to have completed grade school, and nearly as many high school, by the 1980s. But even as this nearly total inclusion of children in institutional public schooling came to pass, resistance on the part of parents spawned a new wave of private schooling and then non-formalized home schooling. Reactions against official public schooling included concerns not only about unsatisfactory academic performance but a diminishing of emphasis on individuality, secularized denigration of overt spirituality, increased levels of violence and

disciplinary impotence, inefficient uses of resources, and a perceived failure to develop maturity and respect among students for others. By the end of the 20th Century home schooling had come to include a considerable percentage of children nationwide involved in a wide diversity of non-institutional learning programs. The challenges of this phenomenon to institutional public schooling involve the reportedly higher-than-average academic as well as 'socialized' performances of these students on standardized tests and in university study. The appropriateness of institutional schooling, at least as constituted, has also come under scrutiny for the rising numbers of grade school children being placed on psychoactive pharmaceuticals (Ritalin) for attitude management, increasing drop-out rates in high schools and declining test scores.

All in all, the impetuous success of the concept of compulsory public schooling has been under almost constant criticism from both conservative and liberal social perspectives for the last thirty years.

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